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ABSTRACT
THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF DETERMINISM AND
MORAL OBLIGATION
FEBRUARY 1998
NEIL SCHAEFER, B.S., SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY
B A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker
From an mdeterminisT s perspective, I support and defend the following
argument for deontic incompatibilism: ( 1 ) If determinism is true, then no one
ever can do otherwise than he does. (2) If no one ever can do otherwise than
he does, then nothing anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory. (3)
Therefore, if determinism is true, then nothing anyone does is ever right,
wrong, or obligatory.
The sense of ‘can' I use in this argument is what I call “the power-‘can’
ol ordinary language.” The power-‘can' has two (implicit or explicit) time
indexes; one applies to the power itself, the other to the relevant doing. (In
ordinary language these indexes usually are not explicit.) I argue that the
power-‘can’ is a sense of ‘can’ with which the “ought implies can” principle
holds true.
vi
I review and respond to various accounts of "can proposed by
compatibilists Bruce Aune, Keith Lehrer, David Lewis, G. E. Moore and
others. Elsewhere I discuss writings by Peter van Inwagen and J. L. Austin.
To support ( 1 ), I utilize, argue for, and show the advantages of the
Temporal Physical Possibility Requirements: If an agent, S, can at time T
do A (not do A) at time T\ then S ’ s doing A (not doing A) at T' is jointly
possible with the conjunction of the state of the world at T and the laws of
nature. When arguing for these requirements, I focus on how most people use
the power- can and how they would use it in various situations. I present and
respond to objections to my arguments. Most of the objections are based on
certain strong forms of contextualism.
I argue for (2) and defend my premises against various objections. One
objection is based on a form of utilitarianism advocated by Fred Feldman.
Other objections are based on an example by Harry Frankfurt concerning
moral responsibility.
Two arguments against (3) are presented and I respond. They are
developed from a suggestion by John Martin Fischer that people would
continue making deontic claims if a consortium of scientists were to find
vii
strong evidence of determinism.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1
. 1 The Case of Gerald
Once in a while, Gerald, for no apparent reason, is overcome by a
desire to punch anyone near him. He then does so. Not even Gerald
understands why he does this. He has gone for counseling about his problem,
but to no avail. In other respects Gerald seems normal. He has a steady job
and has several close friends. People generally find him to be a pleasant
person. However, the several people whom he has attacked certainly don’t
find this. Horace had several ribs broken by one of Gerald’s punches. Horace
is pressing criminal charges, and the case is before a court.
Gerald’s lawyer calls an expert witness to the stand. The witness is a
famous scientist named Maria. She testifies that extensive monitoring and
testing of Gerald have shown that each of Gerald’s punches, including the one
in question, is the consequence of certain laws of nature and other conditions
present before Gerald’s birth, including a prominent genetic defect discovered
in Gerald. She claims that Gerald never had any control over these antecedent
conditions or these laws of nature. She says that only violent people have this
genetic defect. She explains in extensive detail how each of his punches is
entailed by certain laws of nature and other conditions present before Gerald’s
birth, including the genetic defect. She provides extensive evidence of those
antecedent conditions and those laws of nature.
Supposing Maria speaks the truth, this case raises the following
metaphysical and ethical questions: Could Gerald have done otherwise than
punch those people 9 Were any of those punches (morally) wrong?
1
Is Gerald
morally responsible for those punches?
Determinism is the thesis that, given the state of the world at any
instant and the laws of nature, there is at most one possible past and future
from that instants If determinism is true, then a key feature of Gerald's
punches can be attributed to everything anyone does: Just as each of Gerald’s
punches is entailed by some laws of nature together with some other
apparently uncontrollable conditions present before birth, the same holds true
of everything anyone does if determinism is true. However, with determinism.
1 Whenever I use any of the terms ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘obligatory’, or their
cognates, I intend the qualifier 'morally’ or 'moral’ to be implicit if it is not
explicit.
2 When I use any of the terms ‘necessary’, ‘possible’, or their cognates
without qualification, I am usually expressing a “broadly logical” modality. (I
am not counting ‘can’ as a cognate of ‘possible’.) I assume Plantinga’s (1974,
1-2) account of broadly logical modalities. For example, the proposition that
red is a color is necessary in the broadly logical sense even though there is no
set of purely logical rules that alone makes it true.
In the above definition of determinism I say 'at most’ instead of
'exactly’ in order to leave open the possibility of there being a first or last
instant. This definition is meant to be equivalent to Peter van Inwagen’s
(1983, 65) more formal definition of determinism, which I will discuss in
Section 1.3.
2
ull the laws of nature are included, and the conditions are comprised of the
whole state of the world at an instant. The state of the world can even be one
that obtained millions of years before people ever existed, and such a state of
the world seems to be out of the control of any person. Maria's inferences are
based on less extensive information. It is possible for Maria’s inferences to be
sound and determinism to be false. And the truth of determinism, of course,
does not ensure that Maria’s inferences are sound.
Given the earlier analogy between Gerald’s punches and all doings in a
deterministic world,
3
it seems appropriate to ask the following questions: (i)
Can anyone ever do otherwise than she does if determinism is true9 (ii) Can
anyone do anything that is right, wrong, or obligatory if determinism is true?
(iii) Is anyone morally responsible for anything she does if determinism is
true? These three questions are related in many important ways. In particular,
I believe an answer to the first question would help in answering the other
two. Many have argued about the first and third questions. Much less attention
has been given to the second question. Yet the second question is surely more
important to ethical theory than the third. For the deontic concepts of
rightness, wrongness, and obligatoriness are more basic to ethical theory than
the concept of moral responsibility. Also, they are less difficult to grasp.
3
1 refer to possible worlds in which determinism is true as
“deterministic worlds.”
3
These considerations partially motivate my choice to focus on the second
question rather than the third. While doing so, I will not assume any specific
comprehensive ethical theory.
1 2 The Main Argument and an Overview of This Essay
In this essay I support and defend the following argument for what I
call deontic incompatibilism. The sense of "can I use in this argument is
what 1 call '"the power-‘can’ of ordinary language” or simply ‘"the
power-"can\” 4 In Section 2.2 I first discuss this sense of "can’ and argue that
it is a sense of "can’ with which the “ought implies can” principle holds true.
In the following argument, (Al), (A2), and (A3) are meant to be necessary
propositions.
4
1 believe there are numerous senses of ‘can’. Aune ( 1 967) and Taylor
(1960) briefly describe many of them.
For convenience, I wantonly use the term "ordinary language’ as if it
were equivalent to ‘the English language as it is ordinarily or generally used.'
4
The Main Argument
(A1 ) If determinism is true, then no one ever can do otherwise than
he does. 5
(A2) If no one ever can do otherwise than he does, then nothing
anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory.
(A3) Therefore, if determinism is true, then nothing anyone does is
ever right, wrong, or obligatory. (Deontic incompatibilisnf'
)
In Chapter 2 I briefly review and respond to various accounts of ‘can'
proposed by the compatibilists Bruce Aune, Keith Lehrer, and others. In
Chapters 3 and 4 I argue for (Al), present some objections to my arguments,
and reply to those objections. To make my case, I focus above all on how most
people use the power-‘can' and how they would use it in various situations.
The main objections are based on certain strong forms of contextualism
regarding can-claims. (A can-claim is a claim in which the word ‘can’ or one
of its cognates is used.) In Chapter 5 I argue for (A2) and defend it against
various objections. One objection is based on some counterexamples similar
'Many claim that if determinism is true, then no one ever acts freely.
Many also claim that if no one ever can do otherwise than he does, then no
one ever acts freely. I believe that there is an important sense of the word
‘freely’ with which those claims are true. However, in this essay I do not
argue for or defend this belief.
6 Whenever I use the term ‘deontic’, I intend the qualifier ‘moral’ to be
implicit if it is not explicit. (I do not intend deontic incompatibilism to apply
to legal or etiquettical deontic statuses.)
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to one proposed by Harry Frankfurt to defeat the “Principle of Alternative
Possibilities.” In Chapter 6 I present two arguments against (A3) and I respond
to them.
Since each of Chapters 2 through 6 is fairly dependent on what comes
before it, I suggest reading the chapters sequentially. A chapter summary is at
the end of every chapter except the present one.
Some may think that (A3), i.e., deontic incompatibilism, implies that
everyone in a deterministic world ought to stop making (moral) deontic
claims. That is not the case. Rather, (A3) implies that, in a deterministic
world, it is neither right, wrong, nor obligatory to make deontic claims. Any
claim that someone ought to do something would be false. For the term
‘ought’ would not apply to anything in a deterministic world. Claims such as
"Ford ought to pardon Nixon” would be false not because they assert ‘ought’
where asserting ‘ought not’ would be correct. They would be false in a way
similar to that in which any proposition that an object is red would be false in
a world containing only unextended objects (Broad [1952] 1966, 138).
7 A (moral) deontic claim is a claim in which one of the following
words or their cognates is used: ‘right’, ‘wrong’, or ‘obligatory’; also, the
qualifier ‘moral’ or ‘morally’ must implicitly or explicitly apply to the word
or its cognate.
6
1.3 Determinism
I assume Peter van Inwagen s formal definition of determinism ( 1983,
65). He defines it as the conjunction of the following two claims:
( 1 ) For every instant of time, there is a proposition that expresses
the state of the world at that instant.”
(2) “If P and Q are any propositions that express the state of the
world at some instants, then the conjunction of P with the laws
of nature entails (9.” x
By using the term proposition’ instead of ‘sentence’, van Inwagen
sidesteps a potential problem described by John Earman. Earman (1986, 20)
remarks, “While there may be a non-denumerable infinity of physically
possible states of a system, the standard formal languages contain only a
denumerable number of sentences. Van Inwagen sidesteps this potential
8
In this and other quotations I use my own styles for variables and for
the numbering of propositions.
Some may prefer a forward-looking form of determinism in which van
Inwagen’s definition is modified to include in the antecedent of (2) the
requirement that P obtains before Q. Others may dislike the fact that with van
Inwagen’s definition, determinism is true in every possible world that has only
one state at one instant, regardless of what laws, if any, that world has. If one
finds this to be a problem, the requirement that P obtain before O would
provide one solution because it implicitly requires there to be at least two
instants in a deterministic world. If one wants a solution that preserves the
temporal symmetry of van Inwagen’s definition, one can simply modify the
definition to include in the antecedent of (2) the requirement that P and Q
obtain at non-identical instants.
9
Earman, here, is paraphrasing Montague (1962).
7
problem because the number of propositions is not constrained by the number
of sentences.
Although not mentioned by van Inwagen, instances of P and Q in his
definition of determinism must be time-indexed. Otherwise, the consequent of
(_) might be taken to mean. The conjunction of P obtaining at some
indefinite time with the laws of nature entails that Q obtains at some
indefinite time.
In this essay I also assume van Inwagen’s ( 1983, 59-60) requirements
on the concept of a state of the world at an instant:
(3) ^Our concept of state must be such that, given that the world is
in a certain state at a certain instant, nothing/o//ow.s about its
state at any other instant...
. For example, we must not choose a
concept of state that would allow as a part of a description of
the momentary state of the world, the clause, 'and, at [time] T,
the world is such that someone’s left hand will be raised 10
seconds later than T
(4) “If there is some observable change in the way things are—if a
white cloth becomes blue, a warm liquid cold, or if a man raises
his hand—this change must entail some change in the state of
the world.” 10
10
In this essay each emphasis used in a quotation will be that of the
author of the quotation unless noted otherwise.
(continued...
)
8
Regarding the concept of a law of nature, I assume that laws of nature
are propositions with at least the following features: They are contingent,
they “entail the existence of no particular contingent individual,” and they
“support their counterfactuals” (van Inwagen 1983, 6 & 60). 11 Lastly, I
assume, along with van Inwagen (1983, 6) that “whether a proposition. ..is a
law [of nature] is independent of what scientists or others happen to believe or
happen to have discovered. ..”
In this essay I will not enter into the debate over whether determinism
is true. However, to provide some context for this essay, I should note here
that I am an indetermimst. I also believe that people often can do otherwise
(...continued)
To (3) and (4), van Inwagen adds:
The theory of relativity has the consequence that this notion
—
the state of the world at an instant—has no application to things the
way they are, and is perhaps even incoherent. But there is a
relativistically acceptable concept—the state of things on the surface of
a light-cone—that could be used in its place. This refinement, however,
could be implemented only by tedious and philosophically irrelevant
(in the present context) elaborations of definitions and arguments that
are already rather more elaborate than I like. I shall therefore ignore
relativistic considerations in the sequel, (van Inwagen 1983, 59-60)
I will do the same.
11 To understand the last requirement, suppose that it is a law of nature
that if P happens at time T
,
then Q happens at 7+1. Suppose also that P does
not happen at T. Here is the counterfactual the law must support: If P had
happened at T, then Q would have happened at 7+ 1
.
12 See van Inwagen (1983, 190-204) fora defense of indeterminism.
9
than they do. Further, I believe that many things people do are either right
wrong, or obligatory. My indeterminism has led some friends to ask me, “Why
then should you care about the implications of determinism?” I care for
several reasons. First, I and many other indeterminists harbor some
uncertainty regarding our position. Secondly, even after the ascendance of the
theory of quantum mechanics, there are some die-hard determmists left. 13 I
want to expose them to some of the implications of their view. Thirdly, even
if I were certain of my indeterminism, my philosophical inclinations might
still lead me to the question: “//determinism were true, what implications
would that have for morality*7 ” For the process of deciding the answer to this
question can provide some insights into the meanings of deontic terms and the
word ‘can’. And such insights are of interest to me and others whether or not
determinism is true.
1 .4 Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Deontic Compatibilism.
Deontic Incompatibilism. and Common Sense
I begin with some definitions:
Compatibilism (the loose version): Determinism does not entail that no
one ever can do otherwise than he does.
13
See van Inwagen (1983, 191-202) for some support of the claim that
quantum mechanics implies indeterminism. He also provides references and
commentary on many relevant publications by physicists.
10
Incompatibilism (the loose version): Determinism entails that no one
ever can do otherwise than he does.
Compatibilism (the precise version): There is no sense of ‘can’ with
which: The "ought implies can” principle holds true, and
determinism entails no one ever can do otherwise than he does.
Incompatibilism (the precise version): There is at least one sense of
'can’ with which: The “ought implies can” principle holds true,
and determinism entails no one ever can do otherwise than he
does.
The “ought implies can” principle or OIC: If (agent) 5 ought to do A,
then S can do A u
Although many compatibilists and incompatibilists use the loose
versions, the precise versions do have an important advantage. They explicitly
bring out the connection to ethics that is often at least an undercurrent in the
debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. The precise versions bring
out this connection by making it very clear what sense of ‘can’ is at issue.
14
Throughout this essay the variable ‘A’ ranges over doings rather than
acts. For example, twitching is an instance of doing A, and so is speaking. The
concept of doing subsumes the concept of acting, if these concepts are not
identical.
Another sense of can that is sometimes at issue is the sense with
which the following supposedly holds true:
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): “A person is morally
responsible for what he has done only if he could have done
otherwise.” (Frankfurt [1969] 1988, 1)
Within the precise versions of compatibilism and mcompatibilism,
some may even prefer to replace the reference to OIC with a reference to PAP.
I prefer to not do that for two main reasons. First, I think the concept of moral
obligation is more fundamental to ethical theory than moral responsibility.
Secondly, PAP is less widely accepted and more controversial than OIC. 15
Even Frankfurt ([1983] 1988, 95-96) tries to make his rejection of PAP more
palatable by arguing that it does not require renouncing OIC.
In this essay I will generally be using the terms ‘compatibilism’ and
‘incompatibilism’ to refer to the precise versions. I will note when I intend to
be referring specifically to a loose version.
The “ought implies can” principle listed above is imprecise. I will
discuss the principle further in Section 2.2 and I will present some more
precise versions of it.
1:1
For a survey of the controversy surrounding PAP, I recommend:
Blumenfeld (1971), Fischer and Hoffman (1994), Frankfurt ([1969] 1988),
Haji (1994), Lamb (1993), van Inwagen (1983, 162-82), Widerker (1991 ) and
(1995), and Zimmerman (1993).
12
Peter Unger (1984, 55) states definitions of compatibilism and
incompatibilism that are equivalent to the loose versions above. He goes on to
provide some interesting background to the debate between compatibilists and
incompatibilists:
About half [of philosophers] are incompatibilists, and about half are
compatibilists; at any rate, both sides are heavily represented. ...Some
compatibilists believe determinism to be true, some believe it to be
untrue, and some suspend judgment on the matter. There seems a
roughly equal threefold division here.
...No matter which stance is taken, he [the compatibilist] will
not thereby question the presumed fact, presumed by common sense, of
our considerable freedom and power.
...Almost no incompatibilists believe determinism to be true,
and, what is more, very few even suspend judgment on the matter.
The skepticism of almost all incompatibilist philosophers is,
then, only a very moderate one; they do not depart much from the core
of commonsense thinking. Rather, they only declare dire consequences
to follow from a thesis they actually hold to be false, one whose
implications are taken as merely hypothetical. (Unger 1984, 63)
In the years since Unger published this, Peter van Inwagen’s An Essay on Free
Will (1983) has brought significantly more philosophers into the
incompatibilists’ camp
Hard determinism is the conjunction of determinism and
incompatibilism. I am an incompatibilist but no hard determimst. I believe
that hard determinists, unlike most incompatibilists, do call common sense
into question. For hard determinism entails that there is a sense of "can' with
which: The “ought implies can” principle holds true, and no one ever can do
otherwise than he does. And this suggests, but does not entail, the falsity of a
great many ordinary, commonsense can-claims that a great many people would
13
accept. For most people who think OIC is true also think it is true with some
ordinary sense or senses of can’, not some unordinary or esoteric sense. (I
count myself as one of those people.)
The aforementioned suggestion of false can-claims is especially stronu
for can-claims of the following implicit or explicit form: S could have done
otherwise than A at 7 even though he in fact did A at T. However, hard
determinism does not entail or even suggest the falsity of any can-claims for
which the doing in question actually gets done.
Hard deontic incompatibilism is the conjunction of determinism and
deontic incompatibilism. Hard deontic incompatibilism entails the falsity of
all affirmative deontic claims such as “What he did was wrong” and “What
she did was right.” Moreover, when taken in context, a huge number of such
claims would be accepted by a huge number of people. Hard deontic
incompatibilism also entails the truth of all negative deontic claims such as
“What he did was not wrong” and “What she did was not obligatory.”
However, such claims would be true for reasons that would not match the
reasons most speakers had for making such claims in the first place.
I think these points regarding hard deontic incompatibilism and hard
determinism make these theories rather implausible, but not indefensible. If a
theory entails or suggests the falsity of a huge number of ordinary,
commonsense claims that most people would accept, I am inclined to consider
that a large strike against the theory, but not necessarily a fatal blow. Other
14
considerations might uphold such a theory. For example, there may be enough
countervailing linguistic evidence to suggest that people really do have a
meaning tor a certain word that, unbeknownst to them, results in the falsity of
many claims they make with that word.
I turn now to the deontic compatibilist. She can take any position she
wants on determinism without calling into question the commonsense belief
that some things people do are right, wrong, or obligatory. That is not to say,
however, that deontic compatibilism never conflicts with common sense. In
Chapter 6 I discuss certain cases in which affirmative deontic claims either
are withheld by most people or would be withheld by most people. And such
withholdings in those cases conflict with deontic compatibilism.
In Chapter 4 1 discuss certain linguistic behaviors with respect to the
power- can that most people would have regarding certain examples. And the
fact that most people would have these behaviors conflicts with
compatibilism.
So, one upshot of this essay will be that compatibilism and deontic
compatibilism really do conflict with common sense, even though this is not
obvious at first glance. Moreover, that conflict exists whether or not
determinism is true. In contrast, I believe incompatibilism and deontic
incompatibilism would only conflict with common sense if determinism were
true. And determinism is most probably false.
15
CHAPTER 2
COMPATIBILISM AND VARIOUS ACCOUNTS AND SENSES OF ‘CAN’
2.1 Some Conditional Accounts of ‘Can’
In the present chapter I will briefly review and respond to various
accounts of ‘can’ proposed by compatibilists. (See Section 1.4 for the loose
and precise versions of compatibilism and incompatibilism that I use in this
essay.) I also will discuss the power-‘can’ of ordinary language and contrast it
with the ability-‘can I shall argue that the power-‘can’ is a sense of ‘can’
with which the “ought implies can” principle (OIC) holds true. I also call such
a sense of can’ ”a ‘can’ of OIC.” Such a sense may additionally be called “a
morally relevant sense of ‘can’.” (See Sections 1.4 and 2.2 for more on OIC).
There is one tradition among compatibilists that maintains that all the
can-claims at issue in the debate with incompatibilists are equivalent to
conditionals. G. E. Moore ([1912] 1970), P. H. Nowell-Smith (1954), and
many other compatibilists have believed this. This tradition appears to have its
oldest historical roots in Saint Augustine’s account of power in On the Spirit
and the Letter. Augustine ([412] 1955, article 53) writes, “We say that any
man has in his power that which he does if he wills and does not if he wills
not.” Similarly, other philosophers have suggested that:
16
(1) S could have done A
is equivalent to
(2) S would have done A if S had chosen to do A.
Others have suggested that (1) is equivalent to:
(3) S would have done A if S had tried to do A.
Others have suggested that ( 1 ) is equivalent to:
(4) S would have done A if S had willed to do A.
(2), (3), or (4) is equivalent to or sufficient for (1), then
compatibilism is true 1 For even if determinism is true, an agent still may be
such that she would have done something else if she had chosen, tried, or
willed to do it. Thus, if (2), (3), or (4) is equivalent to or sufficient for ( 1 ),
one can conclude, even in the face of determinism, that the agent could have
done otherwise. However, the claim that (2), (3), or (4) is necessary for (1)
does not entail compatibilism. To help see this, suppose that determinism is
true and that an agent is such that, she would have done something else if she
had chosen, tried, or willed to do it. Given all this and the claim that (2), (3),
or (4) is necessary for (1), one cannot conclude that the agent could have done
otherwise. So, it is consistent for an incompatibilist to accept the claim that
(2), (3), or (4) is necessary for (1).
1
Here, for the sake of argument, I am using the loose versions of
compatibilism and incompatibilism (from Section 1.4).
17
Therefore, incompatibilists should be concerned with disprovinu the
claim that (2), (3), or (4) is sufficient for (1). By so doing, they would also
disprove the claim that (2), (3), or (4) is equivalent to ( 1 ).
Keith Lehrer (1966a, 1969, 1976) presents many arguments against the
claim that (2), (3), or (4) is sufficient for (1). Ironically, he is a compatibilist.
Nevertheless, the positions he takes do not commit him to incompatibilism; he
merely blocks one of the paths to compatibilism. Another important figure on
Lehrer’s side here is Roderick Chisholm (1966, 1967). Lehrer and Chisholm
basically argue that (2), (3), and (4) are consistent with S could not have
chosen
,
tried, or willed to do A
,
and thus they are consistent with S could not
have done A. For S could have done A only if S could have chosen, could have
tried, and could have willed to do A. Hence, neither (2), (3), nor (4) is
sufficient for (1). This reasoning is supported by an example suggested by
Lehrer (1976, 248-49). Suppose that Sam has a pathological aversion to
snakes. He is at a petting zoo. A friendly python sits in a nearby open cage.
Sam sees the python and runs away. It is consistent with the preceding to also
suppose that //Sam had chosen, tried, or willed to pet the python, he would
have done so. However, given Sam’s pathological aversion, he could not have
chosen, tried, or willed to do this. Hence, he could not have petted the python
even though he would have done so if he had chosen, tried, or willed to do so.
Hence, neither (2), (3), nor (4) is sufficient for ( 1 ).
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Unfortunately, the main principle employed in this argument seems to
lead to infinite regresses. Suppose it is true that: S could have done A only if
S could have chosen, could have tried, and could have willed to do A. It seems
to follow that: S could have chosen to do A only if S could have chosen to
choose to do A. The iterations continue ad infinitum.
Here is a better argument for the claim that neither (2), (3), nor (4) is
sufficient for ( 1 ).“ Suppose that Max has been in a coma for the one week
before now, yet his arm muscles have not withered in this period. However,
this comatose state together with the laws of nature is not compossible with
his raising his left arm now (I will discuss the relationship between "can’ and
compossibility, i.e., joint possibility, in later chapters). I conclude that Max
could not have raised his left arm now. I think most people would agree. Yet it
may be true that ifMax had chosen, tried, or willed to raise his left arm now
he would have done so. For if he had chosen, tried, or willed to raise his left
arm now, he would not have been in a coma and most probably would have
done as he chose, tried, or willed to do. Again, I think most people would
agree.
An example that is somewhat similar to examples by Kenny (1973,
100) and Locke (1974, 187) provides the basis of another argument for the
2
This argument has some similarities to an argument by van Inwagen
(1983,119-20).
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claim that neither (2), (3), nor (4) is sufficient for (1 ). Rick is a hopelessly
incompetent dart player. His rich sister challenges him, “Hit the bull’s-eye
with your next shot and I will contribute $10,000 to the Save the Children
Foundation. If you don t, then I won’t contribute. Rick wants his sister to
contribute, so he chooses, wills, and tries hard to hit the bull’s-eye. His throw
is poorly aimed, but a draft has just come through the window, throwing the
dart back on course. The dart lands in the bull’s-eye. His sister then sends off
the $10,000 check and he is elated.
Since Rick chose, tried, willed, and succeeded in hitting the bull’s-eye,
each of (2), (3), and (4) is satisfied. So, if (2), (3), or (4) is sufficient for ( 1 ),
then he could hit the bull’s-eye. However, some would deny that he could do
so with any morally relevant sense of "can’. For his hitting the bull’s-eye was
a fluke and a matter of luck rather than ability, and ability is at least a
necessary condition on any morally relevant sense of ’can’ (see Section 2.2,
Aune [1963, 404-406], and Brown [1988, 1-2]). Because he did not have an
ability to hit the bull’s-eye, it would be false to claim that he fulfilled an
obligation or did something right by doing so. Moral evaluation does not apply
to his hitting the bull’s-eye because he could not do so in any morally relevant
sense. This is not to say that any moral evaluation of his trying to hit the
bull’s-eye would be incorrect. For he could, and did, try to hit the bull’s-eye.
However, moral evaluation would be incorrect if applied to his hitting the
bull’s-eye. In conclusion, neither (2), (3), nor (4) is sufficient for (1).
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Moreover, the following principle has been shown false for any ‘can' of OIC:
S did A entails S could do A.
Some might counter as follows. First, it is questionable whether Rick
really did hit the bull’s-eye in this case. For the dart’s landing in the bull’s-eye
was a fluke unconnected to any dart-playing competence on Rick’s part.
However, if he did hit the bull’s-eye, other objections to the argument can be
made. For example, if he did hit the bull’s-eye, the earlier distinction made
between hitting the bull's-eye and trying to hit the bull’s-eye becomes
strained. Perhaps this is a case of a distinction without a difference. It seems
that the trying is the doing in this case. Also, the fact that Rick did choose,
try, and will to hit the bull’s-eye helps support the claim that his hitting it is
morally evaluable, despite his luck.
Another line of argument might focus on the logic of can-claims. Just
as actuality entails (broadly logical) possibility, so too does S did A entail S
could do A. And the latter entailment holds even with any morally relevant
sense of ‘could’. To deny the latter entailment would contradict our intuitions
about the logic of can-claims. If Rick did hit the bull’s-eye, then he really
could hit it, even though his doing so was a fluke. Moreover, to make ability
at least a necessary condition on morally relevant can-claims would greatly
complicate their logic. (Anyone doubting this might want to look at Mark
Brown’s “On the Logic of Ability” (1988).)
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I confess a non-commitment to each side in this debate about Rick.
Since I put my confidence in the coma counterexample above, I feel no urge
to commit to the alleged counterexample of the dart player. Other
incompatibilists might take a different tack. The bottom line is that an
incompatibilist needs some good reason to reject the claim that either (2), (3),
or (4) is sufficient for ( 1 ). He may avail himself of any of the possible reasons
provided here, or he may accept other reasons such as those put forth by J. L.
Austin ([1956] 1966) and Richard Taylor (1960). These various reasons have
turned incompatibilists and even most compatibilists against that the claim
that (2), (3), or (4) is sufficient for ( 1 ).
2.2 The Ability-‘Can’, the Power-‘Can’. and
the “Ouitht Implies Can” Principle
Some compatibilists, for example Bruce Aune (1963, 404-406) and
Mark Brown (1988, 1-2), hold that the concept of ability provides a morally
relevant sense of ‘can’. In this section, one thing I will do is review some
attempts to help clarify this concept. None of these attempts equates the claim
that S had the ability to do A with (2), (3), or (4) of the prior section.
Aune (1963, 403) says, "Jones has the ability to sink short putts’
implies ‘Jones is in some condition O such that, for any person P and any time
T, if P is in this condition at T then, if P is also in what is recognized as
normal circumstances and tries hard to sink a short putt, he will, in all
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probability, be successful .” He goes on to say that condition O “ 1S the ability
itself.” For Aune, having an ability, or “general ability” as some would call it,
does not require that one always succeeds while trying to exercise the ability
Different abilities may even require different success rates. Aune does not
address the question of how to determine what success rates are required for a
particular ability. One general criticism of Aune’s account is that much
importance is placed on the vague term "normal circumstances’, but he does
not go on to explain what he means by it, nor does he give examples of normal
circumstances.
Elsewhere Aune sketches an important distinction between ability and
power. (Neither Aune nor I use the word "power’ in the conditional sense used
in the Augustine quotation above.) Referring to a case in which he is standing
in a dried-up lake, Aune (1962, 518) says, “I would still have the ability to
swim... . But I would not have the power to swim at the time... .” The concept
of power is also typically invoked with the ordinary claim, “She could have
done otherwise than she did.” I think the concepts of ability and of power are
rather simple and familiar. It is difficult to come up with any simpler or more
familiar concepts with which they may be explained. Nonetheless, I will try
my best to help clarify these concepts.
First, it is worth noting that the concepts of power and of ability are
distinct from the concept of reactive causal capacity like the capacity of salt
to dissolve in pure water. They are also distinct from the concepts of
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epistemic possibility, moral permissibility, legal permissibility, and broadly
logical possibility. (See van Invvagen 1983, 9-13.)
To fully portray the distinction between power and ability it is
necessary to use time indexes. One may have at time 7 the ability to swim
even if she does not have the power at 7 to swim at 7 or soon thereafter. I
even claim that it is possible for S to have at 7 the ability to do A even if there
is no I ox I such that S has the power at I
'
to do A at T". For example, it
seems true, albeit somewhat odd, to say that many Neanderthal cavemen had
the ability to thread needles, even though they never had the power to do so.
They never had this power because nobody invented the needle until long after
these cavemen existed. Therefore, ability is not sufficient for power.
Claims that express the concept of power, otherwise called ‘^power-
claims,” have two implicit or explicit time indexes. One applies to the power
itself, and the other applies to the relevant doing. 4 (Either of those indexes
can be implicit, and either of those indexes can be explicit.)
3 T'’ should be read as ‘7 prime’. ‘7” ’ should be read as 7 double
prime'.
4
I generally put the time index for a doing after a description of that
doing. Henceforth, I will generally use ‘7' ’ as a time index for a doing and
‘7’ as a time index for a power.
Other philosophers apply two time indexes onto many can-claims.
These philosophers include Lehrer (1976) and Zimmerman (1986, 1987).
24
An ability-claim has one implicit or explicit time index; it applies to
the ability itself, not to the relevant doing. To take an ability-claim and add a
time index on the doing would diminish the original generality of that
ability-claim and force attention onto the particular circumstances the agent is
in at the supposed ability-time, thereby converting the ability-claim into a
power-claim. Kenny also argues that there is only one time index on ability-
claims. Kenny (1975, 135) says, “The ability-operator needs temporal
specification, but the description of the exercise of the ability should not be
temporally specified. For abilities are inherently general; there are no genuine
abilities which are abilities to do things only on one particular occasion.”
Nothing said thus far precludes ability from being a necessary
condition on power. For example, some might claim:
(5) 5 can (i.e., has the power) at T do A at T' only if S' has at T the
ability to do A.
I pause now to briefly explain some terminology 1 will often use in this
essay:
Power-‘can’ claims are common claims in which the word ‘can" or one
of its cognates is used together with two implicit or explicit time
indexes to express the concept of power/'
5
1 further discuss the power-‘can’ and the concept of power in this
section and in future chapters. In Chapters 3 and 4 I will argue, rather than
stipulate, that there are certain necessary conditions on the power-‘can" that
lead to incompatibilism.
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Even though people making can-claims hardly ever explicitly use
double time indexation, the power-‘can' nevertheless is double time indexed
and is a ‘can' of ordinary language. For people often use implicit double time
indexation when making can-claims. And when they do so they are generally
using the power-‘can'. The two time indexes usually can be determined, or at
least roughly determined, by context. (Sometimes the speaker must be
questioned to better determine the time indexes.)
Consider the following example. Suppose that Glen is frantically
packing in order to catch the 10:00 a.m. plane to his daughter’s graduation. At
9:00 a.m. his son Jim comes in the room and says, “Dad, are you sure you can
catch the plane9 The airport is about forty-five minutes away.” He says, “Yes 1
can. I’m almost done.” Twenty minutes later, his son comes back in the room
and says, “Dad, it's too late. You can’t catch the plane.” Although this story
includes ordinary can-claims that have no explicit time indexes, those claims
are best interpreted as implicitly double time indexed power-‘can’ claims.
With this story it is easy to use context to tease out the implicit time indexes.
At first, Jim is asking whether his dad can at 9:00 a.m. catch the plane by
10:00 A.M. In the second encounter, Jim is denying that his dad can at 9:20
A.M. catch the plane by 10:00 A.M.
Returning now to accounts of ability, van Inwagen has an account that
is somewhat similar to that proposed by Aune. Van Inwagen (1983, 13) says,
“I should think, in fact, that a statement ascribing a skill or other general
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ability to an agent is probably equivalent to some statement asserting that,
under certain conditions, that agent has the power to perform acts that fall
under certain descriptions. Van Inwagen does not explain the term ‘certain
conditions’.
Using the term ‘able to’ to express ability, Kapitan (1990a, 232) argues
that “certain cognitive requirements must be met in order for one to be able to
accomplish (to do, bring about, refrain from, prevent, etc., anything)....”
Kapitan ( 1 990, 235) proposes: “If agent S is able to accomplish A', then (i) S
has a concept ot X
,
and (ii) S has some understanding of how to go about
accomplishing X (i.e., of which actions are needed to accomplish X)... [and]
(iii) S presumes that he/she is able to accomplish XX
Without committing to any one of the above accounts of ability, I
concede two things. First, I concede that sometimes the word ‘can’ is used in
ordinary language just to express ability. In such cases the “ability-‘can”’ is
being used. Secondly, I concede that compatibilism is entailed by the view
that the ability-‘can’ is the only ‘can’ of OIC/’ This view may be held by
some of the compatibilists who consider the ability-‘can' to be morally
relevant. If the ability-‘can’ is the only ‘can’ of OIC, then the following is the
only true version of OIC:
6
In this section I am using the precise versions of compatibilism and
incompatibilism.
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“Ought implies the ability-'can’” or 01 AC: If S ought at T to do A at T'
then, S can (i.e., has the ability) at T do A. 1
Compatibilism is entailed by the view that the ability-'can’ is the only ‘can’ of
OIC because, even if determinism is true, an agent may have an ability to do
something that she does not do. Thus, if the ability-'can’ is the only ‘can’ of
OIC, then that agent can do otherwise in every sense of ‘can’ with which OIC
holds true
H
On the other hand, compatibilism is not entailed by the view that the
ability-'can’ is at least one 'can' of OIC. Such a view requires holding that
OIAC is at least one of the true versions of OIC. To help see this, suppose that
7
Note that I take deontic claims without any explicit time indexes to be
implicitly double time indexed. For example, consider the following claim
that someone makes at 1 :00 P.M.: ‘'Alba ought to write her memoirs.” This
could be interpreted as saying that: As of 1 :00 p.m. Alba has an obligation to
write her memoirs sometime before she dies. Or perhaps the speaker thinks
the memoirs should be written within the next few years. The context of the
utterance or questioning of the speaker should reveal the latest completion
date the speaker has in mind.
8
1 also concede that compatibilism is entailed by the view that the
ability-'can’ and/or the ‘can’ of broadly logical possibility are the only senses
of ‘can’ with which OIC is true. For the broadly logical possibility of doing
otherwise is also consistent with determinism. However, OIC is traditionally
stated by those who have in mind a more restricted sense of 'can' than the
'can’ of broadly logical possibility. Also, it is fairly rare for the word 'can' to
be used to express the mere broadly logical possibility of someone doing
something. Thus, I am not going to pay any further attention to the 'can' of
broadly logical possibility as it relates to OIC.
Also, I am going to ignore the 'can’ of (moral) rightness as it relates to
OIC. For OIC is traditionally not used to express the idea that obligatoriness
implies rightness.
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determinism is true and that an agent has an ability to do something that she
does not do. Given this and the claim that the ability-‘can’ is at least one ‘can’
of OIC, you cannot conclude that the agent can do otherwise in every sense of
can with which OIC holds true. So, it is consistent for an incompatibilist to
accept the claim that OlAC is true and the ability-‘can’ is at least one ‘can' of
OIC. Moreover, this consistency remains even if the concept of ability has
some cognitive or epistemic elements.
Therefore, incompatibilists should be concerned with disproving the
claim that the ability-'can is the only ‘can of OIC. Below is an example
intended to do just that.
Suppose there is a lifeguard named Sue. During her career she has
saved many people from drowning in many different circumstances. She has
taken many courses on lifesaving. She has the ability to swim in rough water,
the ability to properly hold and transport a drowning person to safety, the
ability to give mouth to mouth resuscitation, and the ability to administer
other kinds of first aid.
One day Sue and her friend Jake go off on vacation to a remote Pacific
island. One day they are playing on a deserted beach. For fun, Jake and Sue
dig a deep hole, and Sue stands up in it to allow Jake to bury her in it up to
her neck. After doing this Jake runs into the ocean to cool off briefly.
Unfortunately Jake is a poor swimmer. Unexpectedly, a large wave hits him.
He swallows much water, panics, and the undertow pulls him farther out to
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sea. He starts to drown at 10:00 a.m. At this time. Sue still has all the abilities
described earlier, and she is just as physically fit as she was when she saved
the many others from drowning. Also, she “has a concept” of saving Jake from
drowning. She has a full understanding ot how to go about saving him. She
presumes that she is able to accomplish this. Sue thinks she can free herself.
She tries hard to do so, but she is buried too deep. Sue is also in some
condition such that, for any person P and any time T, if P is in this condition
at /, and if P is also in what is recognized as "normal circumstances for
saving Jake from drowning and tries hard to do so, then she will, in all
probability, be successful. However, Sue is not in normal circumstances for
saving Jake from drowning. She is distraught as she watches Jake drown. He
dies at 10:15 a.m. Later other tourists arrive. Sue calls to them and they come
and dig her out.
In this example, Sue has at 10:00 a.m. the (general) ability to save Jake
from drowning. Unfortunately she cannot exercise that ability in time to save
him. Sue does not have the power to save him. More precisely:
(6) Sue cannot at 10:00 A.M. save Jake from drowning before 10:15
A.M.
She cannot do so because of the circumstances she is in at 10:00 a.m., the
most important of which is her being deeply buried in the sand.
Let us now delve into some moral issues concerning this case. Consider
the following proposition:
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(7) Sue is not obligated at 10:00 a m. to save Jake from drownimj
before 10:15 a.m.
Obviously (7) is true, but why is it true? 9 I contend that the best way to
explain the truth of (7) is by appealing to (6) and the following version of
OIC:
“Ought implies the power-‘can”’ or OIPC: If 5 ought at T to do A at T\
then S can (i.e., has the power) at T do A at T' w
OIPC does not entail the falsity of OIAC. If OIPC is true, then the power-'cam
is at least one can of OIC. Thus any reason to believe OIPC is a reason to
believe that the power-‘can’ is at least one ‘can’ of OIC.
Assuming T can be a time period, the conjunction of (6) and OIPC
implies (7). I earlier provided justification of (6). A full justification of OIPC
^ Although Sue is not obligated (in an absolute sense) at 10:00 A M. to
save Jake from drowning before 10:15 A.M, I grant that it still might be the
case that, as a general, defeasible rule, someone who sees a friend drowning
ought to (in an absolute sense) save him. The case of Sue is a vivid example
of the defeasibility of this rule. Some might claim that this rule does, in some
non-absolute sense, place an obligation on Sue to save Jake from drowning.
Even if this claim is correct, it does not threaten (7) or the (upcoming)
principle that “ought implies the power-‘can’.” For (7) and that principle are
meant to be claims about absolute obligation, or, as some call it, “all-in
obligation” or “duty proper?' Ross (1930, 19-20) contrasts “duty proper” with
a kind of defeasible, non-absolute obligation he calls “prima facie duty.” For
example, promise-keeping is a “prima facie duty” but is not an absolute duty
in every situation. I find the meaning of the term ‘prima facie duty’ to be
rather unclear; see Feldman’s (1986, 127-46) arguments for this position.
"’Here again I use the term ‘ought’ in an absolute sense.
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would go beyond the scope of this essay. I assume herein that some version or
versions of OIC are true. OIC is a commonsense principle that many
philosophers have advocated." One advantage of OIPC is that it is a version
of OIC that employs a ‘can’ of ordinary language. 12 For the “ought implies
can principle is plausible with a 'can’ of ordinary language, and it probably
is not plausible with some can picked out of the dusty philosophers’
cupboard full of ad hoc or esoteric definitions of ‘can’. Also, it seems to me
that an excellent reason to believe OIPC is that OIPC together with (6) best
explains why (7) is true. I see no other plausible way to explain the truth of
(7).
Certainly the view that the ability-‘can’ is the only ‘can’ of OIC would
not help to explain the truth of (7). For at 10:00 a.m. Sue does have the
(general) ability (and the necessary abilities) to save Jake from drowning
(even though she does not have the power to do so). She developed all these
abilities through the courses she took to become a lifeguard, her many years of
11
Advocates of OIC include Kant ([1788], 1956, 38), Feldman (1986;
16-25, 36-44, 197-209), Zimmerman (1987), and Sapontzis (1991).
Montefiore (1958) also reviews some important ways to support OIC.
Zimmerman (1987, 199) says, “The thesis that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ may then
be seen to be the thesis, more precisely stated, that ‘<S ought at T to do A at T'
’
implies LS can at T do A at T' He goes on in the article to defend this
double time indexed version of OIC.
12
Granted, the double time indexing is usually only implicit in ordinary
language.
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swimming, and her many experiences saving others from drowning. Hence, an
inference using OIAC and the facts of this case to get to (7) cannot be made.
Some might object by claiming that such an inference can be made
since Sue in tact does not have the ability at 10:00 a.m. to save Jake from
drowning. But why does she not have this ability? Is it because the objector is
focusing on particular circumstances of this case (rather than on what might
be considered normal circumstances for saving Jake from drowning)? If so,
then the objector s alleged claim about Sue s lack of ability is really a claim
about Sue's lack of power. Thus, it could not be used with OIAC to get to (7)
since OIAC concerns ability, not power. I grant that sometimes people use
‘ability’ to mean what I call ‘power’, but that is not how I intended to use
‘ability’ when stating OIAC.
On the other hand, the objector’s claim about Sue’s lack of ability
might be supported by the assertion that:
(8) Saving Jake from drowning is too particular an act for ability to
apply to it.
And (8) might be supported by the claim that, as part of that act, a particular
person is acted on.
1 '
'’Don Locke, for example, might agree with this line of reasoning since
he (1974, 184-85) says, [Tjhere seems to be no such ability as the ability
to contact some specified person by telephone.”
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I disagree with (8) since the act ot saving Jake from drowning is still
general enough that it is possible for it to be done in different circumstances,
at different times, and by different agents. But even if (8) were correct, then
OIAC would be easily subject to counterexamples. For instance, suppose that
instead of being buried in the sand at 10:00 A.M., Sue is sitting on a beach
chair and is unrestrained when she notices Jake begin to drown. In that case
she would have an obligation at 10:00 a.m. to save Jake from drowning before
10: 15 A M. However, she would not have such an obligation if OIAC and (8)
were true. Hence, if (8) is true, then OIAC is false. Therefore, the conjunction
of (8) and OIAC cannot be used to explain (7).
Therefore the view that the ability-‘can’ is the only ‘can’ of OIC does
not help to explain (7). The best way to explain (7) is with (6) and OIPC.
Moreover, if the ability-‘can’ were the only ‘can’ of OIC, then OIPC would be
false (since OIPC implies that the power-‘can’ is a "can’ of OIC). However, if
OIPC were false, OIPC could not be used to explain the truth of (7). That is
too high a price to pay for maintaining that the ability-‘can’ is the only ‘can’
of OIC.
Here is another related problem for the view that the ability-‘can’ is the
only ‘can’ of OIC. Ability-claims entail claims concerning certain general
conditions (which Aune calls “normal circumstances”). These conditions may
or may not describe the actual conditions in a particular case. The story of Sue
and Jake is a case in which the general conditions relevant to an ability-claim
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about Sue are not the actual conditions. Sue is not in what might be
considered normal circumstances for saving Jake from drowning. Moreover,
the actual conditions she faces on that deserted beach are relevant to what
moral obligations she has and does not have. These actual conditions are not
to be ignored. However, if the ability-‘can’ is the only ‘can’ of OIC, then
those conditions would not be relevant to what moral obligations Sue has and
does not have, and those conditions would have to be ignored. This is
unacceptable.
In conclusion, it is incorrect to claim that the ability-‘can’ is the only
can ot OIC. Thus that claim cannot be used to arrive at compatibilism. In
addition, my support of OIPC has provided a strong reason to believe that the
power-‘can’ is at least one ‘can’ of OIC.
2.3 Keith Lehrer’s Account of ‘Can’
Lehrer (1976, 252-56) proposes what he calls “an analysis of ‘could
have The general idea motivating Lehrer’s analysis is that someone can do
something if and only if he does it in some minimally different possible world
in which he has no additional advantages for doing it. Here is Lehrer’s
analysis:
‘S' could (at T ) have done A at T' ’ is true in W if and only if there is a
possible world w having the same laws as the actual world W and only
minimally different from W so that ‘S’ does A at T' ’ is true in w in such
a way that S has no advantage at T for doing A at T' in w that he lacks
in W, and T' is past in W. (Lehrer 1976, 255)
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Later, Lehrer (1976, 256-57) triples the length of this analysis to
include some additional technical terms and additional time indexes. This
revision allows him to skirt a tricky counterexample, but 1 question whether
such a lengthy and complex analysis could really capture any ordinary
meaning of the phrase "could have’. The discussion below focuses on the
preliminary analysis above, yet each point made would require little if any
modification to apply to the revised analysis.
Lehrer borrows the notion of ‘"minimal difference” between possible
worlds from Pollock (1976). Pollock uses it to provide a possible world
semantics for counterfactual conditionals. Lehrer (1976, 246-48; 1981, 35)
partially explains the notion of ""minimal difference” by using the notion of
similarity between possible worlds. Lehrer (1981, 35) says, ""There may be a
variety of minimally different worlds, some more similar to the actual world
than others, in which the person performs the action."
Fischer (1979), Horgan (1977), and Zimmerman (1981) raise many
objections against Lehrer’s analysis. Horgan (1977, 407-409) argues that in
order to understand the concept of having an advantage for doing A, '"we
require a prior understanding of "could -statements themselves. He holds that
“TS could (at T ) have done A at T'
’ is equivalent to "5 had (at T ) the ability
and the opportunity to do A at 7 ' Further, he claims. An advantage tor
performing A is a condition or state of affairs which enhances one’s ability
and/or opportunity to do A.” He concludes that Lehrer’s proposed analysis
is
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conceptually circular. Lehrer (1981, 34-36) denies such circularity, and he
defends this denial by asserting, “I used it [the notion of an advantage] as
primitive. It is questionable whether Lehrer’s move wins the debate. But it
definitely does produce a stalemate on the issue of whether his analysis entails
compatibilism. Let me explain. 14
1 begin with some definitions of technical terms to be employed:
A hard state of affairs that obtains at T is a contingent state of affairs
that obtains at 7 and it does not entail that any contingent state
of affairs obtains at any time other than A 15
s ' s determined at 7 to do A (to not do A) at 7 ' means that some hard
state of affairs that obtains at T together with the laws of nature
entails that S does A (does not do A) at V.
14
In this section I am using the loose versions of compatibilism and
incompatibilism.
The explanation that follows is similar to but significantly different
from one made by Horgan (1977, 409-10).
15
The following is one example of a hard state of affairs: (a) That
Pluto exists at T. Some might counter my definition of a hard state of affairs
by claiming that (a) is a hard state of affairs yet it entails the following
contingent state of affairs that occurs at a time other than T: (b) At the
moment after T, Pluto had existed at T. I respond that (a) does not entail (b)
since (a) does not entail that there is any time before or after T. It is (broadly
logically) possible for Pluto to exist in a world that lasts exactly as long as T.
In such a possible world (a) is true but (b) is not. Hence the proposed
counterexample fails.
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A state ot the world is an instance of a hard state of affairs. If
determinism is true, then at every time each agent is determined (by the state
ot the world at that time together with the laws of nature) to do: whatever he
actually does at the time he does it. And each agent is determined at every
time to not do whatever he actually does not do at the time he does not do it.
Of course, if S is determined at T to do A at T\ then S in fact does do A at T\
Now, suppose determinism is true in world W, and Lehrer’s analysis is
correct. Suppose also that S does not do A at T' in W
,
and T < T' < T" Given
these suppositions, any minimally different possible world in which S does A
at / ' contains at / a huge advantage over W for S’ s doing A at T'. The
advantage is that of N’s not being determined at T to not do A at V. Whereas
in W, S has the disadvantage at 7’ of being determined at T to not do A at T'.
Note that in some indeterministic possible worlds S does not have this
disadvantage even though he does not do A at T'.
Given Lehrer s analysis ot ‘could have’ and the description above of W
and its minimally different worlds, it is true in W that S could not (at T ) have
done A at T'. Moreover, it is true in W that S could not (at T" ) have done A at
7 '. For T" is after T\ and at T" S already had not done A at T'.
In the case where S does A at T', similar argumentation can be used to
show that N could not at T or T" have not done A at T'. Thus, if determinism is
true and Lehrer’s analysis is correct, no one ever can do otherwise than he
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does. In other words, Lehrer’s analysis of ‘could have’ entails
incompatibilism. Thus it does not entail compatibilism.
Lehrer would deny that his analysis entails incompatibilism. He would
claim that the so-called "advantage" in the argument above is not really an
advantage. However, since Lehrer has stipulated that the term ‘advantage’ is
primitive, he and his disputant can do little if anything to show the other
wrong. The disputants are left in a stalemate. Thus, it is irresolvable whether
Lehrer's analysis entails compatibilism.
2.4 Chapter Summary
In the present chapter I briefly review and respond to the various
accounts of ‘can' proposed by compatibilists. (See Section 1 .4 for the loose
and precise versions of compatibilism and incompatibilism that I use in this
essay.) Some compatibilists claim that ‘can’ is equivalent to one of a few
subjunctive conditionals. I present sundry arguments against this claim. The
strongest argument is based on an example of a coma patient who could not
have raised his arm even though he would have if he had chosen, tried, or
willed.
Some compatibilists emphasize the importance of the “ability-‘can
’
To understand this ‘can’ it is important to first distinguish between ability and
power. Bruce Aune gives an example that helps make this distinction.
Referring to a case in which he is standing in a dried up lake, Aune (1962,
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518) says, I would still have the ability to swim.
.. But I would not have the
power to swim at the time... .” One way to help account for the difference
between ability and power is with time indexation. I argue that power-claims,
including power-‘can’ claims, each have two implicit or explicit time indexes;
one applies to the power itself, the other to the relevant doing. In ordinary
language these indexes usually are not explicit, but they often can be figured
out. For example, my claim that “I can make it to the meeting” means that I
can as ot now make it to the meeting by the time it is scheduled to begin.
Ability-claims, including ability-'can claims, each have one implicit or
explicit time index; it applies to the ability itself, not to the doing. Ability-
claims apply to doings that are more general than is the case with power-
claims. And the lack of a time index on the doing helps to ensure this greater
generality.
Some compatibilists seem to hold that the ability-'can’ is at least one
sense of ‘can' with which the “ought implies can” principle holds true. I
explain why incompatibilists could accept this claim. However,
incompatibilists must reject the claim that the ability-‘can’ is the only such
sense of ‘can’. For in a deterministic world people may still have abilities to
do things they don’t actually do.
I go on to argue that the ability-‘can’ is not the only sense of ‘can’ with
which the “ought implies can” principle holds true. The power-‘can' is also
such a sense of ‘can’. My argument is based on a case of a person buried in
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sand up to her neck who has the ability, but not the power or the (moral)
obligation, to save her friend from drowning. I argue that the absence of this
obligation is due to her not having the power to save him.
Finally, I discuss an analysis of 'could have’ proposed by Keith Lehrer
In doing so I define the expression ‘5 is determined at 7’ to do A at T'\ I show
that it is irresolvable whether Lehrer’s analysis entails compatibilism.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TEMPORAL PHYSICAL POSSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND
THE ARGUMENT FOR INCOMPATIBILISM
31 The Argument for Incompatibilism
Incompatibilism is precisely the thesis that there is at least one sense of
can’ with which: The “ought implies can” principle holds true, and
determinism entails no one ever can do otherwise than he does. In my
Argument for Incompatibilism I intend the word ‘can’ to be understood as the
power-'can' of ordinary language, which I first discussed in Section 2.2.
In the argument:
7/ represents the conjunction of the laws of nature, and
‘TV represents the state of the world at a power-time, T.
A power-time is a time in which an agent has the power to do a certain
thing (at a certain time).
Here is:
The Argument for Incompatibilism
(Bl) The First Temporal Physical Possibility (or TEPP)
Requirement: 1 If S' can at T do A at T\ then S’ s doing A at T' is
compossible with the conjunction of P T and L.
1 The term ‘physical’ is used here to help indicate my reference to the
laws of nature in the principle. I use the term ‘physical’ out of respect for
(continued...
)
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(B2) The Second TEPP Requirement: If S can at T not do A at T\
then 5 s not doing A at T is compossible with the conjunction of
PT and L?
(...continued)
tradition, despite my discomfort with one of its apparent connotations. The
term seems to suggest that there can be no law of nature that contains
essential reference to mental events or properties. For the purposes of this
essay, I need not take a stand on whether there can be such laws Thus I do not
intend the term ‘physical’ to be understood with the apparent connotation just
described.
2
‘ Throughout this essay ‘5 can at T not do A at V ’ should be read 'S
can at T. not do A at T ' rather than ‘It is not the case that S can at T do A at
Some will take the position that the First TEPP Requirement is
equivalent to the Second, and thus the Argument for Incompatibilism is guilty
of redundancy. To support this position one must argue that every not-doing is
a doing and that not-not-doing A is equivalent to doing A. One could point out
that we allow the empty set to be a set, and we allow the negation of a
proposition to be a proposition. So, we should allow not-doings to be doings.
Also, one could also appeal here to Will Rogers’ claim that “Coolidge was
just the man we needed. He didn’t do anything, but that’s just what we wanted
done!”
I agree with the claim that not-not-doing A is equivalent to doing A.
And I am somewhat sympathetic to the claim that every not-doing is a doing.
Certainly some not-doings seem to be doings, for example, my neighbor’s not
turning down her stereo after I asked her to turn it down. However, there are
some not-doings for which it is at least questionable whether they are doings.
For example, are these doings?: (a) A person’s not committing suicide on a
day in which he was full of joy and the thought of suicide never even crossed
his mind, (b) A person’s not contributing money to a distant charity she never
knew existed, (c) Bill Clinton’s not running faster than the speed of light right
now. (d) Julius Caesar’s not talking with Bill Clinton right now. (e) Julius
Caesar’s not drawing a square circle right now. Perhaps these not-doings are
doings, but I prefer not to risk stepping into this linguistic and metaphysical
thicket. Doing so is unnecessary for the purposes of this essay. Thus 1 state
each of the First and Second TEPP Requirements in my Second Argument for
Incompatibilism. Even if this were to make me guilty of redundancy, that
would be a small price to pay for avoiding unnecessary controversy.
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(B3) If the First and Second TEPP Requirements are true, then
determinism entails that no one ever can do otherwise than he
does.
(Al) Therefore, determinism entails that no one ever can do
otherwise than he does.
Assuming that the power-‘can’ is a ‘can’ with which the “ought implies
can principle holds true (as I argued in Section 2.2), the conclusion, (Al),
entails incompatibilism. (Al) is also the first premise of the Main Argument,
which is in Chapter 1
.
I intend the TEPP Requirements to be claims about the meaning of the
power-‘can\ They are consistent with the claim that the word ‘can’ has many
other senses. The truth of the TEPP Requirements depends on what people
generally mean when using the power-‘can\ Although it is certainly not
obvious that they mean something that includes the TEPP Requirements, there
are good reasons to believe that they do mean this. In Chapter 4 I will present
some of those reasons.
Also, note the differences between the TEPP Requirements and:
The Physical Possibility Requirements: If S can at T do A (not do A) at
T\ then S”s doing A (not doing A) at T' is compossible with L.
The TEPP Requirements together entail but are not entailed by the Physical
Possibility Requirements. Each of these several requirements expresses a
semantically necessary condition for at least one but not all senses of 'can’.
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In the next section I will justify (B3). In Section 3.3 I will dtscuss some
of the primary sources of evidence for the TEPP Requirements. In Sect.on 3.4
I will discuss some advantages of the TEPP Requirements.
3.2 Justification of (B3). the Third Premise of
the Argument for Incompatibilism
To justify (B3) I use the concept of being always determined to do a
certain thing at a certain time. In Section 2.3 1 defined the expression ‘5 is
determined at 7 to do A (not do A) at T' \ If S is always determined to do A at
7 then at every time the world exists, S is determined to do A at T'. If
determinism as defined in Section 1.3 is true, then everything we do and
everything we do not do is always determined.
In the following argument the word l can’ should be understood as the
power- can
,
but with no assumption that the TEPP Requirements are true. For
simplicity I have suppressed time indexes of doings and not-doings.
The Always Determined Argument
(Cl) If determinism is true and someone can at some time do
otherwise than he does, then either: Someone can at some time
do something that he is always determined to not do, or someone
can at some time not do something that he is always determined
to do.
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(C2) If the First TEPP Requirement is true, then no one can at some
time do something that he is always determined to not do.
<C3) If the Second TEPP Requirement is true, then no one can at
some time not do something that he is always determined to do
<B3) Therefore, if the First and Second TEPP Requirements are true,
then determinism entails that no one ever can do otherwise than
he does.
(Cl
)
follows from the definition of determinism, the definition of
always determined
,
and the following proposition:
( 1 ) S can at T do otherwise than he does at T' if and only if: (a) S
can at T do something at T that he in fact does not do at T\ or
(b) S can at T nut do something at T that he in fact does do at
7
1
'.
3
Proposition ( 1 ) primarily explains the tricky phrase ‘do otherwise than he
does’ rather than the word ‘can’. I grant that some may find (1) to be overly
precise or overly broad. However, this preciseness and this broadness only
increase the challenge I face when arguing that determinism entails that no
one ever can do otherwise than he does. Moreover, the broadness of (1) helps
to provide for a symmetry between doings and not-doings.
3
This principle was developed out of discussions I had
Bricker.
with Phillip
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To see why (C2) is true, suppose that Vera is always determined to not
k.ss Chris at midnight. Note that my definition of ‘5 is determined at T to not
do A at T' does not require that an agent ever intend to not do what she is
always determined to not do. According to the First TEPP Requirement, if
Vera can at some time, T, kiss Chris at midnight, then her doing so is
compossible with the conjunction of PT and L. But since she is always
determined to not kiss Chris at midnight, there is no time, T, at which her
doing so is compossible with the conjunction of PT and L. So, there is no time
in which Vera can at that time kiss Chris at midnight. The same kind of
argumentation applies to any other pair of an actual not-doing and a non-
actual doing of any agent. Therefore, (C2) is true.
To see why (C3) is true, suppose that Juan is the lucky one whom Vera
is always determined to kiss at midnight. According to the Second TEPP
Requirement, if Vera can at some time, T, not kiss Juan at midnight, then her
not doing so is compossible with the conjunction of PT and L. But since she is
always determined to kiss Juan at midnight, there is no time, T, at which her
not doing so is compossible with the conjunction of PT and L. So, there is no
time in which Vera can at that time not kiss Juan at midnight. The same kind
of argumentation applies to any other pair of an actual doing and a non-actual
not-doing of any agent. Therefore (C3) is true.
The above stories help to reveal that the following propositions are
implied by the TEPP Requirements:
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( 2 ) If .V can at 7 do A at T\ then S is not determined at 7’ to not do A
at r.
(^) If .S’ can at 7 not do A at T\ then S is not determined at Tto do A
at T'.
Returning to (B3), I venture to say that nearly all compat.bil.sts would
be willing to accept it and my argument for it. Of the three premises in my
Argument for Incompatibilism, I think that the TEPP Requirements are the
most likely to be questioned and are the most difficult to justify. Moreover, 1
believe that the TEPP Requirements are at the heart of the long debate
between compatibilists and incompatibilists.
2-3 Some of the Primary Sources of Evidence for
thd Temporal Physical Possibility (or TEPP) Requirements
My chief aim in this section is not to discuss specific pieces of
evidence for the TEPP Requirements. Rather it is to talk generally about how
and where one might find such pieces of evidence.
The TEPP Requirements are semantic claims about a word used in
ordinary language. As with any semantic claim about a word used in ordinary
language, I believe that some of the primary sources of evidence are how the
relevant word is used in specific circumstances and how the word would be
used in specific circumstances. (In saying this I do not intend to equate
meaning and use.) Also important are commonly asserted sentences that
48
include the word. Also important are sentences with the word that would be
agreed to by most people. A claim about the meaning of a word gains support
as one finds more actual or hypothetical uses of the word that support that
claim. Another important source of evidence for semantic claims about a word
is how people justify or would justify claims made with that word. That is not
to say that semantic conditions are the same as justification conditions
The intensive study of word usage by linguists and lexicographers has
contributed greatly to our semantic understanding of many words. However, 1
believe philosophers also bring something to the party. First, a philosopher,
like almost every person, has some of the skills possessed by linguists and
lexicographers. A philosopher, like almost every person, has gathered and
organized a large amount of empirical information about her native language.
Although such a collection of information is large, it certainly is not a
replacement for the much larger collection of information linguists and
lexicographers have gathered or can gather about that language. However, the
strength of many a philosopher is in closely analyzing her more limited
linguistic information and in creatively thinking of specific ways a word is
used or would be used that are especially revealing of that word’s meaning.
Philosophers are also good at creatively thinking of specific ways a statement
is justified or would be justified that are especially revealing of the meanings
of certain words used in the statement. Certainly these skills are held by many
people outside philosophy, and these skills are not held by every philosopher.
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However, many philosophers have had these skills to an unusually high
degree.
Philosophers, more than linguists or lexicographers, are willing to
consider and utilize information about how a word would be used in
hypothetical situations or how a statement would be justified in hypothetical
situations. Philosophers are more willing to consider whether people generally
would agree with certain sentences containing the word. Oftentimes
philosophers conduct "thought experiments” that elicit intuitive judgments
about the meaning of a word used in ordinary language. In these hazardous
territories I believe philosophers have harvested much fruit. J. L. Austin, for
example, has explored these territories and contributed immensely to our
semantic understanding of various words including ‘can’. In the present essay,
I try to further explore these territories with respect to the power-‘can\
It seems to me that many debates in philosophy hinge on a question of
what an ordinary but unclear or ambiguous word means. For example, I
believe the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists hinges on the
question ot what the power-‘can' means. More precisely, it hinges on whether
the TEPP Requirements are true.
Some may complain that I am moving the debate into the realm of
semantics rather than leaving it in the realms of metaphysics and ethics where
it belongs. I respond that the borderlines between semantics, metaphysics, and
ethics are difficult to draw. To the extent that they can be drawn, I view the
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debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists as an intriguing mixture of
all these elements plus some epistemology. In this essay I seriously discuss
each of these elements but I emphasize the one I find most important, namely
the meaning of the power-‘can\
He who engages in debates that hinge on the meaning of an ordinary
but unclear or ambiguous word must not let his judgments about meaning be
impaired by a bias toward his favorite philosophical theories. There is nothing
wrong with seeking and publicizing evidence for a semantic claim that
supports one’s favorite philosophical theory. However, one should also look
lor and address any evidence that detracts from or seems to detract from such
a semantic claim.
Some may say that one piece of evidence against the TEPP
Requirements is that nothing with much resemblance to them appears in any
dictionary entry for ‘can’. I grant that this does detract somewhat from the
TEPP Requirements. However, the major accounts of ‘can’ proposed by
compatibilists also have the same problem. (In Chapter 2 I reviewed and
criticized some ol these accounts.) In addition, dictionaries do not capture the
complete meaning of every commonly used word. Oftentimes lexicographers
settle for using synonyms or short definitions that do not reveal the deeper
meaning of the word. Oftentimes philosophers and others have made true
semantic claims about words even though those claims do not appear in
dictionary definitions. For example, many philosophers help to explain to
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students one common meaning of the word ‘and' by givtng the truth table for
propositions of the form P and Q, where P represents a proposition and so
does Q. However, a truth table for P and Q is nowhere to be found in any
standard dictionary entry for 'and'. This supports the idea that one can make
true semantic claims about common words even when those claims do not
show up in dictionaries.
Another piece of evidence that detracts from the TEPP Requirements is
the following. If asked to define ‘can’, hardly anybody would state a
definition that included something with much resemblance to the TEPP
Requirements. I grant that this does detract somewhat from the TEPP
Requirements. However, the major accounts of ‘can’ proposed by
compatibles have the same problem. In addition, for many words it would be
a mistake to rely on how most people would define the word to determine
what semantic claims are true about that word. Most people could not state all
the semantic rules governing logical terms like ‘unless’ and ‘every’. Yet most
people use these terms in a meaningful way without violating those semantic
rules. Using an ordinary word meaningfully and competently does not require
the ability to articulate all or even most of the true semantic claims about that
word. DiGiovanna (1989, 23) remarks, “,..[W]e invariably find it difficult or
impossible to define words with which we are very familiar.” The ways in
which the power-‘can’ is and would be used may well support semantic claims
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about the power-'can' that most people, when asked for a definition, would
not come close to expressing.
I admit that it is very difficult if not impossible to prove the TEPP
Requirements. Even if one could determine the meanings ‘can’ has for each
ordinary language speaker, it would still be unclear what proportion of those
speakers must share a particular meaning before one can say that that meaning
is one of the meanings of 'can’ in ordinary language. Thus, I do not expect
that my evidence and other reasons for the TEPP Requirements will prove
them. Nor should a compatibilist expect that her reasons against the TEPP
Requirements will disprove them. I think that the difficulty if not
impossibility ot proving or disproving semantic claims about 'can' helps to
explain why the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists has lasted
for millennia.
Since the power- can is used in moral and non-moral contexts, the
linguistic evidence I will present tor the TEPP Requirements is drawn from
moral and non-moral contexts. The reasons I will present for these
requirements help to show that these requirements provide a precise analysis
of the core idea implicit in how the power-‘can’ commonly is and would be
used. Many of the reasons I will present for the TEPP Requirements also
support the claim that most ordinary language speakers are disposed to use the
power-'can’ as if they take these requirements for granted. The TEPP
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Requirements are intended to be claims that help one to best understand what
ordinary language speakers are talking about by means of the power-‘can\
3 4 Some Advantages of the Temporal Physical Possibility Requirements
One advantage of the TEPP Requirements is that, while being rather
substantial principles, they nonetheless provide a wide range of flexibility
regarding the meaning of the power- k can'. They even allow for conditions on
the power-'can' that are quite similar to certain conditions on ‘can’ proposed
by compatibilists. The First TEPP Requirement allows any, all, or none of
conditions (a) through (o) to be necessary for (4); see below. The word ‘can’
in (4) is meant to be understood as the power-‘can\
(4) S can at T do A at T'
(a) As of T, S would do A at T' if he were to choose to do so.
(b) As of T, S would do A at T' if he were to try to do so.
(c) As of T, S would do A at T' if he were to will to do so.
(d) S has at T the ability to do A.
(e) S has at T the abilities necessary to do A.
(f) In the nearest possible world in which S does A at T\ S
has no advantage at T for doing A at T' that he lacks in
the actual world.
(g) S has at T a concept of doing A.
(h) S knows at T how to do A.
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(i) 5” s doing A at V is epistemically possible for S as of T.
That is to say, S s doing A at T' is consistent with
everything S knows as of T.
(j) 5 is not coerced at or before T to not do A at T'.
(k) At some time at or before T, S has done A or has done
something relevantly similar to A.
(l) S’s doing A at T' is consistent with the personality and
character S has as of T.
(m) S”s doing A at T' is compossible with certain facts beyond
those included in the conjunction of PT and L.
(n) As of T, it is “up to” S whether he does A at T'.
(o) S exists at T.
Conditions (a) through (n) could easily be modified for the purpose of
placing necessary conditions on ‘S can at T not do A at T' whereas (o) would
need no modification for such a purpose. 4 Condition (n) is a time indexed
version of a condition regarded as necessary by the incompatibilist Richard
Taylor (1969, 88). Conditions (a) through (k) are explicitly time indexed
( 4 ).
4
Note, however, that (o) is not a necessary condition on the negation of
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versions of conditions similar to those regarded as necessary and/or sufficient
by various compatibilists/
Some may want to claim that (4) is always used with a certain subset of
(a) through (o) as a necessary condition. Some may want to claim that (4) is
used in some contexts with one subset of (a) through (o) as a necessary
condition, and in other contexts with a different subset as a necessary
condition. Any of these claims is consistent with the TEPP Requirements and
with incompatibilism. For the purposes of this essay, I need not accept or
reject any of these claims. A compatibilist and an incompatibilist could be in
complete agreement about which conditions in the above list are necessary for
(4).
Another advantage of the TEPP Requirements is that they allow for the
rejection of a number of false claims that some may think incompatibilists
must accept.
^ These compatibilists did not explicitly include all the time indexes
that I have used in conditions (a) through (k). Conditions (a) through (c) are
somewhat similar to those proposed by Moore ([1912] 1970, 102-15) and
Nowell-Smith (1954). Condition (d) is similar to proposals by Aune (1963)
and Brown (1988). Also, their proposals are somewhat similar to condition
(e). Condition (f) is somewhat similar to a condition proposed by Lehrer
(1976, 255). Conditions (g) and (h) are similar to conditions proposed by
Kapitan (1991a, 235). Condition (i) is very similar to a condition that Dennett
(1985, 148) seems to like. Condition (j) is similar to things said by Raab
(1955, 74-5). Condition (k) is somewhat similar to conditions proposed by
Raab (1955, 74-5) and Lehrer (1966a, 178).
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First, some may think that incompatibilists must accept the following
false claim:
(5) If S is not determined at T to do A at T\ then S can at T do A at
T'.
The TEPP Requirements allow for the rejection of (5). For they place only
necessary conditions on the power-'can
. If the TEPP Requirements were
modified to be biconditionals, then they would entail (5). 6
I grant that some incompatibilists may believe (5), but I do not. For I
believe there is much more to the power-‘can’ than mere temporal physical
possibility. Exactly what more there is I am not sure. However, I do believe
that (o) is a necessary condition on (4).
7
Also, many of conditions (a) through
(n) seem to play a role at least in some contexts in which power- ‘’can’ claims
are made.
6
Storrs McCall (1970, 139-142) makes claims that suggest he would
accept a biconditional version of the TEPP Requirements.
7
However, the following related claim is surprisingly false:
S can at T do A at V only if S exists at T'.
To see why this claim is false, suppose that Scott is given the option at T of
flying a suicidal military mission at T' or flying a non-suicidal military
mission at T". (T < V < T".) Scott can and does fly the suicidal mission at T'.
By doing so he is completely incinerated and goes out of existence before T"
(and stays out of existence during T" ). Still, it is consistent with this story to
add that Scott could at T have flown the non-suicidal mission at T".
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I turn now to a second falsehood some may think incompatibilists must
accept:
(6) .S’ can at T do A at T if and only if 5 can at T do otherwise than A
at T '. 8
Some incompatibilists may actually accept (6), but I find (6) both odd
and false. Consider the conjunction of (6) and the claim that determinism
entails that no one ever can do otherwise than he does. That conjunction
implies the following falsehood: If determinism is true, then no one ever can
do what he in fact does.
Note that the TEPP Requirements are consistent with the falsity of (6).
For, regardless of whether determinism is true, whatever someone actually
does is compossible with the conjunction of: the laws of nature and every
state of the actual world. So, regardless of whether determinism is true, the
TEPP Requirements allow actual doings to also be something the agent can
do.
Now consider the following passage by Lehrer:
Again suppose I do not clench my fingers into a fist at a specific
moment. That flexor digitorum profundus [a certain muscle in the arm]
was unflexed just prior to that moment determines the fingers not being
clenched. Yet it hardly follows from the antecedent condition of that
muscle being unflexed that I could not have clenched the fingers. On
g Some may claim that if (n) is a necessary condition on (4), then (6) is
true. If this claim is correct, then I think (n) would have to be rejected as a
necessary condition on (4). However, there may be some interpretations of (n)
that do not lead to (6).
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the contrary I could have clenched the fingers, and had I chosen to do
so, flexor digitorum profundus would have been in a flexed state at the
required time. (Lehrer 1976, 264)
Suppose that T3 is the time that Lehrer did not clench his fingers and 7
\
is the moment just prior to T3 . Some, including Lehrer (1976) and Horgan
(1979, 356), may think that incompatibilists are stuck with the false claim
that:
(7) Lehrer could not have clenched his fingers at 73 if, at 73, he was
determined to not clench his fingers at Tj 9
Forthwith 1 explain why incompatibilists who believe the TEPP Requirements
can join with Lehrer in rejecting (7).
First, it is important to state and explain the following:
(8) S could have done A at 7 ' if and only if: T' is past and there was
a relevant time, T, at which 5 could at Tdo A at T'.
In (8) the phrase S could at 7 do A at 1
'
is meant to be the past indicative of
S can at 1 do A at 7 ' In many cases there seems to be a dispute over whether
a certain power-time is relevant. For example, suppose that John gets stuck in
an unexpected traffic jam and ends up arriving fifteen minutes late to an
important meeting with his manager, Samar, and Samar’s manager. Samar
9
The expression ‘Lehrer could not have clenched his fingers at 7V is
meant to be equivalent to ‘It is not the case that Lehrer could have clenched
his fingers at 7y. It is not meant to be equivalent to ‘Lehrer could have: not
clenched his fingers at .
In Section 2.3 I defined the expression ‘5 is determined at T to do A at
nrr i
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asserts that John could have arrived at the meeting on time. John asserts that
he could not have done so. The conflict or apparent conflict between these
assertions centers on the issue of what power-time is relevant. Let us assume
that there was some very early time, call it T5 , at which John had it in his
power to depart early and ensure an early arrival at the building in which the
meeting was to occur. Then he could have waited until the time of the meetinu
and walked into the meeting room.
Thus, there was at least one time, namely T5 , at which John could
arrive at the meeting on time. That is to say that there was some time, namely
T5, at which John had it in his power to arrive at the meeting on time.
However, there was also some later time at which John was actually in the
traffic jam and could not arrive at the meeting on time. Samar’s assertion
suggests that she considers to be a relevant time. John s assertion suggests
that he does not consider 75 to be relevant. Is only one of these assertions
true 9 Some may say that there is a fact of the matter whether T5 is relevant,
and thus one of the assertions is true and the other is not. They may argue that
if there was any time at which John could arrive at the meeting on time, then
that time is relevant and Samar’s assertion is true but John’s is not. Others
may argue that each assertion is true and that their apparent conflict is really
no conflict at all. These others may say that the temporal relevancy referred to
in (8) is relative to the context. In the case above, T5 is relevant given the
context invoked by Samar but not relevant given the context invoked by John.
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Thus, Samar's assertion is true and so is John’s, Although Samar's assertton
appears to be of the form P and John's appears to be of the form No, P, the
correct forms are P and No, Q, which can be jointly true.
Being an incompatibilist does not force one onto either side of such a
debate. Incompatibilism, as I have defined it, does not include the slippery
phrase "could have done." Rather it contains the phrase 'no one ever can do
otherwise’. And if there is no time at all in which someone can do otherwise,
then, regardless of what conditions might be placed on relevancy, there is no
relevant time at which someone could do otherwise.
Let us turn again to the flexor story. In that story Lehrer did not clench
his fingers at I\. Moreover, given the lack of flexing at T2 , Lehrer was
determined at J\ to not clench his fingers at A- From that and the First TEPP
Requirement, it follows that:
(9) Lehrer could not at A or A clench his fingers at T3 .
Compare (9) with:
( 10 ) Lehrer could not have clenched his fingers at A-
Now, (10) follows from (9) ifT2 and A are the only times that are relevant.
However, neither incompatibilism nor the TEPP Requirements implies or even
hints that T2 and /
3
are the only relevant times. And that is true regardless of
which side of the temporal relevancy debate is correct.
From ( 8 ) and the First TEPP Requirement it follows that if Lehrer
could have clenched his fingers at A, then there was some relevant time at
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which he was not determined to not clench his fingers at T,. Now, if S j s
determined at r to not do A at 7
”, it does no, follow that there is even one time
before 7 at which 5 is determined to not do A at V. So, it is consistent with
incompatibilism, the TEPP Requirements, and the flexor story that there was
some relevant time prior to F, at which Lehrer was not determined to not
clench his fingers at T3 .
10
Hence, it is consistent with incompatibilism, the TEPP Requirements,
and the flexor story that Lehrer could have clenched his fingers at T3 , even
though he was determined at T2 to not clench them at T3 . So, incompatibilists
who believe the TEPP Requirements can join with Lehrer in rejecting (7).
I now wish to tell a secondflexor story. In discussing the story I make a
tew points similar to those above, but I will also use the story to help show
how the TEPP Requirements allow for the rejection of many other false claims
that some may think incompatibilists must accept.
Suppose that a man named Wong did clench his fingers at T3 . Further,
suppose that flexor's being flexed in a certain way at T2 , together with some
1(1
That consistency holds regardless of which side of the temporal
relevancy debate is correct.
Note that it is consistent with the flexor story as told above that
determinism is false in that story. Although the flexor story happens to have a
character who lives in our world, namely Keith Lehrer, I am not assuming that
the story takes place in our world. I am not assuming this because I do not
want to deal here with the question of whether determinism is true in our
world.
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background conditions, determines at T2 that Wong clenches his fingers at 7\.
Those background conditions include but are not limited to Wong’s having
hands and fingers. I define the word ‘determines’ as follows:
(11) X at T determines Y at T means that: X at T and Y at T are hard
states of affairs, and the laws of nature conjoined with X at T
entails Y at T '. 11
As of T2 Wong was determined to clench his fingers at T3 . Additionally, if the
Second TEPP Requirement is true, it’s not the case that Wong could at T2 not
clench his fingers at 7’3 .
It is consistent with incompatibilism, the TEPP Requirements, and the
second flexor story that there was some relevant time prior to T2 at which
Wong was not determined to clench his fingers at 7V Hence, it is consistent
with incompatibilism, the TEPP Requirements, and the second flexor story
that Wong could have not clenched his fingers at T3 , even though he was
determined at T2 to clench them at T3 .
Therefore, an incompatibilist who believes the TEPP Requirements can
reject the following false principles:
(12) If S could have not done A at T\ then S was not determined at
the moment just before T' to do A at T'.
1
1
This definition is equivalent to Lehrer’s (1976, 244), except that
Lehrer restricts his definition to cases where T precedes T'.
See Section 2.3 for my definition of a hard state of affairs.
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(13) If S could have not done A at T\ then S could at the moment just
before T' not do A at V.
(14) If S did A at 7 ' but could have not done so, then S' s doing so
was never determined.
On the other hand, any incompatibilist accepts:
(15) It .S’ did A at T but could have not done so, then S' s doing so
was at some time undetermined.
Alter receiving an explanation ot the phrase ‘at some time undetermined’, I
submit that most non-philosophers would find (15) to be at least plausible.
Moreover, I think they would find any claim ot the tollowing form to be
implausible:
(16) S was always determined to do A at T' yet he could have not
done so.
Although any incompatibilist rejects (16) and accepts (15), she need
not accept:
(17) If S did A at T' but could have not done so, then S' s doing so had
no sufficient cause.
To understand why, I first must explain the term ‘sufficient cause’:
(18) C at T is a sufficient cause of E at T ' if and only if: T * T' and C
at T determines E at T' n
12
‘ T * T' ’ means that T is not identical to T'.
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(18) allows an event to have many sufficient causes that occur at many
different times. However, C at T cannot be a sufficient cause of C at T,
whereas C at T can and does determine C at T. For C at T (conjoined with L)
entails C at T. Also, C at 7 determines every part of C at T
,
if it has parts.
Causation of any kind must involve either a forward or a backward temporal
sequence, whereas determination need not. 13 (However, I am not firmly
committed to the possibility of backwards causation, and none of my
arguments herein requires that there be this possibility.)
In the second flexor story, the flexing offlexor in a certain way at Ti,
together with some background conditions, is a sufficient cause of Wong’s
clenching his fingers at TV Yet it is consistent with incompatibilism, the
TEPP Requirements, and the second flexor story that Wong could have not
clenched his fingers at ly. Thus the incompatibilist who believes the TEPP
Requirements can reject (17). Moreover, he can reject:
(19) If S did A at T' but could have not done so, then S’s doing so
was uncaused.
13
Since determinism entails that every event is always determined, it
also entails that every event has at least one sufficient cause, assuming there
are at least two states of the world. Hence, determinism entails that every
event has at least one cause, assuming there are at least two states of the
world.
For some good discussion about the dubious claim that determinism is
entailed by every event having a cause, see van Inwagen (1983, 3-5).
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For the sufficient cause in the second flexor story is a cause, and sufficient
causation is a kind of causation.
I do not believe that sufficient causation is the only kind of causation
Striking a match may cause it to light even though striking it is not a sufficient
cause of its lighting. For certain background conditions, such as dryness of the
match and lack of wind, would need to be conjoined with the striking in order
to constitute a sufficient cause. The second flexor story provides another
example. The flexing of flexor in a certain way is a cause of Wong’s
clenching. Since certain background conditions need to be added in order to
constitute a sufficient cause, some may want to call the flexing offlexor a
“partial” cause, but it is still a cause.
14
Since those background conditions are
present, Wong’s clenching has a sufficient cause in addition to the “partial”
cause mentioned earlier, in fact, Wong’s clenching may well have other
“partial” causes, for example a reason and/or an intention to clench his
fingers.
14
David Hume and David Lewis indirectly provide support for the idea
that the flexing of flexor and the striking of the match are causes. One of
Hume's ([1748] 1977, 51, Sec. VII) definitions of ’cause’ reads, “...we may
define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where... if the first
object had not been, the second never had existed.” Lewis ([1973a] 1986b,
167) says, “If c and e are two actual events such that e would not have
occurred without c
,
then c is a cause of e.” Wong's clenching would not have
occurred without the flexing offlexor. The match’s lighting would not have
occurred without the striking of the match. So, the flexing offlexor and the
striking of the match are causes according to the above definitions.
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In debates about incompatibilism the words ‘undetermined',
‘random',
•accidental’, and, inexplicable’ are often applied to individual doings
Frequently it is unclear what is meant by these terms. Potential meanings for
each ot these terms include: ‘never determined', 'lacking a sufficient cause',
and ‘uncaused’. Given my earlier discussions about the second flexor story,
each of these interpretations would allow an mcompatibilist who believes the
TEPP Requirements to reject the corresponding proposition below:
(20) If S did A at / ’but could have not done so, then S’s doing so
was undetermined.
(21) If S did A at 7 ' but could have not done so, then S’s doing so
was random.
(22) If cV did A at 7 ' but could have not done so, then S”s doing so
was accidental.
(23) If S did A at 7 ' but could have not done so, then S’s doing so
was inexplicable. 15
In addition, random
,
accidental
,
and inexplicable each might mean
' unintentional' or ‘whimsical’. Each of these interpretations would allow an
incompatibilist who believes the TEPP Requirements to reject the
‘"Just as an incompatibilist can reject (23), so too do I think he can
reject the following infamous claim of fellow incompatibilist J. L. Austin
([1956] 1966, 308n). He said, “human power.. . is inherently liable not to
produce success on occasion, and that for no reason” (emphasis added).
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corresponding proposition from (21) through (23) above. For if a doing (e .g„
Wong s clenching) was at some time undetermined, it simply does not follow
that it was unintentional or whimsical. In fact, given the view that not all
causes are sufficient causes, the following conjunction is consistent: S is not
determined at T to do A at T\ S intends at Tto do A at T\ and that intention
causes 5 to do A at 7”'. 16 Moreover, it is even open to the incompatibilist to
claim:
(24) II S did A at I
'
but could have not done so, then S’s doing so
was intentional, non-whimsical, and caused.
Some might claim that Undetermined’, ‘random’, ‘accidental’, and
inexplicable can mean ‘at some time undetermined’. I disagree. If Wong’s
clenching was at some time undetermined, it does not follow that what he did
was random, accidental, inexplicable, or simply undetermined. For it was also
at some time determined
,
it did have a sufficient cause, and it may well have
been intentional and non-whimsical. Indeed it may well have been caused by
an intention or other mental state Wong had. In addition, it would be
16
1 believe that some instances of this conjunction are true in the actual
world. Also, I believe that some instances of the following conjunction are
true in the actual world: S is not determined at T to do A at T\ S has at T a
reason to do A at T\ and that reason causes S to do A at T'. I grant, however,
that these beliefs follow from more than just my incompatibilism. A defense
of these beliefs would take me beyond the purposes of this essay. See van
Inwagen ( 1983, 137-52).
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misleading to simply call something “^determined” if it was at some time
determined.
The threat of having to accept claims resembling (21) and (22) has
otten caused discomfort for incompatibilists. For a ‘random’ or ‘accidental'
doing does not seem to be morally evaluable. Thus, it seems (21) and (22)
would force the incompatibilist to regard as not morally evaluable any doinu
where the agent could have not done it. However, with help from the TEPP
Requirements and the second flexor story, I have shown that the
incompatibilist can reject (21) and (22) on every reasonable interpretation
each can be given.
3.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter I present my Argument for Incompatibilism. The sense
of can used in the argument is the power-‘can of ordinary language. (In
Section 2.2 I first discussed this sense of ‘can’ and argued that it is a sense
with which the “ought implies can” principle holds true.) The key premises in
my Argument for Incompatibilism are the Temporal Physical Possibility (or
TEPP) Requirements: If S can at T do A (not do A) at T', then STs doing A (not
doing A) at T' is compossible with the conjunction of the state of the world at
T and the laws of nature. I discuss some of the primary sources of evidence for
the TEPP Requirements. Those sources include how the power-‘can’ is and
would be used. They also include how the power-‘can’ is and would be
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justified. Lastly, 1 present some advantages of the TEPP Requirements. One
advantage is that the TEPP Requirements allow for a wide range of flexibility
regarding the meanings of ‘can' and the power-‘can\ This is partly because
the TEPP Requirements place only necessary conditions on the power-‘can\
rather than necessary and sufficient conditions. Another advantage is that the
TEPP Requirements allow for the rejection of various false claims that some
may think incompatibilists must accept. For example, the TEPP Requirements
allow incompatibilists to reject the following principles:
If S is not determined at T to do A at T\ then 5 can at T do A at T'.
S could not have done A at T' if S was determined at the moment just
before T' to not do A at T'.
If S did A at 7 but could have not done so, then 5”s doing so was
uncaused and random.
70
CHAPTER 4
THE ARGUMENT FOR THE TEMPORAL PHYSICAL
POSSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS, AND THE SUPPORT AND
DEFENSE OF ITS PREMISES
41 The Argument for the Temporal Physical Possibility Requirements
In Chapter 3 I presented my Argument for Incompatibilism. Its key
premises were the Temporal Physical Possibility Requirements or “TEPP”
Requirements. I also discussed some advantages of these requirements. In the
present chapter I argue directly for these requirements. In my Argument for
the TEPP Requirements I intend the word "can to be understood as the
power- "can' of ordinary language, which I first discussed in Section 2.2. In
that section I also argued that the power-‘can’ is a sense of "can’ with which
the "ought implies can" principle is true. Additionally, I contrasted the
concept of power with the concept of ability.
In my argument for the TEPP Requirements I use the technical term
'power-relevant fact’:
( 1 ) A power-relevant fact is a fact or a fact schema that is relevant
to any power-‘cam claim in any context. 1
1 Given this strict definition, it might be better to think of a power-
relevant fact as an “absolute power-relevant fact.” However, for brevity I will
not be using the longer phrase.
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I Will further explain power-relevancy and relevancy in Section 4.2.
In my argument for the TEPP Requirements:
‘I’ represents the conjunction of the laws of nature, and
Ft represents the state ot the world at a power-time T
A power-time is a time in which an agent has the power to do a certain
thing (at a certain time).
I consider a fact that is relevant to a power-‘can’ claim to be a fact that is
relevant with respect to the power-time of that claim. So, as the power-time
changes for a power-'can 7 claim, the set of relevant facts can also change.
Now here is:
The Argument for
the Temporal Physical Possibility Requirements
(D1 ) The Restricted Possibility Requirements or RP Requirements: If
S can at / do A (not do A) at T\ then S”s doing A (not doing A)
at T is compossible with the power-relevant facts.
(D2) The conjunction of P T and L is a power-relevant fact.
(D3) (Dl) and (D2) jointly imply (D4).
(D4) The Temporal Physical Possibility (or TEPP) Requirements: If
S can at T do A (not do A) at T\ then S”s doing A (not doing A)
at T' is compossible with the conjunction of Pr and L. (The
TEPP Requirements are also stated as (Bl) and (B2) of Section
3.1.)
72
(Dj) is an expression ot the idea that if something is a power-relevant
fact, it may be injected into the RP Requirements to yield more specific
requirements. I do not think this will be controversial
In the next section I will support the RP Requirements. In Section 4.3 I
will explain and respond to certain strong forms of contextualism that threaten
(D2). In Section 4.4 I will support (D2).
4-2 Support tor the Restricted Possibility Requirements
I developed the RP Requirements out of a widely accepted view about a
commonality among ‘can's, which is expressed by David Lewis. His flexible,
schematic account conforms pretty well with ordinary language:
To say that something can happen means that its happening is
compossible with certain facts. Which facts? That is determined, but
sometimes not determined well enough, by context. 2 An ape can’t
speak a human language—say, Finnish—but I can. Facts about the
anatomy and operation of the ape’s larynx and nervous system are not
compossible with his speaking Finnish. The corresponding facts about
my larynx and nervous system are compossible with my speaking
Finnish. But don’t take me along to Helsinki as your interpreter: I can’t
speak Finnish. My speaking Finnish is compossible with the facts
“Using set theoretic terminology, Angelika Kratzer (1977) proposes a
similar account of the commonality among ‘can’s.
Fred Feldman (1986, 10) also proposes a similar account framed in
terms of accessible worlds: “The statement that someone can perform a
certain act at a certain time, as I see it, is equivalent to the statement that
there is a possible world then accessible to him in which he does it.” An
accessible world in which he does it might be considered a world in which he
does it and the relevant facts from the base world hold true. (The base world
is the world at which the can-claim is being evaluated.) If there are no
accessible worlds in which he does it, then he cannot do it.
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bUt n0t With further facts about m y lack of trainingat I can do, relative to one set of facts, I cannot do, relative to
another, more inclusive, set. Whenever the context leaves it open which
acts are to count as relevant
,
it is possible to equivocate about whether
I can speak Finnish. (Lewis [1976] 1986b, 77) (second emphasis added)
Concerning facts, Lewis ([1981b] 1986b, 189n)says, “,..[T]hey are
simply truths. That is to say they are the true ones among whatever entities
can be said to bear truth values." For this essay I assume Lewis’s account of
facts. On that account, the following can be considered facts: true laws of
nature, necessary truths, and true counterfactuals.
1 agree with Lewis’s view that the relevant facts for ‘can’ may change
from context to context. However, for specific senses of ‘can’ that flexibility
decreases. 3 For example, I believe that the word ‘can’ is widely used in a
Agreeing with Kratzer, Lewis ([1979] 1986a, 246) says, “,..[A]s
Kratzer [1977, 337-43] has argued, the alleged senses [of ‘can’ and ‘must’]
are altogether too numerous. We do better to think of our modal verbs as
unambiguous but relative. Sometimes the relativity is made explicit.
Modifying phrases like in view of what is known’ or ‘in view of what custom
requires’ may be present to indicate just what possibilities should be ignored.
But sometimes no such phrase is present. Then context must be our guide.”
So, Lewis and Kratzer seem at least inclined toward the view that there are no
senses of ‘can’ as specific as that allegedly picked out by “the power-‘can’.”
On such a view, if there are any senses of ‘can
,
they are very broadly
schematic, such as Lewis s account of ‘can’ as compossibility with relevant
facts.
Incompatibilism is precisely the thesis that there is at least one sense of
‘can’ with which: The “ought implies can” principle holds true, and
determinism entails that no one ever can do otherwise than he does. If the only
sense or senses of ‘can’ are very broadly schematic, then incompatibilism as
defined above is false by default. Without at least one sense of ‘can’ that is
more meaty and specific, one cannot even begin an argument for, or defense
of, incompatibilism.
(continued...
)
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sense whereby the conjunction of PT and /. is a fact schema that is relevant in
every context in which that sense is used. When used in that sense, I believe
that the can' that is being used is the power-'can'. Thus, I consider the
conjunction of PT and I to be a power-relevant fact. (I will support these
claims in Section 4.4.)
The can’ in the RP Requirements is the power-‘can\ These
requirements reflect the fact that the power-'can’, like many ‘can’s, involves a
kind of possibility restricted by certain relevant facts. Much of the appeal of
the RP Requirements derives from their coherence with Lewis’s widely
accepted account of this commonality among ‘can’s. However, there are also
some differences between Lewis’s account and the RP Requirements that
increase the appeal of the RP Requirements.
First, in my account of the RP Requirements I explicitly utilize one
specific ‘can’, the power-‘can'. Whereas Lewis’s account of a commonality
among 'can’s might be misinterpreted to apply to some 'can’s to which it does
not apply. In fact, Lewis’s account does not apply to all ‘can’s. For example, it
(...continued)
I think that compatibilists and incompatibilists alike would find such a
conclusion to their historic debate to be unsatisfying, even if it is correct. I
suspect the debate would ultimately reappear in a slightly different form
revolving perhaps around the following modified definition of
incompatibilism: There is at least one way to fill out some very broadly
schematic sense of ‘can’ so as to make the following jointly true: (a) the
“ought implies can” principle, and (b) the claim that determinism entails no
one ever can do otherwise than he does.
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does not apply to the can' that expresses moral rightness. Here is why.
Anything anyone actually does is compossible with any (actual) fact. Thus,
anything anyone actually does is compossible with any relevant (actual) fact
Thus, according to Lewis’s account, anything anyone actually does is also
something she can do. 4 However, with the 'can’ that expresses moral
rightness, it is not the case that anything anyone actually does is also
something that she can do. Hence, Lewis’s account does not apply to the ‘can’
that expresses moral rightness.
The RP Requirements are double time indexed whereas Lewis’s
account is not. Hence, the Restricted Possibility Requirements, unlike Lewis’s
account, are well suited for the power-‘can’. However, Lewis’s account could
easily be modified in the following way to apply to the power-‘can’:
(2) S can at T do A (not do A) at T' means that S’ s doing A (not
doing A) at T' is compossible with the relevant facts.
By the phrase ‘ the relevant facts’, I do not mean to imply that such facts must
apply across all contexts or even more than one context. For example, as the
4 To avoid that implication, Lewis’s account could be modified as
follows: S can do A means that S’s doing A is compossible with the relevant
propositions. This would permit non-factual propositions to be relevant. For
example, with the ‘can’ that expresses moral rightness, many would regard the
following as a relevant though non-factual proposition that holds true in all
morally ideal worlds: No one kills an innocent person. This helps explain the
dictum that “No one can kill an innocent person.’’
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value for the power-time, T, changes for a can-claim, (2) allows the set of
relevant facts to change.
The RP Requirements express a necessary condition on the power-
can’, whereas, if (2) is correct, it expresses a necessary and sufficient
condition. This leaves (2) more open to controversy. Unlike (2), the RP
Requirements allow for the possibility that there may be more to the power-
can’ than just being a form of restricted possibility. Some may want to place
necessary conditions on the power- can' that are consistent with the RP
Requirements but inconsistent with (2). Some of conditions (a) through (o) in
Section 3.4 fit that description. For example, consider the following very
plausible principle: If S can at T do A at T\ then (o) S exists at T. Suppose
that S had not yet come into existence as of Tbut is twenty years old at T'. If
(o) is a necessary condition on the power-‘can' as the last principle indicates,
then there is nothing S can at Tdo at T'. However, if (2) is correct, then S”s
not existing at 7’cannot lead to the same conclusion. Even ifS’s not existing
at T is a relevant fact, it is still compossible with S”s doing A at T'. If, like the
RP Requirements, (2) was framed as a conditional rather than a definition, (2)
would permit (o) to be an additional necessary condition on the power-‘can\
But (2) is not framed in this manner, nor does it allow for an indirect way of
permitting (o) as a necessary condition by counting S”s not existing at T as a
relevant fact.
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Some might argue that (2) cannot allow either of the following to be
necessary conditions on the power-‘can’: (d) S has at Tthe ability to do A, or
(e) S has at /’the abilities necessary to do A. Take the case of Rick, the
hopelessly incompetent dart player who, with the help of a gust of wind, hits
the bull’s-eye. Suppose that time T is 10 seconds before he hits the bull’s-eye
and / ' is the time he hits the bull’s-eye. Anything Rick actually does is
compossible with any (actual) fact. Thus, anything Rick actually does is
compossible with any relevant (actual) fact. Therefore, according to (2),
anything Rick actually does is also something he at Tcan do. However, some
would claim that at T Rick has neither the ability nor the abilities necessary to
hit the bull s-eye, despite his later doing so on a fluke. (I presented arguments
for and against that claim in Section 2.1) Hence, with the ability-‘can’, Rick
cannot at 7 hit the bull’s-eye. Thus, (2) seems to not apply to the ability-‘can\
Moreover, if the power- can’ has (d) or (e) as a necessary condition, then,
with the power-‘can’, Rick cannot at T’ hit the bull’s-eye at T'. Hence, (2) also
seems to be inconsistent with (d) or (e) being a necessary condition on the
power-^can’. If, like the RP Requirements, (2) was framed as a conditional
rather than a definition, (2) would permit (d) and (e) to be necessary
conditions on the power-’can’.
Because the RP Requirements do not mandate what facts are power-
relevant, these requirements do not lead to either compatibilism or
incompatibilism. Given this fact and the other advantages of the
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RP Requirements described earlier, I do not think the RP Requirements will
be controversial. 1 turn now to a theory that poses perhaps the strongest threat
to (D2). (Again, (D2) is the claim that the conjunction of PT and L is a power-
relevant fact.)
4-3 Strong ‘Can’-Contextualism and Mv Response
“Strong ‘Can
-Contextual ism” and “SC-Contextualism” are the terms I
use for the conjunction of the following: 5
(3) The truth or falsity of any can-claim is dependent on the context
in which the claim is made. 6
(4) Rule of Accommodation: “What you say makes itself true, if at
all possible, by creating a context that selects the relevant
features so as to make it true.” (Lewis 1986c, 251)
' The following theory, justification, and exposition of SC-
Contextualism is loosely derived from my discussions with Phillip Bricker and
from writings by Horgan (1979), Unger (1984, esp. 54-58), and Lewis (most
of Lewis’s work listed in the bibliography of this essay). Unger ( 1984, esp.
54-58) describes some of what I call “SC-Contextualism,” but he does not
agree with that which he describes. I think the other philosophers mentioned
probably would accept the four tenets of SC-Contextualism. However, I do not
think any of them would accept one of my upcoming interpretations of the
theory, namely “liberal SC-Contextualism.”
6
In (3) the somewhat vague words ‘dependent’ and ‘context’ are left
undefined so as to allow various SC-Contextualists to clarify them as each
sees fit.
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( 5 ) //there are any power-relevant facts, they are small in number
and they have far fewer underlying facts than the conjunction of
PT and L.
(6) In ordinary contexts for can-claims and for power-‘can’ claims,
the conjunction of P T and L is not a relevant fact.
To help justify (3) and the Rule of Accommodation, the SC-
Contextualist might appeal to examples like the earlier one about whether
David Lewis can speak Finnish. Lewis ([1976] 1986b, 77) said “I can,” and
then a few sentences later he said “I can’t speak Finnish.” Yet each claim was
true (taken in its respective context). To explain this, one can appeal to (3)
and the Rule of Accommodation. Thus, a good reason to believe (3) and the
Rule of Accommodation is that they provide such an explanation.
An SC-Contextualist might argue against (D2) by claiming that it
would result in a power-‘can’ that would not permit the degree of context-
dependency or the degree of vagueness that are characteristic of the true
power-‘can’ of ordinary language.
To help justify (5), the SC-Contextualist might claim that the contexts
of power-‘can’ claims vary so much that few if any facts or even fact schemas
are relevant in every context. The relevant facts shift from context to context.
To help justify (5) and (6), an SC-Contextualist might claim that, for
any can-claim, the conjunction of PT and L involves so many underlying facts
of such a diverse nature that they cannot all be relevant in an ordinary context.
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The conjunction of fY and L includes a huge number of underlying facts about
macroscopic, microscopic, and submicroscopic objects and the laws that
govern them. Almost all such facts seem to be the farthest thing from a
speaker's mind when making ordinary power-‘can’ claims. Moreover, if so
many facts were relevant to each power-‘can’ claim, such claims would be
impossible to justify. However, they are justifiable. Therefore, the
conjunction of P
j
and L is not relevant to every power-‘can claim in every
context. That is to say, it is not power-relevant, and (D2) is false.
An SC-Contextualist can allow that the conjunction of P T and L is
relevant in some contexts in which ‘can’ or the power-‘can’ is used, for
example, in contexts created by incompatibilists. However, he would be quick
to add that such contexts are not ordinary contexts. So, if an incompatibilist
carves out an ad hoc, esoteric sense of ‘can’ for which that conjunction is
always relevant, he has no right to call that sense the power-‘can’, for the
power-'can’ is a ‘can’ of ordinary language. 7 The conjunction of PT and L
cannot be power-relevant because it is not relevant in ordinary contexts in
which power-‘can’ claims are made. Hence (D2) is false.
7
The issue of whether the compatibilist or incompatibilist is using a
‘can’ of ordinary language is also important because the “ought implies can
principle is plausible with a ‘can’ of ordinary language, and probably is not
plausible with an esoteric or ad hoc sense of ‘can’.
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SC-Contextualism poses a number of serious challenges to (D2) and
thus to my argument for the TEPP Requirements and my argument for
incompatibilism. In the rest of this section I will respond directly to the SC-
Contextualist. In Section 4.4 I will argue for (D2). In Section 4.4.4 I will
argue that (D2) is consistent with and is suggested by the kinds of evidence
that are commonly used for or would be accepted as justification for
power-'can’ claims. One upshot of this argument is that (D2) does not make
power-'can' claims unjustifiable.
Throughout the present section and Section 4.4 I will be using as
examples many ordinary and many less than ordinary power- l can’ claims.
Some people might discount the importance of the less than ordinary
examples. I think this would be a mistake. For the meaning or meanings of a
word often cannot be determined until some less than ordinary claims that
include the word are considered. The truth value most people assign or would
assign to such a claim often can help to determine the meaning or meanings of
that word.
In response to the SC-Contextualist I first acknowledge that most can-
claims, including most power- k can’ claims, are to some degree context-
dependent and vague. The evidence for this is obvious and undeniable. I
maintain, however, that (D2) is consistent with some degree of context-
dependency and vagueness for most can-claims and most power-‘can' claims.
I say this for the following reasons.
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First, since (D2) concerns only power-‘can’ claims, it has no
implications regarding whether any other class of can-claims is context-
dependent or vague.
Secondly, with respect to power-‘can’ claims, (D2) allows for some
contexts to include ability as a necessary condition and for other contexts to
not include it. Moreover, take any subset of conditions (a) through (o) listed at
the beginning of Section 3.4; (D2) allows for some contexts to include that
subset as a necessary condition on a power-‘can’ claim and for other contexts
to not include it. (D2) even permits contexts to be vague about which subset is
included.
Thirdly, (D2) allows for power- ''can’ claims in various contexts to have
differing sets of relevant facts, so long as each of those sets includes PT and
L. (D2) even permits contexts to be vague about which set of facts is relevant
so long as each of those sets includes PT and L.
o
However, actual facts about times at or after the doing in question are
not typically relevant. In a similar context, Lewis ([1976] 1986b, 78) says,
“We are accustomed to exclude facts about the future of the time in question
but to include some facts about its past.” Perhaps such facts are not typically
relevant because of the usual, and perhaps natural, anti-fatalistic tendencies of
most human beings. The more such facts are included as relevant, the closer
one gets to fatalism. And if the whole state of the world at the doing-time is
power-relevant, then fatalism is true. I will justify the last claim in Section
4.4.
However, in some exceptional cases, facts about some time at or alter
the doing in question may be relevant. Consider Lewis's ([1976] 1986b)
example about a time traveler named Tim who has traveled back to 1921. This
is a time before Tim’s father was conceived, and a time well before Tim's
grandfather’s death in 1957. Tim has a gun and is twenty yards from
(continued...
)
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Fourthly, the tact that each of P
j
and L is a variable provides for
additional context-dependence and context variety. The referent of PT can
shift from context to context as the power-time shifts from context to context.
(D2) even allows contexts to be vague regarding what power-time is relevant.
Also, the referent of PT and of L can each shift across possible worlds. For
example, a power-‘can’ claim made in one possible world can have a different
referent for PT and for L than the same power-‘can’ claim made in a different
possible world. This holds even if the time referred to by T is the same.
Many philosophers these days consider knowledge claims to be at least
somewhat context-dependent and/or vague. Yet most such philosophers
believe that, regardless of the context, a claim of “5 knows that P” entails that
P is true and that S believes that P. At least one other condition is then
appended to provide for some degree of context-dependence, for example, the
condition that S satisfies a contextually-relevant standard of justification with
respect to P. Similarly, I believe that the power-‘can’ is somewhat context-
(... continued)
grandfather, a man he detests. Now, the question arises, “Can Tim kill
grandfather?” To explain the claim “Tim can't kill grandfather,” some fact
about a time after 1921 may need to be held relevant. For example, Lewis
([1976] 1986b, 78) suggests as one possibility “the fact of grandfather's
survival until 1957.” Note that (D2) and the TEPP Requirements permit (but
do not require) the relevance of such a fact about a time at or after the doing
time.
84
dependent and vague even though the conjunction of PT and L is relevant to
any power-‘can' claim in any context.
Despite all this, 1 admit that the conjunction of PT and L is a wide
ranging and precise fact schema whose power-relevance would leave the
power- can with significantly less context-dependence and vagueness than
the SC-Contextualist alleges for the power-‘can\ I will now argue that the
greater degree of context-dependence and vagueness alleged by the SC-
Contextualist creates some serious problems for him. I will also show how
(D2) avoids those problems.
There are two basic types of SC-Contextualism, liberal and
conservative. I will first discuss what 1 call “liberal SC-Contextualism.” My
account of this type of SC-Contextualism is inspired by, but not implied by,
some things Lewis says about essences and the Rule of Accommodation. In
that rule, the phrase if at all possible’ is crucial but is open to various
interpretations. In the context of a discussion concerning essences, Lewis
( 1 986c, 25 1 ) explains the phrase as it is used in the rule: “If at all possible.
Perhaps not if you gave an especially silly answer [to the question of what
Humphrey could have been], such as that Humphrey could have been a
poached egg, yet he could not have been a human born to different parents”
(emphases added). The conjunct that Humphrey could have been a poached
egg requires for its truth a liberal context with a rather non-restrictive set of
relevant facts. Such a context would conflict with the more constrained
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context required by the conjunct that Humphrey could not have been a human
born to different parents. So, the conjunctive claim is “perhaps” not true
because there is not a context that allows its conjuncts to be jointly true.
Consider some other things Lewis says about essences:
Further, as with vagueness generally, the vagueness of the
counterpart relation—and hence of essence and de re modality
generally—may be subject to pragmatic pressures, and differently
resolved in different contexts. The upshot is that it is hard to say
anything,false about essences. For any halfway reasonable statement
will tend to create a context that (partially) resolves the vagueness of
the counterpart relation in such a way as to make that statement true in
that context. So, almost anything goes. (Lewis 1986d, 42) (second
emphasis added)
Suppose you took Lewis’s above liberal comments about essences and
the Rule of Accommodation, and modified them to apply to the power-‘can'.
The result coupled with SC-Contextualism would be liberal SC-
Contextualism. However, I would be somewhat surprised if Lewis would
accept liberal SC-Contextualism. In fact, I do not know of any liberal SC-
Contextualists (but, for stylistic reasons, I will often refer to “the liberal SC-
Contextualist”). Liberal SC-Contextualism will serve here at least as a
limiting case to demonstrate the need for SC-Contextualists to clarify and add
enough to their theory to avoid the problems I will discuss here.
One problem for the liberal SC-Contextualist is that his theory makes it
too hard to say anything false with the power-
L
can\ Moreover, power- L can
claims that most people would consider contradictory end up being
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non-contradictory. Consider the (implicitly double time indexed) power- k can’
claims in the following two examples.
Suppose Ajay and Shah are thirteen year old high school freshmen who
have arrived early to their first ever track and field practice. Although Ajay
has never tried to high jump, he points at a bar and says with seriousness,
confidence, and sincerity, “I can high jump over that bar right now.” Shah
says, “No you can’t!" The bar happens to be set at 8 feet for pole vaulting. (A
recent world record for the high jump was 8 feet, V2 inch set by Javier
Sotomayor on 7/27/93 (Famighetti 1994, 868).)
Also, suppose Amy and Nabila are college roommates, and Amy is
frantically preparing for her first job interview. The company is 45 minutes
away by the fastest mode of transportation available to Amy. At 30 minutes
prior to the interview Nabila comes in and tells Amy, “You can’t make it there
on time." Amy looks at her watch and says, “Yes I can.” Then she
immediately rushes out. Unbeknownst to Amy, her watch has malfunctioned
and is 15 minutes slow.
In a way similar to Lewis’s example about speaking Finnish (presented
in Section 4.2), the liberal SC-Contextualist would hold that the context shifts
in the stories of Ajay and Amy in a way that allows each of the claims made to
be true. Each claim creates a context so as to make that claim true. The liberal
SC-Contextualist reaches this conclusion by using his liberal interpretation of
the Rule of Accommodation together with the other tenets ot
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SC-Contextualism. Even taken individually, each tenet provides some impetus
toward this conclusion. Also, note that neither Ajay’s claim, nor Shah’s claim,
nor Amy s claim, nor Nabila’s claim by itself creates two conflicting or
contradictory contexts, such as was seen in the Humphrey case earlier. Since
each claim comes out true, the liberal SC-Contextualist is left with no
contradictions between the claims.
Many people, including myself, would agree that there are many cases
of seemingly contradictory claims of “can” and “can’t” that aren’t really
contradictory. The earlier case about speaking Finnish provides just one
example. However, many cases of “can” and “can’t” cannot be resolved in this
way. For example, I think most people would consider Ajay’s claim to be not
only false but also contradictory to Shah’s claim. Further, I think most people
would consider Amy’s claim to be not only false but also contradictory to
Nabila's claim. Since I side with the would-be majority in these cases, I infer
that liberal SC-Contextualism is false.
Some liberal SC-Contextualists might object by saying that Ajay and
Amy can plausibly be interpreted as using either the ’can' of epistemic
possibility or perhaps even the ’can' of broadly logical possibility. Either
interpretation allows each of their claims to be true. In response, I think that
these interpretations are overly charitable and incorrect. Still, even if they are
not, suppose, as an addition to the stories, that Shah and Nabila ask questions
of Ajay and Amy respectively to better determine whether those ‘can’s were
88
being used. Suppose they answer in ways that make it clear they did not intend
to be using either ot those two can s. At this point charity surely reaches its
limit and the original can-claims of Ajay and Amy are clearly false and the
apparent contradictions between Ajay and Shah and between Amy and Nabila
are real. Yet the liberal SC-Contextualist would still find and employ contexts
that allow Ajay and Amy’s original can-claims to be true and non-
contradictory with Shah and Nabila’s claims.
I look now to the question of how I and others would justify a rejection
of Ajay and Amy’s can-claims. When doing so I grant that most people,
including myself, would refer only to a rather limited number of macroscopic
facts. For example, in the case of Ajay those facts would probably include
Ajay’s age and lack of experience high jumping. However, for reasons of
efficiency and simplicity, justification conditions need not be anywhere nearly
as rigorous or comprehensive as truth conditions. And it is the truth conditions
that I am concerned with when attempting to give a complete explanation of
the truth values of power-‘can’ claims. In addition, with the power-relevance
of the conjunction of PT and L, I can account for, either directly or indirectly,
most of the macroscopic facts people normally use as justification for
power-'can’ claims. For example, Ajay’s age and lack of experience high
jumping are reflected in his physical condition at the power-time, and that
physical condition is directly or indirectly a part of PT .
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A complete and reasonable explanation of the correct truth values in
the cases of Ajay and Amy is that. (D2) is true, the Restricted Possibility
Requirements are true, and the actions Ajay and Amy say they can do are
actually not compossible with the conjunction of P T and L (as it is instantiated
in the two cases). This non-compossibility claim is quite plausible given the
stories of Ajay and Amy. And in Section 4.2 I supported the Restricted
Possibility Requirements. Although I will provide much more support for (D2)
in Section 4.4, one good reason to believe it is that it is part of the reasonable
explanation expressed above.
Some may object to my explanation as follows. Assuming the truth of
quantum mechanics, the actions Ajay and Amy say they can do have a
radically low objective probability given PT and L, but those actions are not
impossible given P T and L
9
Moreover, there are a huge number of similar
cases in the actual world.
In response I concede that all this may be true, and it requires a slight
modification in the Restricted Possibility Requirements, which 1 will soon
describe. Ajay’s not jumping 8 feet that day may not be determined at the time
he makes his claim. However, his not doing so may “for all practical
purposes” be determined.
9
Phillip Bricker introduced this objection to me.
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This provides an occasion for me to express my belief in.
Practical Incompatibilism: If, for all practical purposes, determinism is
true, then no one ever can do otherwise than he does. 10
However, I reject the idea that every actual doing and every actual not-doing
is, for all practical purposes
,
always determined or even determined from the
time the agent comes into existence. I also reject the idea that, for any
particular person, the only doings that are temporally physically possible for
her during her lifetime have either a radically high, radically low, one, or zero
objective probability. 11 As evidence (but not proof) of this, consider the
variability and unpredictability of human behavior, which is the bane of many
a social scientist. I know of no social scientist who is even close to being a
perfect predictor of a wide variety of human behavior.
To do justice to my belief in practical incompatibilism, and to answer
the earlier objection to my explanation of the falsity of Ajay and Amy’s can-
claims, I propose:
1,1
For a worthwhile discussion of issues related to practical
incompatibilism, see van Inwagen ( 1983, 197-202). (Van Inwagen is a
practical incompatibilist.)
11
1 make the one and zero probabilities explicit for the following
reasons. The term ‘radically high objective probability’ conversationally
implies that a probability of one is being excluded. In addition, the term
‘radically low objective probability’ conversationally implies that a
probability of zero is being excluded.
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The Modified Restricted Possibility (RP) Requirements: If 5 can at T
do A (not do A) at T\ then S’s doing A (not doing A) at T' is
compossible with the power-relevant facts, and the objective
probability of S’s doing A (not doing A) at T' is not radically low
given the power-relevant facts. 12
The Modified RP Requirements imply, but are not implied by, the (original)
RP Requirements. So, I can and do accept both the modified and the original
versions. If the RP Requirements are replaced by the Modified RP
Requirements in the Argument for the TEPP Requirements, then the resulting
argument is sound, even though the conclusion stays the same.
The original can-claims of Ajay and Amy are false because: (D2) is
true, the Modified RP Requirements are true, and the actions Ajay and Amy
1
^
“Edward Abrams suggested this modification to me.
Note that a modified version of the Temporal Physical Possibility
Requirements can be constructed along similar lines.
I grant that the borderline of radical improbability is vague. I think that
for any given context there is a range of borders that can reasonably be called
the border of radical improbability. Only very rarely will the determination of
the truth value of a power-‘can’ claim require that the range be so narrow that
it be confined to only one number.
Consider the rare case where S does something. A, at T' that had a
radically low objective probability at 7 given PT and L. If (D2) and the
Modified RP Requirements are true, then S could not at 7 do A at 7 ', even
though 5 actually does A at T'. I can live with this implication. However, note
that between T and T\ the probability may increase. So, there may end up
being a time before T' at which S’s doing A at T' is not radically improbable.
Also, at T\ S’s doing A at T' has a probability of one and thus is not radically
improbable at T'.
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say they can do either are not compossible with Pr and L, or they have a
radically low objective probability given P T and L.
With the passage of time, objective probabilities change (and so do
temporal physical possibilities). If and when a temporally physically possible
doing becomes radically improbable given the power-relevant facts, it
becomes something the agent cannot do (if it had not already been such due to
a prior violation of some other necessary condition on the power-'can’).
As a continuation ol Ajay s story, suppose that he fails miserably at an
attempt to high jump over the bar. He walks back to Shah with his head held
low and says, “Well it looks like what I said before wasn't true." As a
continuation of Amy’s story, suppose that she arrives at her interview 15
minutes late and the interviewer tells her that she is too late and must leave.
On her way home she hears the time broadcast on the radio and realizes that
her watch is 15 minutes slow. Back at her dorm room she tells Nabila what
happened. Then Amy says, “Well it looks like what I said before wasn't true.”
Now the liberal SC-Contextualist is in another bind.
Liberal SC-Contextualism applied to the original can-claims of Ajay
and Amy renders them true. Yet liberal SC-Contextualism also renders true
Ajay and Amy’s later denials of the original can-claims. I find such results
counterintuitive and contradictory. I think the original can-claims of Ajay and
Amy are false and their later denials are true. I think most people would agree.
However, the liberal SC-Contextualist may argue that his results are neither
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counterintuitive nor contradictory since Ajay and Amy’s denials were made in
a different context than the original can-claims. But 1 think the liberal SC-
Contextualist is ignoring the fact that Ajay and Amy’s denials implicitly
invoke the contexts of the original can-claims. For the denials refer
specifically back to those claims, and each denial states that the original can-
claim “was not true The use of the past tense rather than the present tense
further indicates that the denials are invoking the contexts of the original can-
claims. Faced with this evidence, I think the liberal SC-Contextualist might
respond in one of two ways.
First, he might claim that the above evidence is not sufficient and that
Ajay and Amy could contradict their original can-claims only by saying,
"What I said before, taken in the context 1 said it
,
was false.” Similarly, Shah
and Nabila could only contradict Ajay and Amy’s original can-claims by
saying, “What you said, taken in the context you said it
,
was false.” The
problem with this strategy is that hardly anyone speaks in such ways to make a
denial. And even if they did, nearly all such denials would be false according
to liberal SC-Contextualism. For most of the claims being denied would be
true according to liberal SC-Contextualism. And there is no point in making a
false denial. Still, most people think that most ordinary denials (whether true
or not) really do contradict the claims apparently being denied. The liberal
SC-Contextualist must deny this commonsense belief. Now, the only question
is: Flow should he phrase his denial to accomplish his purpose?
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Another option the liberal SC-Contextualist might take is to say that
Ajay and Amy s denials are false because each is equivalent to the claim
“What I said before, taken in the context I said it, was false.” Although this
option does ensure contradictions between the original claims and their
denials, the truth values end up all wrong. For Ajay and Amy’s original can-
claims are true according to liberal SC-Contextualism, and thus the denials
are false. This gets the truth values backward.
Therefore, in any case such as Ajay’s or Amy’s, liberal SC-
Contextualism yields truth values with which most people would disagree,
whereas (D2) yields truth values with which most people would agree.
Moreover, since the would-be majority is correct in these cases, liberal SC-
Contextualism is false.
Notwithstanding the original power-‘can’ claims of Ajay and Amy,
many if not the majority of power-‘can’ claims would be regarded by most
people to be true. In those many cases, liberal SC-Contextualism is on firm
footing since it ensures the truth of nearly all power-'can’ claims. As we saw
with the cases of Ajay and Amy, (D2) is not as charitable as liberal SC-
Contextualism. However, if determinism is false, as I believe, then (D2) may
well allow the truth of all or nearly all of the power-’can' claims that most
would regard as true. With the affirmative power-‘can’ claims that most would
regard as true, it may well be that in all or nearly all such cases the doing is
compossible with the conjunction of Pj and L , and the doing is not radically
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improbable given PT and L
n
Here (D2) allows, but does not entail, the truth
of the corresponding affirmative claims. In this way (D2) plays a role in
explaining the truth of the corresponding claims.
Consider the power-^can’ claims most would regard as true that are
also of the implicit or explicit form: could have done otherwise than A at T'
even though he in tact did A at / If indeterminism is true, as I believe, it may
well be that in all or nearly all such cases, S’s doing otherwise than A at T is
compossible with the conjunction ofPT and L, and it is not radically
improbable given PT and L (where / represents some relevant power-time).
Here (D2) allows, but does not entail, the truth of the corresponding ‘could
have done otherwise’ claims. 14 In this way (D2) plays a role in explaining the
truth of the corresponding claims.
Now consider the negative power-‘can’ claims that most would regard
as true. It may well be that in all or nearly all such cases either: (a) the doing
is not compossible with P T and L, or (b) the doing is radically improbable
n Note that in every case where the doing actually gets done, the doing
is compossible with PT and L.
Affirmative power-‘can’ claims include claims of the following
implicit or explicit forms: S can at T do A at T', S can at T: not do A at T\ S
could at T do A at T', and S could have done otherwise than A at T'. Negative
power-‘can’ claims include negations of claims in the prior forms.
14
Whereas, if determinism and (D2) are true, then all such ‘could have
done otherwise’ claims are false. See my comments on hard determinism and
common sense in Section 1.4.
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given PT and L, or (c) some other necessary condition on the power-‘can’ is
violated. In case (a) or case (b), (D2), together with the Modified RP
Requirements, entails the truth of the corresponding negative claims and
explains the truth of those claims. In case (c), the corresponding negative
power-'can' claims also are true. In case (c), (D2) would not play a role in
explaining the truth of the corresponding claims, but it would not prevent such
truth or such an explanation.
Therefore, if determinism is false, then (D2) may well allow the truth
of all or nearly all of the power-‘can’ claims that most would regard as true.
Moreover, (D2) may help explain the truth of most such claims. So, (D2) need
not clash with common sense regarding such claims. (D2) and liberal SC-
Contextualism may, in very many cases, allow for identical truth values for
power-'can' claims. However in cases such as those of Ajay and Amy, (D2)
yields truth values with which far more people would agree.
I now look briefly at the question of how the liberal SC-Contextualist
might differentiate the power- k can’ from other senses of ‘can’. To do so he
would need to describe how the things relevant for power-"can’ claims
generally differ from the things relevant for other senses of "can’. Given his
liberal interpretation of the Rule of Accommodation, and given the other
tenets of SC-Contextualism, it is not at all clear to me how he might do this.
I turn now to conservative SC-Contextualism. The conservative SC-
Contextualist would claim that Ajay and Amy’s original can-claims really are
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false. With each of these can-claims, the conservative SC-Contextualist would
count a limited number of macroscopic facts as relevant. To simplify the
discussion I will focus on Ajay’s claim. With this claim, the conservative SC-
Contextualist might count as relevant the strength of Ajay’s legs at the power-
time, call this D, and the force of gravity at the power-time, call this D'. (One
could use facts about Ajay’s age and lack of training to infer that strength D is
not nearly as strong as the strength of the legs of the world record holder.) In
addition, some macroscopic law-like generalization is necessary in order to
arrive at a non-compossibility statement that may explain the falsity of Ajay’s
can-claim.^ One prospect is the following:
The Strength Generalization: If a human’s legs have strength to degree
D at T and the force of gravity is present to degree D' at T, then
he does not high jump 8 feet within N seconds after T.
(
N
represents the number of seconds between the power-time and the latest
relevant doing time in the case of Ajay.)
Even though the Strength Generalization is not a law of nature, it may
nevertheless be (accidentally) true and may be consistent not only with the
laws of nature, but even with indeterminism. Moreover, Ajay’s jumping over
the 8 foot bar (by the latest relevant doing time) is not compossible with the
15 Of course, I am assuming here that facts about the doing time are not
relevant in this case.
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conjunction of the Strength Generalization and the previously cited
macroscopic facts concerning gravity and the strength of Ajay’s legs.
I grant that the above tactics probably will produce the non-
compossibility the conservative SC-Contextualist wants and needs in the case
of Ajay. However, to avoid being ad hoc, these tactics are in need of some
guiding pragmatic rules to help determine, in this and other cases, which
macroscopic facts, including which macroscopic law-like generalizations, are
to be counted as relevant. These rules are also needed to differentiate the
power-‘can' from other senses of ‘can' and to prevent the Rule of
Accommodation from being too accommodating. On the other hand, the rules
should not be too restrictive. They would play a role similar to some of the
rules that govern use of the word ‘know’. Just as there is a rule that
knowledge implies true belief, so too would there be rules, perhaps more
vague, that govern the use of the power-‘can’. These rules should cohere with
how the power-‘can' is used in ordinary language. Moreover, they should not
add up to or flow from the following ad hoc rule: If most people would regard
a certain power-‘can’ claim as true (as false), then count as relevant the first
set of facts one thinks of—other than the set of PT and /.—that is not
obviously irrelevant and that ensures or helps ensure the truth (falsity) of that
power-‘can’ claim.
To my knowledge, there is no published work that provides rules that
basically satisfy the above desiderata. Beyond my woefully incomplete
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description of such rules, I am not at all clear what those rules would be.
Without knowing what they would be, it is very difficult to evaluate
conservative SC-Contextualism. Nevertheless, 1 do have some preliminary
criticisms ot it. For one, I doubt that there is a set of rules that can both satisfy
all the above desiderata and deal with the case of Ajay in roughly the way
described earlier. Still, even if there is such a set of rules, that way of dealing
with the case of Ajay has numerous problems.
First, the Strength Generalization may be false for all we know; the
same holds for other macroscopic generalizations a conservative SC-
Contextualist may want to use in this or other cases. In contrast, neither L nor
Pt faces this problem. And it is a problem, since, with the power-‘can\ the
things relevant to it in any particular context must be facts. To see how the
Strength Generalization might fail, consider the following scenarios. Perhaps
there will be one time in the whole history of the world in which a radically
improbable series of events occurs that is inconsistent with the Strength
Generalization. Or perhaps someone with leg strength D at T will take a new
drug or nutritional supplement right after T, and it suddenly gives him enough
leg strength so that he high jumps 8 feet within N seconds (even though the
force of gravity is D ' ).
Secondly, even if the Strength Generalization is true, it is only
accidentally true. Not so with L. Moreover, it seems inappropriate to count
accidentally true generalizations as relevant, especially when you have the
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option of generalizations that are not accidentally true, namely the laws of
nature. When justifying power-‘can' claims, accidentally true, macroscopic
generalizations are needed as an imperfect but useful proxy for L or the
implications of L. But accidentally true generalizations do not seem
appropriate as part of the truth conditions of power-'can’ claims
Thirdly, in the case of Ajay, the conservative SC-Contextualist must
make a difficult choice between different macroscopic facts and different
generalizations that seem to be equally good or better candidates for relevance
than the ones discussed. Perhaps the wind resistance present or the agent’s
weight should be accounted for in the relevant facts and in the generalization.
Perhaps the conservative SC-Contextualist should count as relevant the fact
(which I will allow as part of the story) that Ajay does not have access to a
leg-strengthening wonder drug. These are just a few of the many worthy
candidates. The conservative SC-Contextualist needs some reasonable and
generalizable way to choose between them. I do not know what that way might
be. In contrast, if the conjunction of Pr and L is power-relevant, no such
choice need be made.
I turn now to respond to some more of the earlier criticisms of (D2)
made by the SC-Contextualist. I grant that most ordinary power-'can’ claims
refer directly to macroscopic things rather than microscopic or
submicroscopic things. I also grant that most people are usually not directly
considering microscopic or submicroscopic things while making such claims.
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However, all this does not rule out the relevance of microscopic things,
submicroscopic things, or the laws that govern them. First, macroscopic things
are themselves composed of microscopic and submicroscopic things.
Furthermore, those microscopic and submicroscopic things are in constant
interaction with macroscopic things. In fact, as van Inwagen (1983, 191) puts
it, even “ individual submicroscopic events can ‘trigger’ observable events.” 16
Second, there are many cases of a person making a power-‘can’ claim
without being aware of all that is relevant to that claim. Reconsider the case
ot Ajay. In that case Shah claims that Ajay cannot high jump over that bar
right now. To help explain the truth of Shah’s claim one must at least count as
relevant some law of nature or macroscopic law-like generalization that
concerns gravity. Moreover, one must do so even //Shah is unaware of any
such law or its content. 17 Without the relevance of such a law, I do not see a
reasonable way to achieve the non-compossibility that would explain Shah’s
claim.
1
6
Van Inwagen (1983, 191-92) gives an example of a click from a
Geiger counter that is caused by an individual submicroscopic event (that was
at some time undetermined). In the same pages he also gives an example of a
bomb set to explode if a Geiger counter clicks five times in any ten second
interval. In the same chapter, he further discusses the fact that the behavior of
observable things statistically supervenes on the submicroscopic.
Note that the above examples concerning geiger counters seem to show
that determinism is not even true for all practical purposes.
17 One can find a parallel in epistemology: A person can have
justification for believing something even if he is unaware of the relevant
standards of justification.
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Consider also the case of Jane who is suddenly bed-ridden due to a
mysterious, undiagnosed illness. Unbeknownst to her or her doctor, she has
contracted a viral infection that has yet to be discovered by the scientific
community. Jane gets a call from a nearby friend who has yet to hear of the
illness. She asks Jane to walk over to see her in ten minutes. Jane says, “No I
can t do that. 1 m quite sick right now. To explain Jane s negative can-claim,
it is necessary to count her viral illness as relevant. Yet that illness involves a
microscopic virus of which she and her doctor and the scientific community
are unaware.
These two examples suggest that one cannot disprove (D2) with an
argument based on the mere fact that people making power-‘can’ claims are
unaware ot the conjunction of PT and L, and unaware of most facts that
underlie it. However, I admit that such unawareness does not help my case for
(D2).
Also, I admit that at first glance (D2) is implausible due to the
enormous number of (macroscopic, microscopic, and submicroscopic) facts
underlying P T and L for any one power-'can’ claim. However, I think this
initial implausibility is far outweighed by the advantages of and reasons for
(D2). In the present section I have presented some of those advantages. In
Section 4.4 I will present some of those reasons. Here are some additional
advantages.
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Some philosophers, e g., Lehrer (1976, 264-66) and Unger (1984, 54-
58), apparently think that incompatibilists must hold every past state of the
world as relevant. Although there may be some incompatibilists who hold this,
(D2) leads to incompatibilism while requiring the relevance of just one state
of the world to each power-‘can’ claim. Also, unlike SC-Contextualism, (D2)
provides tor every single power-‘can’ claim a clear, easily understandable
schema that precisely determines some, if not all, of the particular facts
relevant to that claim. With (D2) there is no need to completely wipe the slate
clean from one power-‘can’ claim to the next. Moreover, (D2) provides for
some commonality between all power-^cam claims by identifying at least one
thing among them that is independent ot the contextual interests of the
speakers. Some vagueness and some context-dependence remain, but each is
less than with SC-Contextualism. Unlike SC-Contextualism, (D2) allows the
power- k can' to land in the proper places on the continuums of context-
dependence and vagueness. Lastly, all these things make it much easier to
differentiate the power-‘can’ from other senses of ‘can’.
I now want to discuss the relationship between SC-Contextualism and
compatibilism. Clearly, SC-Contextualism entails the falsity of (D2). It is also
clear that SC-Contextualism entails that, with the power- ‘can ' of ordinary
language
,
the following is false: Determinism entails that no one ever can do
otherwise than he does. Nevertheless, SC-Contextualism does not entail
compatibilism. For SC-Contextualism does not rule out the possibility that
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there is another sense of ‘can’ with which: The “ought implies can” principle
holds true, and determinism entails that no one ever can do otherwise than he
does. Even if the power-‘can’ is not a sense of 'can’ for which the conjunction
of /V and L is always relevant, such a sense of ‘can’ might still be one with
which the “ought implies can” principle holds true. Even if that sense were
unordinary or esoteric, it would still be possible for it to be a sense with which
that principle is true. To rule out such possibilities the SC-Contextualist must
look for resources beyond the boundaries of her theory.
In the present section 1 have described SC-Contextualism and the
liberal and conservative types of SC-Contextualism. I have shown that liberal
SC-Contextualism yields incorrect truth values for various power-‘can’
claims. In addition, I have uncovered some significant problems with
conservative SC-Contextualism. I have also shown that there are many
advantages (D2) has over SC-Contextualism in explaining power-'can’ claims.
For these reasons, I believe that SC-Contextualism is false. Still, even if it
were true, it would not fulfill all the hopes some SC-Contextualists may have
invested in it. For SC-Contextualism does not entail compatibilism. The best
if not the only alternative left for compatibilists is to look for one or more fact
schemas whose power-relevance would both lead to compatibilism and
explain power-‘can’ claims better than (D2). However, I do not think they will
find such.
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44 Support for (D2), the Claim that the Conjunction of the State of the World
at the Power-time { P j ) and the Laws of Nature (L) is a Power-Relevant Fact
While I argue tor (D2), I will not be assuming that the truth of a
proposition implies its relevance. In particular, I will not be assuming that a
law ot nature or a state of the world is relevant in virtue of its being true. For
if truth implied relevance, then fatalism would be true.
Fatalism is the thesis that it is a necessary truth that no one ever can do
otherwise than he does.
I will now explain why fatalism would be true. First, the proposition
expressing the state of the world at the doing-time, namely PT >, is true in every
case to which it applies. Further, if truth implied relevance, then Pr would be
relevant to any power-‘can' claim in any context. (That is to say, PT would be
power-relevant.) Moreover, Pr includes what the agent is doing and not doing
at T'. Thus, the power to do otherwise involves either: the power to do
something that is not compossible with PT >, or the power to not do something
whereby not doing it is not compossible with PT >. However, no one could have
any such powers if Pj< were power-relevant. To conclude, if truth implied
relevance, then PT > would be power-relevant, and thus fatalism would be true.
In this essay I simply assume fatalism is false.
My support for (D2) is divided into four sections. In Section 4.4.1 I
will argue that Pj is a power-relevant fact. In Section 4.4.2 I will argue that L
106
is a power-relevant fact. I assume that the power-relevance of Pr and the
power-relevance of /.jointly entail the power-relevance of the conjunction of
P T and L. Thus, if Sections 4.4. 1 and 4.4.2 are successful, (D2) will be
justified. In Section 4.4.3 I will present and discuss some inferences and
statements that can be explained by (D2). In Section 4.4.4 I will argue that
(D2) is consistent with and suggested by the kinds of evidence that are
commonly used for or would be accepted as justification for power-‘can’
claims.
4.4.1 Support for the Power-Relevance of TV
Suppose that Pratip is laughing at a certain time, T. In this case,
regardless of whether or not determinism is true:
(10) Pratip cannot as of T not laugh at 7
1
.
18
Here the power-time and doing-time are identical. Once T is present, Pratip is
already laughing. He may well try at T to stop his laughing, and he may
1 o
Similarly, Nissen (1969, 135) says, ‘"That is, if the statement that
Smith does not leave at 3:30 is true, then. ..the statement that he can, at 3:30,
leave at 3:30 is false.” Also, Lehrer (1976, 266) says, “For it is what exists at
the present that determines what a person can and cannot do then.” [The term
‘then’ refers in this case to the present ]
Some may think that my reasoning about Pratip has fallen victim to the
following fallacy: If not-F at T, then it is not possible that P at T. I plead
innocent. Even if the ‘can’ in (10) is regarded merely as a form of restricted
possibility, my reasoning about Pratip would be of the following form: If not-
F at T, then it is not possible as ofT that P at T.
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succeed very quickly. But by the time he succeeds, it is too late for his success
to erase the fact that he really was laughing at T. In cases where the power-
time and doing-time are not identical, Pratip’s powers need not be so
restricted. Pratip may have at 7 the power to do something after Tthat is an
instance of not laughing. Thus, fatalism can be avoided. Also, prior to T,
Pratip may well have had the power to not laugh at T. However, as of T he
does not have that power.
I believe that if these distinctions and justifications were made to many
(patient) people, most would agree that Pratip cannot as of T not laugh at T.
Also, the reader of this essay may find the distinctions and justifications
convincing regardless ot what others may think. In either case, the example of
Pratip supports the following compelling principle:
(11) It .S' does A at T\ and T = T\ then S cannot at T not do A at T'.
In other words, no one can at T not-do at T what he is already doing at T.
The question now arises, “What is the power-relevant fact that best
explains the truth of ( 1 0) and ( 1 1 )?” One alternative to consider is P-r, the
state of the world at the doing-time. This alternative does maintain the truth of
(10) and (11) because P T > includes everything that the agent is doing (and not
doing) at T'. However, for reasons explained earlier, if Pr were power-
relevant, the assumption that fatalism is false would be contradicted. Thus, PT >
is not power-relevant.
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Another alternative is Pj, the state of the world at the power-time. This
alternative does maintain the truth of (10) and (1 1 ) because, in cases where
T\ P T includes everything that the agent is doing (and not doing) at T'.
Moreover, the broad nature of the power-relevance of PT helps to explain the
fact that (1 1) has such universal application. In addition, the power-relevance
of P 7 does not imply fatalism. For in cases where T * T\ the state of the world
at 7 does not include, indeed cannot include, what the agent is doing and what
the agent is not doing at T'. ]> Since the power-relevance of PT maintains the
truth of ( 1 0) and (11) without leading to fatalism, and I see no other possible
power-relevant fact that better explains the truth of ( 10) and ( 1 1), I consider
PT to be power-relevant.
Some may claim that PT is far too broad to be power-relevant. For
example, if PT is power-relevant, then the state of all objects on Mars at T is
relevant to what Pratip can at T do at T. And why should things so far away
from Pratip at T be relevant in that way?
I respond that the claim that Mars is so far away at T is an assumption
that seems itself to be based on the power-relevance ofPr . For the state of the
world at T includes the distance of Mars from Pratip. Moreover, despite
Mars’s distance, certain true statements about Pratip are best explained by
19
It cannot include it because states of the world are hard states of
affairs. (See Section 2.3 for an explanation of the term ‘hard state of affairs .)
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counting as relevant the state of all objects on Mars at T. For example: “Pratip
cannot at 7 be touching Martian rock /?, at T” and “Pratip cannot at 7’ be
leaping in Martian crater (
,
at 77’ Counting the laws of nature as relevant will
not help to explain the truth of these statements. For the conjunction of the
laws of nature is consistent with Pratip’s touching at T and with Pratip’s
leaping in C
l at T.
In order to help explain in a simple, precise way every single claim
about what Pratip at 7 can and can’t do at T, the power-relevance of P T fills
the bill. Take any object anywhere in the universe that Pratip is not acting on
at 7 and make a statement involving his acting on it. For example, consider
statements of the form “Pratip does A to O at 77’ Since Pratip does not do A to
() at T, he cannot at 7 do A to O at 7. No one can as of T do something at T
that makes the world different than it is at T. Also, no one can as of T do
something, even a mental act, at T that he is not in fact doing at T. I see no
possible power-relevant fact that would better explain the truth of all these
conclusions than PT .
4.4.2 Support for the Power-Relevance of L
Consider:
(12) No one ever can break a law of nature.
(12) is a simple but revealing dictum with which even some compatibilists,
including Lewis ([1981a] 1986b), agree. Moreover, most people would agree
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with (12), and I think they would agree regardless of whether ‘can’ is
interpreted to mean power or ability. Interpreted to mean power, I translate
the dictum as follows:
( 1 j) For every time, 7, and every time, T\ no one can at T do
something at 7 that would be or would cause a law-falsifying
event.
(14) A law-falsifying event is an event whose occurrence is not
compossible with L. In other words, a law-falsifying event is an
event that is not physically possible.
20
The following examples help to justify (12) and (13). 7/1 could at T run
at T faster than the speed of light, then I could at T break a law at T'.
However, no one ever can run that fast. If I could at T throw a baseball at T' so
fast that my doing so would cause the baseball to exceed the speed of light,
then I could at 7 do something at 7 ' that would cause a law-falsifying event
(and would qualify me for a tryout with the New York Yankees). However, no
one ever can throw a baseball so fast. It is common sense that the laws of
nature put certain limits on what we have the power to do. Those limits apply
at all times to all possible doings.
2(1
Lewis ([1981a] 1986b, 297) says, “Let us say that an event would
falsify a proposition if and only if, necessarily, if that event occurs then that
proposition is false.” He also makes remarks that suggest he would probably
agree with the translation of (12) into (13). However, none of his remarks
involves double time indexation.
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The question now arises, “What power-relevant fact best explains the
truth of (12) and $3)?” The obvious choice is L. For L is not compossible
with something that is or would be a law-falsifying event, nor is L
compossible with something that causes or would cause a law-falsifying event.
Moreover, the broad nature of the power-relevance of L helps explain the fact
that (12) and (13) apply at all times to any possible doing in any possible
circumstance.
Some compatibilists may be willing to accept the claim that L is power-
relevant. However, to do so they must reject the claim that P T is power-
relevant. For the power-relevance ofPr and L leads to incompatibilism.
Compatibilists who accept the power-relevance of L would need to answer my
previous argument tor the power-relevance of Pj and my future arguments in
Section 4.4.3 for the power-relevance of the conjunction of PT and L.
Moreover, such compatibilists apparently could not maintain, as Lewis
([1981a] 1986b) does, that:
(15) It is possible that sometime someone can do something such that
if he did it L would have been falsified (though not by his act or
any event caused by his act).
Some compatibilists may want to deny the power-relevance of L. But if
L were not power-relevant, then why would nearly everyone agree that no one
ever can break a law of nature? What else might be power-relevant to explain
this dictum? The compatibilist who agrees with me that PT is power-relevant
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is in an uncomfortable position here. To avoid incompatibilism he must find
something besides the power-relevance of L that better explains the truth of
(12) and (13).
One alternative for the compatibilist is to claim that what is power-
relevant is not L but rather that:
(16) L holds with respect to the doing in question and all events that
would causally depend on that doing. 21
The power-relevance of (16) would maintain the truth of (12) and (13). (For
(16) is not compossible with doing something that would be or would cause a
law-falsifying event.) In addition, the power-relevance of (16) does not imply
the power-relevance of L. Here’s why.
If L were power-relevant, then L would hold with respect to not only
the doing in question but it would also hold with respect to whatever is power-
relevant besides L. Further, if PT is power-relevant (as well as L), then L
would hold with respect to Pj
,
and this would lead to incompatibilism.
However, (16) clearly leaves out P T as one of the things L holds with respect
to. And (16) does so regardless of whether PT is power-relevant. Thus, the
21
Another alternative for the compatibilist would be to claim that the
following is power-relevant: (a) L holds at and after the time of the doing in
question. However, if one allows for the possibility of backwards causation as
Lewis ([1976] 1986b, 73) does, then this alternative fails. For the power-
relevance of (a) would not rule out the possibility of breaking a law by
causing a law-falsifying event to occur in the past.
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power-relevance of ( 16) does not imply that L is power-relevant and does not
lead to incompatibilism. Moreover, since (16) does not imply that L is power-
relevant, (16) does not conflict with (15).
In response, even though the power-relevance of (16) would maintain
the truth of (12) and (13), it would not best explain the truth of (12) and (13).
Here s why. First, the compatibilist s claim that (16) is power-relevant seems
so tailored to explain (12) and (13) that it appears ad hoc. Secondly, one can
use the power-relevance ol L to help explain many inferences and statements
that the power-relevance of (16) does not. For the power-relevance of L
combined with the power-relevance of PT can be used to explain many
inferences and statements that the power-relevance of (16) alone or the power-
relevance of (16) combined with the power-relevance of P T does not. I will
show this in the next section.
If it is shown, and if my earlier arguments were successful, then each
of PT and L is power-relevant. Furthermore, if each is power-relevant, then the
conjunction of P T and L is power-relevant (i.e., (D2) is true).
I now consider an objection to the power-relevance of L. Consider the
claim:
(17) “For any time, T, and for any time, T', God or some God-like
being can at T break a law of nature at T'."
114
Many people believe or would accept (17), and (17) is inconsistent with the
power-relevance of L. ~ Thus L is not power-relevant.
In response, I grant that (17) is inconsistent with the power-relevance
of L, assuming (17) employs the power-'can’. However, the fact that many
people believe ( 1 7) does not make ( 1 7) true. And it is the truth of ( 1 7) that
must be added as a premise to the above argument for that argument to be
valid. Moreover, denying the truth of (17) is a bullet I am willing to bite,
notwithstanding the protestations of my God-fearing dentist.
Even if a majority of people believed ( 1 7), L could still be power-
relevant. For I do not think that a semantic assertion about the power-‘can'
must permit the truth of every predominantly believed claim that employs the
power-‘can'. Nevertheless, I admit that a semantic assertion that is
inconsistent with a great number and variety of predominant beliefs is less
likely to be true than a semantic assertion that is inconsistent with few if any
predominant beliefs. I believe that the assertion of the power-relevance of L
falls in the latter category.
Notwithstanding all that, it should be recognized that some people who
believe or would accept (17) may be employing some ‘can' besides the
22 i *
Phillip Bricker made these two points to me and suggested that they
jointly provide some evidence against the power-relevance of L.
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power-‘can’, e.g., the can' of epistemic possibility, or the ‘can’ of broadly
logical possibility. In such cases, the power-relevance of L is not challenged
4 4 3 Some Inferences and Statements that Can Be Explained with rrm
Suppose you are trying to figure out whether you can as of a time, T, do
an act A
,
at another time, T'
.
Suppose that you know nothing about A and the
state of the world at T except that:
( 18) Your doing A at T' is not jointly possible with the state of the
world at T and the laws of nature. 2 ^
So, can you as of / do A at I '? Avowed compatibilists notwithstanding, I
think that most people would answer this open-ended question with a “No.” I
base this claim partly on the results of an informal empirical study that I
conducted. In that study I stated the story and asked the question to many non-
philosophers. Almost all of them answered, “No.” 24 I think a broad scientific
study would support the claim that most people would answer, “No.” Given
‘ One may ask, “How might one come to believe a claim in the form of
( 1 8)?” 1 find this question moot to the present thought experiment. (18) is
meant to be a (generic) supposition
,
not a justified belief.
While supposing the truth of (18), one can maintain that in the actual
world there are many cases of undone doings that are jointly possible with PT
and L.
24
1 asked non-philosophers since many philosophers have prior
theoretical commitments that might pull them away from ordinary language
and unduly influence their answers.
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the generic nature of the story, such an answer conflicts with compatibilism.
Moreover, the only possible power-relevant fact that can help explain why
most people would answer “No” is the conjunction of PT and L. This strongly
suggests that the conjunction of P
j
and L is power-relevant.
In contrast to the straightforward explanation above, a compatibilist’s
claim that (16) is power-relevant but not L is of no help here. For (16) does
not imply that L holds with respect to any part or all of the state of the world
at the power-time. Thus, not even (16) combined with the power-relevance of
PT is of any help here.
Now, some SC-Contextualists would say:" Granted, most people
would answer “No” to the question in the broad scientific study. For the
questioner has created a special context in which the conjunction of P T and L
is relevant to whether the respondent can at T do A at T'. This puts pressure on
the respondent to answer in conformance with that context, and most
respondents would do so. Still, that by no means conflicts with compatibilism.
Nor does it imply that the conjunction of PT and L is relevant to any
power-'can’ claim in any context.
In response, I grant that the hypothesized results of the broad scientific
study are open to some interpretation. Thus, it is hard to prove either of the
two interpretations described above. However, the SC-Contextualist’s
This objection is quite similar to one Phillip Bricker had.
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interpretation is based on a theory that has many problems that I described in
Section 4.3. One important point in favor of my interpretation is that the very
generic nature of the story and the very generic nature of the question suggests
to each respondent that his answer should apply to: any case whatsoever in
which it is true that his doing A at T' is not compossible with the conjunction
°f pr and L. Moreover, I think most respondents would agree that their “No”
answers should apply to such cases even when those selfsame respondents are
not aware that such a case is at hand. In addition, suppose that each
respondent would be asked whether he can think of any possible
circumstances in which (18) would be true yet he could at 7’ do A at T'. I still
think most would answer “No.”
I acknowledge that it is often difficult to try to find out what people
mean by a word without having some influence on how they use that word. A
fairly non-obtrusive approach is to simply take notice of how they use a word
in everyday life. Unfortunately, this approach often does not fully expose a
word’s meaning or meanings. If and when that is the case, as it is with the
power-'can', one must turn to other approaches. One approach is to directly
ask people what they mean by a word. Another approach is what I call the
“situational questioning approach”; this is the approach I suggest for the broad
scientific study I described earlier. With this approach the questioner creates
and asks open-ended questions about an actual or hypothetical situation. The
questioner must create an environment where the respondent feels comfortable
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answering any way he wants. The questioner can even say, “There are no
correct answers here. Whatever you say is fine with me.” The questioner must
avoid revealing her own beliefs and avoid asking leading questions. She also
must avoid asking questions in a tone that suggests she desires a certain
answer. She also must avoid asserting anything that suggests that she thinks a
certain answer would be correct. If such precautions were to be taken in the
broad scientific study described earlier, I think the results would nevertheless
be as 1 hypothesized. And there is no reason why those precautions could not
be taken.
I grant that while describing a situation, the questioner inevitably
makes some things salient. For example, with the story used in the above
studies, the conjunction of PT and L is made salient. I also grant that by
making something salient this puts at least minor, subtle, and indirect pressure
on the respondent to treat it as relevant when choosing his answer. However,
if the questioner takes the precautions described above, that pressure will not
be excessive. The point of this approach is to see whether the respondent will
treat the salient things as relevant when choosing his answer. Such subtle,
non-excessive pressure is sometimes necessary to “tease out'’ a word’s
meaning or meanings. If the respondent ignores that subtle pressure, one
meaning might be suggested. If he bends to the subtle pressure another
meaning might be suggested. Whether he ignores or bends to that subtle
pressure is usually clear by the answer he gives.
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With the broad scientific study described earlier, the results could end
up providing evidence against the power-relevance of PT and L. For the
respondents could generally answer the question with “Yes, I can at T do A at
I or It depends or I need to know more about the circumstances.”
Although I do not believe this would happen, I am not certain. I do believe,
however, that if such answers were given, SC-Contextualists would probably
hasten to put forth the results as evidence against the power-relevance of PT
and L. Yet, if the results would be as I believe, it seems some SC-
Contextualists would claim such results provide no evidence for the power-
relevance of PT and L. I submit that they cannot have it both ways.
Here is a hypothetical example of a study that further shows the
usefulness of the situational questioning approach. Suppose someone wants to
define what the word ‘die means. She gets a fairly good idea by noticing in
what circumstances people generally use the word. Still, she wonders:
(19) Is it semantically possible for a living thing to go out of
existence without dying?
So she conducts a large linguistic study with a wide variety of respondents to
help determine the answer to this question. Throughout this study she takes
the precautions described earlier.
In the study she asks the respondents what each means by the word
‘die’. The vast majority gives answers that either suggest an answer of “No” to
(19) or do not help in answering (19). Later she tells them there are actually
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some bacteria that reproduce by splitting in half. She also tells them of living
sea sponges that can be put through a sieve yet the hundreds of parts that come
out can continue to live as independent organisms in separate containers. Then
she asks the respondents whether at least one of these examples is a case of a
living thing going out of existence without dying. The vast majority answers
in the affirmative. Here it was necessary to use the situational questioning
approach to help find out that it is semantically possible for a living thing to
go out ot existence without dying. The other approaches were unsuccessful in
determining this linguistic fact.
In a similar way, I think that to best judge whether the conjunction of
PT and L is power-relevant, it is necessary to use the situational questioning
approach. It is not sufficient to merely observe the power-"can' in use or to
ask people what they mean when they use it. Even if one assumes that most of
the ordinary power-‘can‘ claims observed are true, one cannot rule out the
power-relevance of P T and L. For determinism may well be false (see Section
4.3 for more on this).
I turn now to some more examples to help determine whether the
conjunction of PT and L is power-relevant.
Suppose that Nadia is on earth at a certain time, T, and that Mars is
100,000,000 miles away from earth at T. Suppose also that the theory of
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relativity is correct that it is a law of nature that nothing moves faster than
1 1,176,920 miles per minute. 26
Without having to ask about the state of spaceship technology at T, it
follows from this story of Nadia that she does not walk on Mars at one minute
after 7. It also follows from Nadia’s story that:
(20) Nadia’s walking on Mars at one minute after T is not
compossible with the conjunction of the state of the world at T
and the laws of nature. 27
Lastly, it follows from Nadia’s story that:
(21 ) Nadia cannot at T walk on Mars one minute after T. 28
After being provided an explanation of any unfamiliarities, most people would
readily accept the inference from the story of Nadia to (21).
26
According to the theory of relativity, the speed of light in a vacuum is
the maximum speed of any material particle. The speed of light in a vacuum is
186,282 miles per second or 1 1,176,920 miles per minute.
27 The state of the world at T includes the distance of Nadia from Mars
at T.
Note that (20) does not follow from the fact that Nadia does not walk
on Mars at one minute after T.
“ 8 Van Inwagen (1983, 75-78) discusses a similar example and a
somewhat similar inference in order to support one of his arguments for
incompatibilism. However, he does not use his example and inference to help
justify the power-relevance of the conjunction of PT and L. For he does not
utilize any term that expresses the concept of power-relevance or any concept
similar to it.
Note that I am not assuming that (21) follows from the fact that Nadia
does not walk on Mars at one minute after T.
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The question now arises, “What is the power-relevant fact that best
explains the validity of the inference to (21) and the would-be acceptance of
that inference by most people 0 ” The obvious choice is the conjunction of PT
and Lr For the story of Nadia certainly implies (20). Further, if (20) is true
and the conjunction of Pj and L is power-relevant, then (21) is undoubtedly
true. Moreover, one can use the power-relevance of P T and L to
straightforwardly explain a number of other inferences and can-claims,
including those discussed herein.
Note that the broadness of P T helps to explain the inference from the
story of Nadia to (21). For Mars’s location so far away from Nadia at T is a
tact that is part ol the state of the world at T
,
and this fact helps the inference
to go through. In addition, neither the power-relevance of L alone nor the
power-relevance of P T alone will explain the inference. For Nadia’s walking
on Mars one minute after T is compossible with L alone and her walking on
Mars one minute after T is compossible with PT alone.
An advantage to the option of holding P T and L power-relevant is that it
explains the inference from the story of Nadia to (21) yet it avoids fatalism.
Fatalism is avoided because the power-relevance of PT and L does not imply
that in ///deterministic worlds no one ever can do otherwise than he does.
29
Thus, the validity and would-be general acceptance of that inference
conflicts with (though may not contradict) compatibilism.
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In contrast to the incompatibility straightforward explanation of the
inference from the story of Nadia to (21), a compatibility claim that (16) is
power-relevant but not L is of no help in explaining that inference. It is not
even of help to the compatibilist who accepts that (20) follows from the story
of Nadia. For (16) does not imply that L holds with respect to any part or all of
the state of the world at the power-time. Thus, not even (16) combined with
the power-relevance of PT can be used to help explain the inference from the
story of Nadia to (21 ).
The reasoning employed in the case of Nadia can be applied in a
similar way to many different cases, including cases that are more
psychological in nature. For example, consider the case of a schizophrenic
named Steve. One night he is in a packed movie house. During a quiet scene
in the movie Steve is reminded of some past event in his life, and at 9:00 p.m.
he suddenly has an intense feeling of distress. Just suppose that a number of
laws of nature jointly imply that if a person has an intense feeling of distress
such as Steve’s, and that person operative vocal cords (as Steve has), then that
person will scream within five seconds.
It follows from this story of Steve that he screams within five seconds
after 9:00 p.m. It also follows from this story that:
(22) Steve’s not screaming within five seconds after 9:00 p.m. is not
compossible with the conjunction of the state of the world at
9:00 P.M. and the laws of nature.
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Lastly, it follows from Steve’s story that:
(23) Steve cannot at 9:00 p.m. do otherwise than scream loudly
within five seconds after 9:00 p.m.
To continue the story, Steve’s scream is so loud and disturbing that
much of the audience hurries for the exits. One person named Boris trips and
breaks his wrist.
After being provided an explanation of any unfamiliarities, most people
would readily accept the inference from the story of Steve to (23). Moreover,
for reasons similar to those used in the story of Nadia, the power-relevance of
the conjunction of P T and L best explains the validity of the inference to (23)
and the would-be acceptance of that inference by most people. 30 Note that the
broadness of L helps to explain the inference from Steve’s story to (23). For L
includes all the various laws of nature that help this inference go through.
I now present and discuss some commonsensical, ordinary can-claims
made by G. E. Moore to see if they can be at least partially explained by the
power-relevance of PT and L. He says:
.
..
[0]ne of the commonest and most legitimate usages of the phrases
‘’could” and “could not” is to express a difference, which often really
does hold between two things neither of which did actually happen.
Only a few instances need be given. 1 could have walked a mile in
twenty minutes this morning, but I certainly could not have run two
miles in five minutes. I did not, in fact, do either of these two things;
30
For reasons similar to those used in the story of Nadia, a
compatibilist’s claim that (16) is power-relevant is of no help in explaining
the inference to (23).
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but it is pure nonsense to say that the mere fact that I did not, does
away with the distinction between them, which I express by saying that
the one was within my powers, whereas the other was not. Although I
did neither, yet the one was certainly possible to me in a sense in which
the other was totally impossible. (Moore [1912] 1970, 133-34)
This passage would be greeted with assent by most people. In addition,
if the distinction between ability and power were explained, 1 think most
people would assent to the above passage whether it was interpreted to be
about ability or about power. If Moore is interpreted to be making power-
claims, and the phrase “could have” is expanded in a way similar to that
which 1 argue tor in Section 3.4, then Moore has made the following central
claims:
(24) There was a relevant time at which Moore had it in his power to
walk a mile in twenty minutes during the morning.
(25) There was no relevant time at which Moore had it in his power
to run two miles in five minutes during the morning.
The question now arises, “What is the power-relevant fact that helps to
explain the truth of (24) and (25)?” Once again the conjunction of PT and L
fills the bill. With respect to (24), if the conjunction of P T and L is power-
relevant then one necessary condition on (24) is that:
(26) There was a relevant time, T, at which Moore’s walking a mile
in twenty minutes during the morning was compossible with the
conjunction of state of the world at T and the laws of nature.
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Of course, the state of the world at T includes Moore’s physical condition at
J\ Assuming that Moore had no physical handicaps at T
, (26) is a plausible
claim.
' 1
Moreover, it seems to support (24). Even though Moore did not walk
a mile in twenty minutes that morning, I, as an incompatibilist who is not a
determinist, can consistently assert (26).
32
Further, if (26) is true and the
conjunction of PT and L is power-relevant, then a necessary condition for (24)
is fulfilled. Thus, by asserting (26) and that the conjunction of PT and L is
power-relevant, one can help to explain the truth of (24). Hence, the power-
relevance of P T and L can help to explain the truth of (24). Moreover, the
power-relevance of P T and L helps to explain the truth of (24) in a simple,
straightforward way that one can use for myriad other power-‘can’ claims.
Let us now consider (25). The truth of (25) can be explained as follows.
Take any time one might want to consider relevant with respect to (25) and
call it T. One can then claim that:
31
In Section 4.4.4 I will describe some of the other kinds of evidence
one might use to justify statements like (26).
32
For an incompatibilist who is not a determinist can assert that there
was some relevant time at which it was not determined whether Moore was to
walk a mile in twenty minutes that morning. Whereas, a hard determinist, an
incompatibilist who is a determinist, must reject (26) and (24). For more on
hard determinism, see Section 1.4.
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(27) The state of the world at T together with the laws of nature is
not compossible with Moore’s running two miles in five minutes
during the morning in question.
As evidence tor (27), a fairly recent world record for a two mile run came
nowhere close to five minutes; it was 8 minutes and 13.8 seconds, set by
Brendan Foster. 33
If (27) is true and the conjunction of P T and L is power-relevant, then
(25) is surely true. Thus, by asserting (27) and that the conjunction of Pj and
L is power-relevant, one helps to explain the truth of (25). Hence, the power-
relevance of Pr and L can help to explain the truth of (25). Moreover, it does
so in a simple, straightforward way that one can use for myriad other
power-'can' claims.
I turn now to an ordinary can-claim discussed by J. L. Austin ([1956]
1966, 308). In a famous footnote he says, “Consider the case where I miss a
"According to the Guinness Book of World Records (McWhirter 1976,
327), this record was set on August 27, 1973, at the Crystal Palace in London.
In Section 4.4.4, I will describe some of the other kinds of evidence
one might use to justify statements like (27).
14 Some may want to deny (27) on the following grounds: Assuming the
truth of quantum mechanics, Moore’s running two miles in five minutes is
radically improbable given PT and L, but it is not impossible given PT and L.
In response, I concede that this may be true. However, the Restricted
Possibility Requirements could be modified as described in Section 4.3. Then
the power-relevance of PT and L together with the radical improbability of
Moore’s running two miles in five minutes would help to explain the truth of
(25).
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very short putt and kick myself because I could have holed it.
. . . It is not that I
should have holed it if conditions had been different: that might of course be
so, but I am talking about conditions as they precisely were.” Here Austin
expands on his original can-claim in order to explain what he meant by it.
Once the basic differences between the ability-‘can’ and the
power-'can’ are explained, I think that most people would accept that (28)
either implies or is equivalent to (29):
(28) S can at T do A at T'.
(29) Given conditions exactly as they are at T, S can at T do A at T'.
For most people would not accept that (28) implies or is equivalent to any of
the following:
(30) If certain conditions were different than they are at T, then S
could at T do A at T'.
(31 ) If certain conditions were different than they are at T, then S
would at T do A at T'.
(32) If certain conditions were different than they are at T, then S
should at T do A at T'.
For (30) and (31) and (32) are obviously counterfactual conditionals, whereas
(28) and (29) are not.
3 '
35
1 argued against some more specific conditional accounts of ‘can’ in
Section 2. 1
.
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Regarding (29), it is important to determine what the phrase
'conditions exactly as they are at T ’ refers to. I think that the most reasonable
and plausible interpretation is that such conditions are the state of the world at
I and the laws ol nature. First, the broadness of each is needed to account
for cases such as Nadia s and Steve s described above. Secondly, suppose you
are trying to figure out whether you can as of a certain time, T, do a certain
act. A, at another time, T'. To figure this out, does it matter what you could do
if the state of the world at T were different? Does it matter what you could do
ifthe laws of nature were different? I think that most people would answer
“No” to these questions. I conclude that the phrase ‘conditions exactly as they
are at 7 ’ (as used in (29)) is best interpreted to include the state of the world
at /’and the laws of nature.
Since most people would accept that (28) either implies or is
equivalent to (29), and since the phrase 'conditions exactly as they are at T ’ is
best interpreted to include the state of the world at T and the laws of nature, I
again conclude that the conjunction of PT and L is power-relevant.
I admit that my conclusion may be either strengthened or weakened by
scientific studies in which the generic and non-generic examples discussed in
this chapter are presented to participants. And that is as it should be. I think
36
Thus, compatibilism conflicts with the would-be general acceptance
of the claim that (28) implies or is equivalent to (29).
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many compatibilists would disagree with me about what most people would
say or accept in such studies. But perhaps some compatibilists can at least can
agree with me that such studies would go a long way toward resolving the
debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. I think that such an
agreement would be an important step forward. Moreover, stimulating the
interest of empirical linguists to carry out such studies would be another
important step forward.
4.4.4 The Evidence Used to Justify Power-'Can’ Claims
The ultimate purpose of this section is to argue that the power-
relevance of PT and L is consistent with and is suggested by the kinds of
evidence that are commonly used for or would be accepted as justification for
power-'can claims. One implication of this is that the power-relevance of P T
and L does not make power-'can' claims unjustifiable, nor does
incompatibilism.
Power-'can' claims include claims that are explicitly or implicitly of
the following forms:
(33) S can at T do A at T'.
(34) S cannot at T do A at T'.
In this section I will show how evidence that is or would be used to
support claims in the form of (33) also supports claims of the following form:
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(35) S’s doing A at T' is compossible with the conjunction of P T and
L.
In addition, I will show how evidence that is or would be used to support
claims in the form of (34) also supports claims of the following form:
(36) S’s doing A at T' is not compossible with the conjunction of PT
and L.
Note that the relation of support that I have in mind does not
essentially involve (logical) implication. If proposition P implies proposition
Q, then P supports Q. However, if P supports Q, it does not follow that P
implies Q. To support claims in the form of (33) through (36), one inevitably
must look to the past as a guide, albeit an imperfect guide. For the purposes of
this essay I am ignoring the question of how to justify the general process of
induction.
In what follows I use ‘X \ 7 ’, ‘Z ’, and lN ’ to represent numbers. In
particular:
tN ' is used to represent the number of minutes there is between T and
77
For most people, claims in the form of (37) through (47) below are
used as, or would be considered as support for, claims in the form of either
(33) or (34). Claims in the form of (37) through (47) below also provide
support for claims in the form of either (35) or (36). I do not intend (37)
through (47) to be an exhaustive list.
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(37) I know ofX instances in which: The state of the world was
relevantly similar to that at T, and 5 did A or something
relevantly similar to A approximately N minutes later.
(j 8) There are A times I know about in which S did A or something
relevantly similar to A.
( j> 9) Of the X times I know about in which S did >1 or something
relevantly similar to A
,
there were Y times in which the state of
the world approximately N minutes before 5 did it was
relevantly similar to the state of the world at T.
(40) There are X times I know about in which the state of the world
was relevantly similar to that at T, and of those X times, there
were ) times that S did A or something relevantly similar to A
approximately ./V minutes later.
(41 ) I know that .S’ has done A many times and under a wide variety of
conditions.
37
(42)
-(46) The same as (37) through (41) except that ‘S” is replaced
with ‘someone relevantly similar to S\
37
Lehrer ( 1 966a, 1 77-8 1 ) presents and discusses schemas very similar
to (38) and (41). Also, he (1966a, 178) emphasizes the importance of temporal
propinquity: “The amount of time that has elapsed between the time at which
we see a person perform an action and the time at which it is claimed that he
can perform the action is of considerable importance. For example, if I saw a
man perform forty push-ups twenty years ago and have not seen him do it
since, that would hardly justify my claim to know that he can do it now.”
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(47) I know that S did A at T'.
Regarding (37), ifX is sufficiently above zero, then (37) supports (33)
and (35). What is to be considered “sufficiently above zero” may vary from
case to case. If A' is sufficiently close to zero, then (37) supports (34) and (36),
or at least (37) does not support (33) and (35). What is to be considered
sufficiently close to zero may vary from case to case. However, there is no
number for A that would make (j7) imply any of (33) through (36). The same
things I have said here about (37) apply equally to (38).
When looking to the past for evidence that supports a claim in the form
of (33), (34), (35), or (36), it would be most helpful to know of states of the
world before / that were exactly like the state that obtains at T
,
and then to
know whether the doing in question happened N minutes later. Moreover, it
would be helpful if the aforementioned exact likeness held on the macroscopic
and the non-macroscopic levels. For macroscopic things are themselves
composed of non-macroscopic things, and those non-macroscopic things are in
constant interaction with macroscopic things. (For more on this, see Section
4.3.)
However, one cannot expect to know of states of the world before T
that were exactly like the state that obtains at T. And since justification
conditions need not be as stringent as truth conditions, one can and must
compromise by considering cases in the past where conditions were merely
relevantly similar to the conditions that obtain at T.
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Usually, past evidence is evaluated on more than one kind of relevant
similarity; the following case of Kurt is an example of this. Suppose one is
trying to judge whether the following are true:
(48) Kurt can at 7j walk across tightrope R at T2 .
(49) Kurt s walking across tightrope R at T2 is compossible with the
state of the world at 7j and the laws of nature.
N represents the number of minutes between 7j and T2 . Suppose that Kurt is a
world famous acrobat and has walked across tightrope R many times. Suppose
he has walked across somewhat thinner tightropes many times. Additionally,
suppose he has walked across somewhat longer tightropes many times. All this
supports (but does not imply) (48) and (49). Suppose that at 7j Kurt is high on
marijuana to degree D j and drunk to degree D2 . In this case, one kind of
relevant similarity to look for in the past is Kurt’s being drunk to a degree
close to Di. Suppose that there have been many times in the past when Kurt
was drunk to such a degree and then walked across tightrope R approximately
N minutes later. This provides further support for (48) and (49).
Another relevant similarity to look for in the past is Kurt’s being both
drunk and high on marijuana. Suppose there have been no cases in the past
where Kurt was both drunk and high on marijuana and then walked across a
tightrope approximately N minutes later. Suppose there were two times when
Kurt was both drunk and high on marijuana and tried to walk tightrope R
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about N minutes later. Those times he fell into the safety net. All this is
evidence that detracts from (48) and (49).
Regarding (39), it X > 1, and Y/X is sufficiently above zero, then (39)
supports (33) and (35). What is to be considered “sufficiently above zero" may
vary from case to case. \fX > 1, and Y/X is sufficiently close to zero, then (39)
supports (34) and (36), or at least (39) does not support (33) and (35). What is
to be considered “sufficiently close to zero” may vary from case to case. The
larger X is, the more important the ratio of Y to X is for judging (33) through
(36). However, there is no combination of numbers for X and Tthat would
make (39) imply any of (33) through (36). All the things I have said here about
(39) apply equally to (40).
Lehrer (1966a, 179) speaks of the kind of case where one has seen a
person perform an action “under circumstances very similar to the
circumstances he is in when it is claimed that he can perform it.” Lehrer
remarks, “In this case, the greater the similarity of the circumstances the
better the evidence.” In fact, the greater the similarity of the circumstances the
better the evidence for not only (33), but (35) as well.
Claims in the form of (41) provide support for corresponding claims in
the form of (33) and (35). (41 ) is particularly useful when one knows of few
or no prior cases where S was in conditions relevantly similar to those he is in
at T. If one knows that S has done A many times and under a wide variety of
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conditions, then one has evidence that (given the conditions S is in at T ) he
can at / do A at / s One also has evidence for (35).
The same things 1 have said about (37) through (41) apply equally to
the corresponding claims in (42) through (46).
Claims in the form of (47) either imply or at least provide support for
corresponding claims in the form of (33). A denial of such an implication
would be made by those who believe that ability is a necessary condition on
the power-‘can\ (See my discussion in Section 4.2 of the hopelessly
incompetent dart player who hits the bull s-eye.) Even if the aforementioned
implication does not hold, it is nevertheless the case that claims in the form of
(47) do imply (and thus support) corresponding claims in the form of (35).
Assuming knowledge implies truth, (47) implies that S does A at T'. And if S
does A at T\ then S’s doing A at V is compossible with any (actual) state of
the world and the (actual) laws of nature. 39
Certainly the kinds of evidence claims described above have
justificatory relevance to (33) and (34). Still, some may question whether
those kinds of evidence claims have justificatory relevance to (35) and (36).
That question may arise since (35) and (36) include the concept of a law of
This is especially true if ability is a necessary condition on the
power-‘can\
39 Whereas claims in the form of (35) or (33) obviously do not imply
that S does A at T\
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nature, yet the kinds of evidence claims described above do not include that
concept. I first respond by saying that an evidence claim need not invoke all
the concepts included in the statement that it supports. For example, ordinary
evidence claims that support statements in the form of (33) and (34) do not
invoke the concept expressed by the ‘can’ in (33) and (34). Also, knowing that
someone once dunked a basketball is evidence that he is not a dwarf, even
though this evidence claim makes no mention of dwarfism. Secondly, the
evidence claims for statements in the form of (33) through (36) concern the
frequency of events and the frequency of patterns of events. Science too is
concerned with such. For example, suppose a scientist experiments many
times under a variety of conditions and finds no instance in which a chemical
solution in state] is followed one minute later by that chemical solution being
in state 2 . This finding is evidence that it is never the case that a chemical
solution in state] at a certain time will then be in state 2 one minute later. This
finding is also evidence that it is not physically possible for a chemical
solution to be in state] and then be in state 2 one minute later. In other words,
this finding is evidence that a chemical solution’s being in state 2 is not
compossible with the conjunction of its being in state] one minute earlier and
the laws ofnature. And this is so even though the finding does not mention
the laws of nature.
Now the following questions arise: “What power-relevant fact best
explains why the evidence that is or would be used to support claims in the
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form of (33) also supports claims in the form of (35)?” and “What power-
relevant fact best explains why the evidence that is or would be used to
support claims in the form of (34) also supports claims of the form of (36)?”
Given the generic nature of (33) through (47) and the specific mention of the
conjunction of Pr and L in (35) and (36), it seems that the power-relevant fact
that provides the best explanation is the conjunction of PT and L. Also, the
evidential links between (33) and (35) and between (34) and (36) suggest
semantic links that the power-relevance of PT and L can help account for. If
the conjunction ot P
j
and L is power-relevant, then (35) is a necessary
condition on (33), and (36) is a sufficient condition for (34).
Therefore, the power-relevance of Pr and L is consistent with and is
suggested by the kinds of evidence that are commonly used for or would be
accepted as justification for power-‘can claims. Hence, the power-relevance
ot P
j
and L does not make power-‘can' claims unjustifiable, nor does
incompatibilism.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In the present chapter I argue for the Temporal Physical Possibility
Requirements, which state: If S can at T do A (not do A) at T\ then S’s doing
A (not doing A) at V is compossible with the conjunction of the state of the
world at T and the laws of nature. The ‘can’ here is the power-‘can’ of
ordinary language (which was first discussed in Section 2.2). The key premise
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is (D2), which states: The conjunction of state of the world at Tand the laws
of nature is power-relevant, i.e., it is relevant to any power-^can’ claim in any
context. I defend (D2) from certain strong forms of contextualism. I also show
the many advantages (D2) has over that form of contextualism. The primary
way I support (D2) is by arguing that its truth explains why most people would
respond in certain ways when presented with certain power-‘can’ claims
and/or certain hypothetical situations. Lastly, I argue that (D2) is consistent
with and is suggested by the kinds of evidence that are commonly used for or
would be accepted as justification for power-‘can’ claims.
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CHAPTER 5
THE UNAVOIDABILITY IMPLIES DEONTIC AMORALITY ARGUMENT.
INCLUDING OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
5 1
—
e Unavoidabi lity Implies Deontic Amoralitv Argument
In the present chapter I shall support and defend the premises of the
following argument. Every 'can' in this argument should be understood as the
power-'can' of ordinary language, which I first discussed in Section 2.2.'
The Unavoidability Implies Deontic Amorality Argument
(El) The First Avoidability Requirement: If it is right at T that S do
A at T\ then 5 can at T not do A at T'. (R -> C~)
(E2) The Second Avoidability Requirement: If it is wrong at T that S
do A at T\ then S can at T not do A at V. (W -» C~)
(Ej) The Third (and last) Avoidability Requirement: If S' ought at 7’
to do A at T\ then S can at T not do A at T'. (O -> C~)
When I use the power-‘can in this argument, I am not assuming, nor
need I assume, the truth of incompatibilism or the Temporal Physical
Possibility Requirements. (I presented arguments for them in prior chapters.
Even if those arguments were not sound, the Unavoidability Implies Deontic
Amorality Argument could still be sound.)
In this argument, I include some abbreviations as mnemonic aids. For
example, ‘R -> C~’ is short for ‘Right implies can: not-do’. And that is short
for: ‘If it is right at T that S do A at T\ then S can at T not do A at T \ The
tilde symbol, means ‘not’.
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(E4) If (El), (E2), and (E3) are true and no one ever can do otherwise
than he does, then nothing anyone does is ever right, wronu, or
obligatory.
(A2) Therefore, if no one ever can do otherwise than he does, then
nothing anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory. 2 ((A2) is
also the second premise of the Main Argument, which is in
Section 1.2.)
Deontic amorality is the state of not having a deontic status. I am
counting only rightness, wrongness, and obligatoriness as deontic statuses.
In Section 5.2 I will argue tor the Avoidability Requirements. At
present 1 want to argue for (E4) with the help of the following explanation of
a phrase in (E4):
'Throughout this essay, when I use the terms Tight’, 'wrong’,
‘obligatory’, and their cognates, I intend the qualifier 'morally’ or 'moral’ to
be implicit if it is not explicit.
In this essay I am using an absolute or “all-in” sense of 'wrong’,
‘right’, and ‘ought’. In a footnote in Section 2.2 I briefly contrasted the
absolute or “all-in” sense of 'ought’ with Ross’s (1930, 19-20) notion of
“prima facie duty.”
In this essay I also intend to be using senses of ‘right’, ‘wrong’, and
‘obligatory’ that are used in ordinary language. I think most people use the
term ‘right’ to mean something stronger and more positive than mere
permissibility (yet weaker than obligatoriness). It is this sense of ‘right’ I
intend to be using in (E1)/(R —> C~). However, I grant that if the term ‘right’
is used to mean permissibility, then (E1)/(R —» C~) would at least be
questionable. For it is at least somewhat plausible to claim that: all
unavoidable doings are permissible (as of the time they are unavoidable), but
they are not obligatory or wrong.
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( 1 ) No one ever can do otherwise than he does if and only if: (a)
There is no S
,
T, A, and 7
' such that S can at T not do A at T' yet
s ln fact does do A at T'\ and (b) there is no S, T
,
B
,
and T' such
that S can at 7 do B at T' yet S in fact does not do B at T'.
( 1 ) follows from Principle ( 1 ) of Section 3.2. (See Section 3.2 for some
comments on the latter principle.)
Conjunct (a) of (1 ) together with (El)/ (R -> C~), implies:
(2) There is no S, T, A, and T such that: It is right at T that S do A
at T\ and S in fact does do A at T\
Conjunct (a) of (1) together with (E2)/(W -> C~), implies:
(j>) There is no S, T, A, and 7 ' such that: It is wrong at T that S do A
at T\ and S in fact does do A at T'.
Conjunct (a) of ( 1 ) together with (E3)/(0 -» C~), implies:
(4) There is no S, T, A, and T' such that: S ought at T to do A at T\
and S in fact does do A at T'.
From (2), (3), and (4) it follows that:
(5) Nothing anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory.
I conclude that (E4) is true. 3
3 Consider the following variation of (A2):
(i) If no one ever can do otherwise than he does, then nothing
anyone does not do is ever right, wrong, or obligatory.
(continued...
)
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5 2 In Support of the Avoidabilitv Requirements
In this and future sections I will often be assuming the followinu
principle:
(6) If S cannot at T do otherwise than A at T\ then S cannot at T not
do A at T'.
Principle (6) is also derived from Chapter Three’s Principle (1 ).
I turn now to some ordinary language considerations that support but
do not entail the Avoidability Requirements. First, suppose a speaker has
made a deontic evaluation of a certain act by a certain agent. Later, the
speaker comes to believe that, for whatever reason, the agent cannot or could
not have done otherwise than that act. When such cases actually happen, the
speaker usually withdraws the evaluation, either publicly or in her own mind.
And such withdrawals are appropriate if the Avoidability Requirements are
true. For example, consider the following realistic case of a client who
sometimes forgets to go to appointments with his accountant, Ms. Wells. One
(...continued)
An argument for (i) could be made with Conjunct (b) from (1) together with
the following modified versions of the Avoidability Requirements: (R > C),
(W > C), (O > C). 1 do not specifically argue in this essay for these
modified versions. However, I think my support of the non-modified versions
does lend some support to the modified versions. Note that (i), (A2), and (Al)
(from the Main Argument in Section 1.2) jointly imply: If determinism is
true, then nothing anyone does or does not do is ever right, wrong, or
obligatory.
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day another appointment is missed. Ms. Wells calls her client’s answering
machine and says angrily, “This is Katherine Wells. You ought to have come
to your appointment' Where are you'?!!” Later Ms. Wells discovers that her
client had missed his appointment due to a significant injury sustained when
the jetliner he was in skidded off a runway. Upon learning this, Ms Wells
believes that her client could not have done otherwise than miss the
appointment. She then calls her client at the hospital and says, “I am so sorry
to hear about your injury. I’m glad you survived and I wish you a swift
recovery. By the way, please disregard that message I left when you missed
your last appointment. If I had known what had happened, I wouldn’t have left
that message.”
Consider also the fact that people rarely if ever make deontic
evaluations ol the doings of infants, truly insane or psychotic people, and non-
human animals ot all kinds. I grant that sometimes insane people and
psychotics are locked up in the name of public safety. Also, some animals are
killed in the name of public safety. However, such actions are consistent with
a lack of deontic evaluations of the doings of these beings. I grant that people
often use /70/2-deontic yet judgmental terms to describe the doings of animals,
psychotics, insane people and infants. For example, they call some of these
doings “bad,” “horrible,” “good,” or “charming .” 4 In fact, some of the doings
4
Consistent with the Avoidability Requirements, I contend that
badness, horribleness, goodness, and charm, each do not imply avoidability.
(continued...
)
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of these beings have such good consequences, and these consequences are so
obvious, that it seems people would also call these doings “right” or
“obligatory” if they really were such. Some of the doings of these beings have
bad enough and obvious enough consequences that it seems people would also
call these doings “wrong” if they really were such. Yet hardly anyone would
say or even accept that an infant does something morally wrong, right, or
obligatory by crying and waking up her parents at 3:00 a.m. Hardly anyone
would say or accept that a truly psychotic man does something morally wrong,
right, or obligatory when he harasses passersby with his “word salad” and
incoherent stories. In addition, hardly anyone would say or accept that bees do
something morally right, wrong, or obligatory by making honey.
Why do people rarely if ever assert that the doings of infants, insane
people, psychotics, or non-human animals are right, wrong, or obligatory?
Why would hardly anyone accept such assertions? A reasonable explanation is
that such assertions would be false/ Furthermore, a reasonable explanation of
(...continued)
Further, I think that good and bad things can happen even in a world in which
no doing is avoidable. For example, consider a world with an abundance of
living things, but none of them can do otherwise than they do. I think the
existence of such life would be a good thing. Moreover, if all the life in that
world were permanently wiped out in a natural catastrophe, I think that would
be a bad thing, even though nothing right, wrong, or obligatory was ever done
in that world.
5
This is merely a claim about what is a reasonable explanation of
certain states of affairs. It is not a claim that these states of affairs are jointly
or individually sufficient for the truth of that which I have proposed as an
(continued...
)
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this falsity is that: ( 1 ) (While those beings are infants, or insane people, or
psychotics, or non-human animals), they never can do otherwise than they do.
and (li) the Avoidability Requirements are true. So, one reason to believe the
Avoidability Requirements is that they are part of this reasonable explanation.
In addition, the exceptions support the rule. For example, consider
cases in which the doing of an infant or an insane person is called “wrong” or
is called “right.” These are sometimes cases in which the speaker believes that
the alleged infant is not an infant, or that the alleged insane person is not
really insane. And I believe non-infant children and sane people oftentimes
can do otherwise than they do. So, the speaker is not implicitly rejecting the
Avoidability Requirements. Sometimes cases in which the doing of an infant
or an insane person is called “wrong” or is called “right” seem to be cases in
which the speaker believes that, despite the agent's infancy or insanity, that
agent can do or could have done otherwise than the act for which he is being
evaluated. Again, the speaker is not implicitly rejecting the Avoidability
Requirements.
Also, consider the rare cases of dog owners who call some of their
dog's doings “wrong.” Such dog owners usually have had enough experiences
(...continued)
explanation. Thus, I can consistently concede Feldman’s (1986, 43) point that
“There are lots of things that we never say, but which, if we were to say them,
would be correct.”
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with dogs or enough experiences training dogs to seriously question if not
reject the idea that dogs never can do otherwise than they do. Thus, these doe
owners probably are not implicitly rejecting the Avoidability Requirements.
Perhaps dogs, some other animals, infants and insane people sometimes
can do otherwise than they do. It’s hard to know for sure. If they sometimes
can do otherwise, then it may be that some of their doings are right, wronu. or
obligatory. However, if they never can do otherwise than they do, then none of
their doings has a deontic status. In either case the results are in accord with
the Avoidability Requirements.
Some may offer the following alternative explanation for the cases of
infants, insane people, psychotics, and non-human animals: These beings lack
the requisite moral training. Furthermore, no doing has a deontic status
unless the agent has received the requisite moral training. All this explains
why deontic claims are not made in the cases being discussed.
I think the preceding explanation has a number of problems. First, it is
not as powerful as mine since it does not work for any of the other cases I
discuss in this section, including some 1 have yet to discuss. It does not even
work in the cases of insane people and psychotics who receive requisite moral
training when growing up.
f
’ Phillip Bricker suggested this claim to me as a possible explanation.
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Secondly, the term ‘requisite moral training’ would be difficult to
explain and, in many cases, difficult to apply: Are there any restrictions on
the moral codes or moral theories used in such training? How much training is
required 9 To what degree must the trainees understand what they are being
taught?
Thirdly, the deontic principle used in the alternative explanation is
subject to the following counterexample. Suppose a tribesman, following the
traditional moral teachings of his leaders, goes out and kills then cannibalizes
an innocent child from another tribe. Yet, there is a plethora of other kinds of
food available to the tribesman, and he could have done otherwise. Now, I
don’t think his moral training is of the requisite kind to allow his killing and
cannibalizing to be wrong according to the deontic principle at issue.
Nonetheless, I say that his killing and cannibalizing was wrong, and I think
most people would agree.
Granted, most people would not cast much if any blame on the
tribesman in these circumstances. But that is a separate issue. Although I think
there probably is some loose and indirect relationship between
blameworthiness and wrongness, I think the case of the tribesman shows the
relationship to be not as close as some may think. Blame in this case probably
should be focused on the leaders of the tribe. A moderate amount of blame
might even be considered an important part of a process of moral
re-education.
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I look now at another issue. Some may claim that there are cases in
which a speaker made a deontic evaluation of an actual doing even though the
speaker believed the agent could not have done otherwise than he did. 7 1 do
not recall encountering such cases, but if there are such, and if the agent really
could not have done otherwise, then I say those evaluations are false. 8
However, such evaluations may still be promoting an aim of the speaker. For
example, the speaker may be trying to influence the future behavior of people
listening who sometimes can do otherwise than they do. However, I think the
same purpose could largely be achieved without uttering a falsehood. The
speaker could use the terms ‘good’ or ‘bad’ instead of Tight’, ‘wrong’, or
‘obligatory’, though I grant that the latter three terms usually have somewhat
more emotive and persuasive force than the first two.
7
Again, I am speaking of absolute instead of prima facie deontic
statuses.
In Section 5.4 I will discuss some non
-actual cases where an agent
supposedly does something that has a deontic status but the agent could not
have done otherwise than he did.
Some may challenge my assertion with an actual case of a drunk
driver who wrongly runs over someone but allegedly could not have done
otherwise. I say that the agent could have done otherwise because there was
some relevant time, perhaps before he decided to drive his car or before he
had his third drink, at which he could do otherwise than run over the person.
(See Section 3.4 for a discussion of the notion of relevancy with respect to a
power-time.)
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I turn now to an imaginary world I call the Program World. It is the
possible world with the most overall similarity to ours, for which the
following description holds:
When any human being is born, the Martians implant in his brain a tiny
device, which contains a “program” for that person’s entire life:
whenever that person must make a decision, the device causes him to
decide one way or the other according to the requirements of a table of
instructions which were incorporated into the structure of the device
before that person was conceived, (van Inwagen 1983, 109)9
This device is not programmed to wait to see if the person will decide “on his
own, without intervention, to do that which the device has programmed to
happen. Instead, the device directly causes every decision.
In most respects, this world is just like ours. Everyone receives the
same moral training she gets in our world. Martin Luther King leads the civil
rights struggle. Hitler orders the Holocaust. Poachers hunt endangered species
to extinction. And Drs. Rowland, Molina, and Crutzen discover the link
between chlorofluorocarbons and the destruction of the ozone layer in the
atmosphere. Our world and the Program World are each filled with good and
with bad actions. Nonetheless, I think most people in our world would agree
that, unlike our world, there is nothing the completely controlled human
agents do in the Program World that is right, wrong, or obligatory. A
reasonable explanation for this would-be agreement is that what they would
9 Van Inwagen uses this example for a different purpose than I do.
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agree on is true. Furthermore, a reasonable explanation of this truth is that:
(a) Unlike our world, the Program World is one in which no human ever can
do otherwise than he does, and (b) the Avoidability Requirements are true. So.
one reason to believe the Avoidability Requirements is that they are part of
this reasonable explanation.
Some might claim that there are no differences in moral deontic status
between human doings in our world and the corresponding doings in the
program world, even though, unlike our world, the humans in the Program
World cannot do otherwise than they do. The many doings that are wrong in
our world are also wrong in the Program World. The same goes for doings that
are obligatory and doings that are right.
I find this line of thought to be quite implausible and I think most
people would reject it. Moreover, since it implies the falsity of
(E2)/(W -> C~), any proponent of this line of thought must reject one of the
(highly plausible) premises of the following valid argument for (E2). This
argument is almost the same as arguments proposed by Zimmerman (1993,
52-53) and Haji (1994, 123): 10
10 Zimmerman’s and Haji’s arguments differ from mine primarily by
their lack of time indexes.
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The Wrongness Implies Avoidability Argument
(FI) It is wrong at T that S do A at T if and only if S ought at 7* not
do A at T'. (W <-^ O')
(F2) If S ought at T not do A at T\ then S can at T not do A at T'.
(O' -> C~)
(E2) Therefore, if it is wrong at T that S do A at T\ then S can at T
not do A at T'. (W -> C~)/(The Second Avoidability
Requirement)
(F1)/(W <r+ O') is a double time indexed version of a widely accepted
deontic principle. (F2)/(0~ -» C~) is a double time indexed version of the
“ought implies can” principle for wo/-doings. In Section 2.2, I argued for a
double time indexed version of the “ought implies can” principle for doings. If
one accepts that version, I see no reason why one would want to reject
(F2)/(0~ -> C~). n
For those who find the Wrongness Implies Avoidability Argument to be
sound, or for those who believe (E2)/(W -» C~) for any other reason, the
symmetry of (E2) with (El )/(R —
>
C~) and with (E3)/(0 —> C~) seems to be a
11
In making this claim, I am not assuming that the two versions in
question are equivalent. In a footnote in Section 3.1, I discussed the question
of whether every not-doing is a doing.
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decent, though not overwhelming, reason to believe (El) and (E3): 12 If
wrongness implies avoidability, why shouldn t the other kinds of deontic
status also imply avoidability?
I now want to provide further support for (E1)/(R C~). Consider the
case ot a deeply paranoid psychotic named Jay whose psychosis is partly a
reaction to the strict moral training he received as a child. Jay is taking a walk
in the hills. On a ledge stands someone named Adam. Adam turns to look at
Jay. Although Jay has never seen Adam before. Jay mistakenly starts to think
that Adam is plotting to grab him and throw him off the ledge. Jay is seized
with a deep and disturbing paranoid fear that this will happen. At noon Jay
overwhelmingly feels that to prevent this he must act first by throwing Adam
off the ledge. So Jay sprints toward Adam, grabs him, and at 15 seconds after
noon Jay throws Adam off the ledge. Adam breaks his right leg, sustains a
moderate concussion, but survives. Lastly, suppose that Jay’s not throwing
Adam off the ledge at 10 seconds after noon is not compossible with the
conjunction of the state of the world at noon and the laws of nature. (The state
of the world at noon includes Jay’s greatly disturbed and deluded mental
state.)
It seems clear from this story that the following propositions are true:
12
Similar reasoning would apply if one were to begin with a good
reason to believe (E1)/(R -» C~) or with a good reason to believe
(E3)/(0 -> C~).
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(7) At noon Jay cannot do otherwise than throw Adam off the ledge
at 15 seconds after noon. 13
(8) It is not the case that at noon it is right for Jay to throw Adam
off the ledge at 15 seconds after noon.
Now consider the following deontic principles:
(9) It is right at T that S do A at T if and only if it is not the case
that S ought at T not do A at T\ (R <-» ~0~)
(F2) If S ought at T not do A at T\ then S can at 7’ not do A at 7".
(O- -> C~)
Those who want to accept (7), (8), (9)/(R <-> ~0~), and (F2)/(0~ -> C~) face a
dilemma. (8) and (9)/(R <-> ~0~) jointly imply that at noon Jay ought not
throw Adam off the ledge at 15 seconds after noon. That and (F2)/(0~ -> C~)
jointly imply that Jay can at noon not throw Adam off the ledge at 15 seconds
after noon. And that implies that (7) is false. 14 Hence, (8), (9)/(R <-> ~0~),
and (F2)/(0 » C~) jointly imply that (7) is false.
I grant that (9)/(R <-> ~0~~) has some initial plausibility and appeal.
However, my firm belief in (7), (8), and (F2)/(0~ -> C~) causes me to
question (9). In addition, here is a second dilemma for those holding out in
13
If the reader is not convinced of (7), I ask that he add to the story
whatever he thinks is minimally sufficient for (7).
14
Here I am using principle (6) as a background assumption.
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support of (9). Consider a possible world, W, in which Boris Yeltsin never
exists. Also, consider any action, C, and any time, 1". Since Boris never exists
in W, he never has any obligations whatsoever in W. Therefore:
(10) It is never the case that in H Boris has an obligation not to do C
at T'.
And (9)/(R <-> ~0~) together with (10) implies that:
(11) At every time in W, it is right for Boris to do C at T'.
However, (1 1) is false. For Boris does not exist in W, and thus nothing
whatsoever is right for Boris to do in W, including doing C at T'.
1 think that the best way out of these dilemmas is to reject
( 9 )/( R <-» ~0~) in its present form and accept the following revised version of
it:
(9') It is right at T that .S’ do A at T' if and only if: (i) It is not the
case that S ought at T not do A at T\ and (ii) S can at T not do A
at 7T (R <-» (~0~ & C~~)) 15
The additional clause included in (9' )/(R <-» (~0~ & C~)) is simple and
straightforward, and, (9'
)
preserves the “kernel of truth” in (9)/(R <-* ~0~).
Moreover, (9' )/(R <-» (~0~ & C~)) provides an escape from the above
15
Dahl (1974, 494-99) argues for a non-time-indexed version of
(9' )/(R <-> (~0~ & C~)) with an example of a kleptomaniac which has some
similarities to my example of Jay. Into his argument Dahl weaves issues
concerning excuses and the justification of actions. I find that these issues
complicate and weaken his argument.
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dilemmas because (8), (9' ), and (F2)/(0- -> C~) do not jointly imply the
falsity of (7). Also, (9
'
)/( R (~0~ & C~)) and ( 10) do not jointly imply
(II). They do not do so because clause (ii) of (9’ )/(R <-» (~o~ & c~)) is not
satisfied with respect to Boris in IV. For Boris must exist to have any powers
whatsoever, including a power to not do something at T'.
So, a good reason to believe (9' )/(R <-» (~0~ & C~)) is that it provides
a simple and sensible way out ot the dilemmas I have described while
preserving the “kernel of truth” in (9)/(R <-> ~0~). Moreover, since
(9' )/(R (~0~ & C~)) implies (El )/(R -» C~), the good reason to believe
(9'
)
is also a good reason to believe (El). 16
1 turn now to support (E3)/ (O —> C~). The earlier dilemma concerning
Jay parallels another dilemma faced by those who find each of the following
incompatible propositions appealing:
16 Some might want to replace (9' )/(R <-> (~0~ & C~)) with (9" ). (9" )
is the same as (9'
)
except that (ii) is replaced by: (ii' ) S can at T do A at T'.
(
9
"
)/(R <-» (~0~ & C)) does not imply (El )/(R —
>
C~). However,
(9" )/(R <-» (~0~ & C)) does not solve the first dilemma. Here’s why. At noon
Jay can throw Adam off the ledge at 15 seconds after noon. That he does do so
is strong if not sufficient evidence that he can do so. That he can do so
satisfies (ii' ), thus allowing (8), (9" )/(R <-> (~0~ & C)), and (F2)/(0 » C~)
to jointly imply the falsity of (7).
Interestingly, (9" )/(R <-» (~0~ & C)) does solve the second dilemma
because (ii'
)
is not satisfied with respect to Boris in W. For Boris must exist
to have any powers whatsoever, including a power to do C at T'. Hence,
(9" )/(R (~0~ & C)) and (10) do not jointly imply (11). Also, since
(9" )/(R <-> (~0~ & C)) solves the second dilemma and (9)/(R <-> ~0~) does
not, (9" ) surprisingly is not equivalent to (9).
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(7) At noon Jay cannot do otherwise than throw Adam off the ledge
at 15 seconds after noon. 17
(12) It is not the case that at noon Jay ought to throw Adam off the
ledge at 15 seconds after noon.
(13) S ought at / to do A at 7 ' if and only if it is not the case that it is
right at T that S not do A at T'. (O <-> ~R~)
(14) If it is right at T that S not do A at T\ then S can at T not do A at
r. (R~ -> C~)
(12)
,
(13)/(0 ~R~), and (14)/(R > C~) jointly imply that (7) is false. 1K
Also, the earlier dilemma concerning Boris Yeltsin parallels another
dilemma faced by those who want to accept (13)/(0 <-> ~R~) and:
(15) (For any world, W, in which Boris never exists, for any doing C,
and for any time, T ' ) it is never the case that in W it is right for
Boris not to do C at T'.
(13
)
/(0 <-» ~R~) together with (15) implies that:
(16) At every time in IV, Boris ought to do C at T'.
But (16) is false. For Boris does not exist in W, and thus he never has any
obligations in W
.
19
17
If the reader is not convinced of (7), I ask that he add to the story
whatever he thinks is minimally sufficient for (7).
18 Note that I see no reason why one who accepts (F2)/ (O > C~)
would reject (14)/(R > C~).
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I think that the best way out ot these last two dilemmas is to reject
( 1 3 )/(0 <-> ~R~) in its present form and accept the following revised version
of it:
(13') S ought at T to do A at T if and only if: (i) It is not the case that
it is right at T that S not do A at T\ and (ii) S can at T not do A
at T. (O <-> (~R~ & C~))
(12), (13
'
)/(0 <-» (~R~ & C~)), and (14)/(R > C~) do not jointly imply that
(7) is false. Also, (13' )/(0 <-» (~R~ & C~)) together with (15) does not imply
(16).
A good reason to believe (13' )/(0 <-» (~R~ & C~)) is that it provides a
simple and sensible way out of the dilemmas I have described, while
preserving the “kernel of truth" in ( 1 3 )/(0 <-> ~~R~). Moreover, since
(13')/(0 <-> (~R~ & C~)) implies (E3)/(0 —
>
C~), the good reason to believe
(13'
)
is also a good reason to believe (E3).
(...continued)
19 World W also can be used in a similar way to counter all the
biconditional deontic principles that have a positive expression of a certain
deontic status on one side and the denial of another deontic status on the other
side. For example, an act is right if and only if it is not wrong.
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^•3 The Argument Against the Third Avoidabilitv Requirement
and My Reply to It
The following argument against the Third Avoidabilitv
Requirement/(E3)/(0 C~) is loosely based on work by Feldman (1986, 3-
44) and Haji (1994).
Consider the following fairly typical utilitarian moral principle:
(AU) S ought at T to do A at T' if and only if the utility of S”s doing A
at T' is greater than the utility of any other alternative that S has
at T.
The utility of a doing is the amount of intrinsic good it would produce, minus
the amount of intrinsic bad it would produce. Something that is intrinsically
good or bad is something whose goodness or badness “is not to be explained
by appeal to any of its effects, or consequences, or accompaniments"
(Feldman 1986, 26). A proponent of (AU) may consider any or all of the
following to be intrinsic goods: pleasure, justice, beauty, knowledge,
freedom, life, existence, or perhaps other things.
Feldman (1986, 16-72) proposes a more sophisticated utilitarian theory
than the one just described. With his theory, actions and doings are morally
judged not by appeal to the value of what they produce, but by appeal to the
values of the “accessible” possible worlds in which they are performed. The
fundamental principle in his theory is:
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(MO) S morally ought, as ot a time T, to see to the occurrence of a
state of affairs, P, if and only if P occurs in some world
accessible to S at 7, and it is not the case that not-7J occurs in
any accessible world as good as (or better than) that
one.”
2l, (Feldman 1986, 38)
(AU) and (MO) figure prominently in:
The Argument Against the Third Avoidability Requirement
(Gl) (AU) or (MO) is true.
(G2) If (AU) or (MO) is true, then every unavoidable doing is
obligatory (as of the time or times it is unavoidable).
(G3) If every unavoidable doing is obligatory (as of the time or times
it is unavoidable), then the Third Avoidability
Requirement/(0 —> C~) is false.
(G4) Therefore, the Third Avoidability Requirement/(0 —> C~) is
false.
One strategy to support (Gl
)
might be to describe numerous and varied
examples of agents in certain situations and point out that (AU) or that (MO)
has implications that match one’s intuitions about what is right, wrong, or
20 With (MO), intrinsic goodness and intrinsic badness help determine
the values of possible worlds; see Feldman (1986, 26-40). For some additional
material useful for understanding the concept of the value of a possible world,
see Moore ([1902] 1988, 27-36), Parfit (1984, 381-442), and Feldman (1995,
189-206).
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obligatory in those situations. A further claim might be made that those
implications match the intuitions the majority of people would have regarding
those situations. A second strategy to support (Gl) might be to claim a direct
intuition of the truth of the principle that “we ought to do the best we can.”
And then one might claim that the best way to make this seminal moral idea
clear, precise, and unproblematic is to interpret it as (AU) or as (MO). A third
strategy might be to claim a direct intuition of the truth of (AU) or of (MO). A
fourth strategy is one directed at those who already are utilitarians. The claim
might be made that (AU) and (MO) are simpler than they would be if they
were modified to be consistent with the Avoidability Requirements. 21 With or
without such modifications, the principles are utilitarian in nature. However,
the deontic logic allowed by (AU) and (MO) would be simpler and more
powerful. For example, by allowing principles such as (9)/(R ~0~) and
2
1
Feldman (1986, 43) describes such a modification to (MO) without
embracing that modification.
(AU) could be modified as follows:
(AU'
)
5 ought at T to do A at T' if and only if: S can at T not do A at
T\ and the utility of S’s doing A at T' is greater than the utility
of any other alternative that 5 has at T.
Prior to these modifications, (AU) and (MO) are inconsistent with
(A3)/deontic incompatibilism. (Deontic incompatibilism is the thesis that
determinism entails that nothing anyone does is ever right, wrong, or
obligatory.) After these modifications, (AU) and (MO) would be consistent
with deontic incompatibilism. Yet they would still be utilitarian theories.
Hence, deontic incompatibilism is consistent with at least some forms of
utilitarianism.
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( 1 j )/(0 —
>
~R~), ( AU) and (MO) each allow a simpler and more robust
deontic logic that has many formal features corresponding to other modal
logics.
(G2) can be justified as follows. Suppose that S’s doing A at T' is
unavoidable as of T. So, as of T, S has no alternative but to do A at T\ Thus,
by default, the utility of that doing is greater than that of any of the “other
alternatives that lS has at 7. Hence, if (AU) is true, then every unavoidable
doing is obligatory (as of the time or times it is unavoidable). This includes all
the unavoidable doings described in Section 5.2.
Suppose again that S’ s doing A at T' is unavoidable as of T. This may
be translated into accessible world terminology like this: S does A at T' in
some world that is accessible to S at T, and S does A at T' in every such world.
Thus, by default, S does A at T' in some accessible world such that there is no
as good accessible world where he does not do so. Hence, if (MO) is true, then
every unavoidable doing is obligatory (as of the time or times it is
unavoidable). Again, this includes all the unavoidable doings described in
Section 5.2. Therefore, (G2) is true.
The Third Avoidability Requirement/(0 —> C~) requires that any
obligatory doing be avoidable as of the time it is obligatory. Therefore, (G3) is
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true: If every unavoidable doing is obligatory (as of the time or times it is
unavoidable), then the Third Avoidability Requirement/(0 -> C~) is false. 22
In reply, I agree with (G2) and (G3), but I disagree with (Gl). Although
I am sympathetic with some of the strategies used to support (Gl ) that were
described, I do not think that any one of or combination of these strategies is
sufficient to establish (Gl).
Even though each of (AU) and (MO) has the correct implications for
many varied moral cases, one must resist the temptation to quickly conclude
that (AU) or that (MO) is true and that it has the correct implications in all
cases. The first strategy to support (Gl) is incomplete if it does not include
consideration of cases of unavoidable doings such as those described in
Section 5.2. If it does include such consideration, then I think that most
people would share my intuition that each of those unavoidable doings is not
obligatory. Or at least most would agree that at least one of those unavoidable
doings is not obligatory. Moreover, given (G2), if even one unavoidable doing
is not obligatory, then (AU) and (MO) are each false. Perhaps some people
"Here the following uncontroversial assumption must be made: In
some possible world, perhaps ours, there is at least one unavoidable doing.
If every unavoidable doing is obligatory (as of the time or times it is
unavoidable), then it can also be argued that the First Avoidability
Requirement/(R —» C~) is false. One need only employ the uncontroversial
assumption just mentioned and the following unquestionable deontic
principle: O —» R. Note that the claim that every unavoidable doing is
obligatory would be no help in an argument against the Second Avoidability
Requirement/(W -> C~).
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really have the direct intuition that every single one of the unavoidable doings
described in Section 5.2 is obligatory. To such people 1 would merely say that
I think we have a fundamental disagreement and I doubt there is much either
of us can do to persuade the other.
Consider the two strategies to support (Gl) that appeal to direct
intuitions of the truth of a moral principle. There is little that can be done to
argue against the direct moral intuition someone has of a moral principle,
except to say that such intuitions can often lead one astray. I believe moral
intuition is more trustworthy when it is directed at particular cases rather than
at moral principles. When deciding whether to believe a moral principle, one
should focus more on the moral intuitions one has in numerous and various
particular cases, rather than on any direct intuition one may have of that
principle. Also, 1 believe that greater weight should be placed on actual, or at
least realistic, cases. If the moral intuition one has in a particular case is
inconsistent with the principle, one should seriously consider rejecting the
principle. Still, I grant that direct intuition of a moral principle should never
be ignored. One should treat such an intuition somewhat like a theoretical
hypothesis in science. One should not embrace it without first testing it with
an open mind on numerous and various particular cases.
I must admit some sympathy for the fourth strategy to support (Gl), but
not enough to embrace it. I grant that modifying (AU) and (MO) to be
consistent with the Avoidability Requirements would result in the formalistic
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disadvantages outlined in the fourth strategy. However, utilitarians should not
find those disadvantages sufficient to choose (AU) or (MO) over the modified
versions. I, for one, am willing to swallow the disadvantages in order to do
justice to the strong intuition that unavoidable doings such as those described
in Section 5.2 are not obligatory. The truth is not always as simple, neat, and
tidy as we want it to be. As economist John Kenneth Galbraith (1996) once
said. The capacity for erroneous belief is very great, especially when it
coincides with convenience.”
Now 1 want to describe some more unavoidable doings that I think are
neither obligatory, right, nor wrong. Suppose a lifeguard sees through her
binoculars a man drowning far offshore. The lifeguard has no boat or
helicopter available so she tries to swim to save him. Unfortunately the man is
so tar offshore that the lifeguard s failing to save him is unavoidable. Imagine
the look you would get if you said to the family of the victim that it was
obligatory, and thus right, that the lifeguard failed to save him. Consider also
the case of a woman with advanced Parkinson’s disease whose unavoidably
shaking hands cause her many problems and much grief. Consider the case of
a volcano that has exploded. Certainly that explosion was neither obligatory
for the volcano, nor was it avoidable by the volcano (or anyone else). In
addition, what about the case of the black widow spider who instinctually and
unavoidably kills her mate and devours him? Lastly, Zimmerman (1987, 200)
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puts forth the example of people unavoidably traveling slower than the speed
of light.
Since the above examples are cases of unavoidable and non-obligatory
doings, (AU) and (MO) are false.' 3 Even if only one of these examples is such
a case, (AU) and (MO) are false. Moreover, the Avoidability Requirements
provide the best explanation ot why the above examples are cases of
unavoidable doings that have no deontic status. This further bolsters the
Avoidability Requirements.
Some may defend (AU) and (MO) from the examples of the volcano
and the spider by saying that (AU) and (MO) should apply only to rational
agents.' This move would succeed against the volcano example and may
succeed against the spider example. Still, one should recognize that defining
and applying the term ‘rational agent’ is at least as difficult as defining and
applying the terms ‘can do otherwise’ and ‘can: not-do’. Attaching a ‘can do
23
~ Some may claim that these examples are not cases of doings. I
disagree. I think each is a case of a doing (though perhaps none is a case of an
action). However, even if I am not correct, (MO) would still apply to them.
For (MO) applies to instances of ‘seeing to the occurrence of ’. And Feldman
(1986, 36-44) interprets this phrase so that it can apply to instances of ‘failing
to save’ and ‘unavoidable hand shaking’.
24
Note that Feldman (1986, 16) says that his variable ‘S’ ranges over
“agents.” In a broad sense of that term, volcanoes and spiders can be
considered agents. However, volcanoes are not rational agents, and spiders
may not be. (On the other hand, I sometimes I think that spiders act more
rationally than certain people.)
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otherwise' requirement to (AU) or (MO) handles the volcano and spider
examples without having to include a "rational agent' restriction.
5 4 Some Frankfurt-stvle Counterexamples and My Response
In a classic article, Harry Frankfurt proposes a much discussed
counterexample to:
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): ‘"A person is morally
responsible for what he has done only if he could have done
otherwise.” (Frankfurt [1969] 1988, 1)
Since PAP has some similarity to the Avoidability Requirements, Frankfurt’s
counterexample might also apply to them. Here is the counterexample:
Suppose someone—Black, let us say—wants Jones to perform a certain
action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way,
but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits
until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does
nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such
things) that Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he
wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to decide to
do something else. Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones
decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do.
...Black [would] manipulate the minute processes of Jones’s
brain and nervous system in some direct way, so that causal forces
running in and out of his synapses and along the poor man’s nerves
determine that he chooses to act and that he does act in the one way
and not in any other.
Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because
Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the
very action Black wants him to perform. (Frankfurt ([1969] 1988, 6-7)
In a crucial footnote, Frankfurt adds:
The assumption that Black can predict what Jones will decide to
do does not beg the question of determinism. We can imagine that
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Jones has often confronted the alternatives—/! and B—that he now
confronts, and that his face has invariably twitched when he was about
to decide to do A and never when he was about to decide to do B.
Knowing this, and observing the twitch, Black would have a basis for
prediction. This does, to be sure, suppose that there is some sort of
causal relation between Jones’s state at the time of the twitch and his
subsequent states. But any plausible view of decision or of action will
allow that reaching a decision and performing an action both involve
earlier and later phases, with causal relations between them, and such
that the earlier phases are not themselves part of the decision or part of
the action. The example does not require that these earlier phases be
deterministically related to still earlier events. (Frankfurt [1969] 1988
6-7)
Frankfurt maintains that Jones is morally responsible for having done A even
though he could not have done otherwise.
1 will now adapt Frankfurt’s example to see how it might be used
against the Avoidability Requirements. (To maintain consistency with
Frankfurt’s example as stated above, I will be not be using any explicit time
indexes when referring to events in the example or in my adaptations of it.)
Consider the following ways to make A more specific.
Actl : Jones going on his promised monthly visit to see his father at a
nursing home.
Act2: Jones beating his wife.
Some might consider Actl to be a case where Jones did something that
was right and obligatory yet he could not have done otherwise. If Actl were
such a case, then the First and Third Avoidability Requirements, (R -> C~)
and (O -» C~), would be false. Some might consider Act2 to be a case where
Jones did something that was wrong yet he could not have done otherwise. If
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Act2 were such a case, then the Second Avoidability Requirement/(W —» C~)
would be false.
Since Frankfurt's story has elements that are alien to actual experience,
one should make a close and critical inspection of the story before accepting
any initial intuitions one may have. Through such an inspection, I intend to
show that the story and my adaptations of it do not succeed as
counterexamples to either PAP or the Avoidability Requirements.
First I shall discuss the class of cases where Jones s doing A is regarded
as wrong; Act2 is part of this class. In such cases the following cannot all be
true:
(17) Jones’s doing A was wrong.
(18) If S’s doing A was wrong, then it was obligatory that S not do A.
(19) If it was obligatory that S not do A, then S could have done
otherwise than A.
(20) Jones could not have done otherwise than A.
(18) and (19) are compelling deontic principles. They are consistent
with the intuitions many have in a wide variety of particular cases. The
parallel between the “ought implies can” principle and (19) also makes (19)
appealing. If someone believes (18) and (19) and does not want to give up that
belief, she must give up her belief either in (17) or in (20), assuming she
previously believed (17) and (20). If either belief is given up, then the
example fails as a counterexample to the Second Avoidability
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RequirementsW -> C~). Furthermore, if belief in (20) is given up, then the
example fails as a counterexample to PAP.
Now 1 want to broaden the discussion beyond just cases in which Jones
is regarded as having done something wrong. A key element of Frankfurt’s
counterexample is Black’s predictive process. That predictive process depends
greatly on the reliability of Jones’s twitch as a sign of Jones’s future behavior.
To gauge that reliability it is necessary to know whether there is a
deterministic causal linkage between the twitch, the decision, and act^l. In
other words, it is necessary to know whether the twitch is a sufficient cause of
the decision and the decision a sufficient cause of the act. Here is my
explanation of sufficient causation (which I am borrowing from Section 3.4).
C at T is a sufficient cause of E at T' if and only if: T * T\ C at T and
E at 7 ' are hard states of affairs, and the laws of nature
conjoined with C at T entails E at T'. (See Section 2.3 for my
definition of a hard state of affairs.)
Frankfurt speaks of ’‘some sort of causal relation” between the twitch,
the decision, and act A, but he does not indicate whether it is the relation of
sufficient causation or some less strict notion. In a footnote in Section 3.4 I
discussed some less strict notions put forth by David Hume ([1748] 1977, 51,
Sec VII) and David Lewis ([1973a] 1986b, 167). With such notions, striking a
match may cause it to light, even though the striking by itself is not a
sufficient cause. A sufficient cause of the match lighting might include the
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striking of the match and various background conditions such as the match
being dry. Yet in ordinary language, most people still use the word ‘cause’ to
describe events such as the striking of the match. If Jones’s world is much like
ours, then few ifany sufficient causes in that world would be as limited as a
mere twitch sans background conditions. In fact, few ifany sufficient causes
in such a world would be what people normally think of as single events. Note
also that a relation of sufficient causation between the twitch and the decision
is not guaranteed by the past examples of the twitch being followed by Jones’s
deciding to do A. Therefore, it is consistent with Frankfurt s example that
there is not a deterministic causal linkage between the twitch, the decision,
and act A.
Supposing there is not such a linkage, the following scenario is
physically possible: The twitch happens, Jones does not decide to do A, and
he does not do so ~ Remember that Black is basing his prediction only on the
twitch, and thus will not intervene once the twitch happens. So, without a
deterministic link between the twitch and the decision to do A
,
it follows that
there is a physically possible scenario where Jones twitches, yet Black’s
prediction of Jones deciding to do A fails. Moreover, if this scenario is
physically possible. Black’s predictive powers are fallible. Such fallibility is
23
“X is physically possible” means that X is consistent with the laws of
nature.
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consistent with Frankfurt’s stipulation that Black’s predictive powers are
“excellent.”
Again supposing no deterministic causal linkage between the twitch,
the decision, and act A, it is also physically possible that: The twitch happens,
Jones does decide to do A, yet he ends up not doing so. In such a scenario.
Black’s prediction about the decision is correct, yet Jones still does not do A.
Perhaps Jones changes his mind soon after deciding to do A.
If these scenarios were not physically possible, I would agree that Jones
could not have done otherwise. However, since Frankfurt’s example is
consistent with there being no deterministic causal linkage between the
twitch, the decision, and act A, it follows that Frankfurt’s example is also
consistent with the physical possibility of these various scenarios described
earlier. It also follows that the example is consistent with the fallibility of
Black's predictive powers. All this suggests that Frankfurt’s example is
consistent with the claim that Jones could have done otherwise
.
26
Some may wonder if I am ignoring the fact that if Jones were to not
twitch. Black would intervene and Jones would do A. I respond that this fact is
consistent with Jones having the power to do otherwise. For it is part of the
example that Jones does twitch, thereby ensuring that Black does not
26
Also, it implies that Frankfurt’s example is consistent with Jones’s
world being indeterministic.
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intervene. Thus Black becomes practically irrelevant to whether Jones could
have done otherwise. 27
Fischer and Hoffman ( 1994, 323) argue that Black’s role does ensure
that Jones could not have done otherwise. They do so by likening Jones to a
circuit board and Black to a fuse on that circuit board. They say, “once the
fuse is installed, the circuit cannot overheat.... Of course, we assume here that
the fuse works properly and that there are no other unusual events that
intervene.” I think this analogy fails. First, Frankfurt does not stipulate the
absence of “unusual events.” Secondly, Black’s predictive feedback
mechanism, unlike that of the fuse just described, may not work properly.
Frankfurt says that Black is an excellent predictor but he does not say that
Black is an infallible predictor. Frankfurt’s example allows for the physical
possibility of scenarios in which Jones twitches yet neither decides to do A nor
does A. Whereas, Fischer and Hoffman build enough stipulations into their
example that they rule out the physical possibility of scenarios in which there
is no voltage surge yet the fuse for some reason overheats soon thereafter.
Besides the issues discussed above, I see nothing in Frankfurt’s
example that might be advanced to support the claim that Jones could not
have done otherwise. And since those issues turned out to not ensure this, I
27 The points made in this paragraph are similar to but less detailed than
those made by Lamb (1993, 521-24) and Widerker (1995, 251).
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conclude that it is consistent with Frankfurt’s example that Jones could have
done otherwise.^ Thus, Frankfurt’s example does not succeed as a
counterexample to PAP. Moreover, none of the adaptations of Frankfurt’s
example described earlier succeeds as a counterexample to any of the
Avoidability Requirements. For his example and the adaptations to succeed, it
would be necessary (but not sufficient) for them to be cases where Jones could
not have done otherwise. As they stand, they are not such cases.
If Frankfurt were to modify his example by stipulating deterministic
causal links between the twitch, the decision, and act A, then I admit he would
have a case where Jones could not have done otherwise. But would Jones be
morally responsible for doing A ? Would his doing A have a deontic status? To
these questions I now turn.
First, it is important to point out that the earlier definition of ‘sufficient
cause’ results in sufficient causes being transitive
.
29
So, if Jones’s twitch is a
In drawing this conclusion, I am not assuming that if the twitch
definitely were not a sufficient cause, Jones definitely could have done
otherwise.
29
This further weakens the idea that the concept of a sufficient cause
might capture an ordinary language notion of causation. For the word 'cause'
can be and sometimes is used in ordinary language in a way that violates
transitivity. Someone might agree that her flipping the switch caused the light
to come on, and that caused the burglar to run away at high speed into the
dark night, and that caused him to fall and crack his head open. Yet it is easy
to imagine her rejecting the claim that her flipping the switch caused the
burglar to fall and crack his head open.
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sufficient cause of his decision to do A, and his decision to do A is a sufficient
cause of his doing A, then Jones’s twitch is a sufficient cause of his doing A.
I grant that Jones’s deciding to do A without intervention from Black is
evidence in favor of the claim that Jones is morally responsible for doing A. It
is also evidence in favor of the claim that this act has some deontic status.
However, it is not sufficient evidence for either of these claims. One must also
take account of whether Jones's twitch sufficiently caused, i.e., causally-
determined, Jones s doing A. Any act causally determined by a twitch is quite
peculiar and even alien. Furthermore, it seems to me it would be misleading if
not false to say of such an act that the agent did it “on his own.” For people do
not have control over their twitches. People do not decide to twitch, and even
if they did, it would seem even more farfetched that they could do so knowing
it would cause some future decision and some future act. If A is causally
determined by a twitch, I do not see how this is so different from Black
intervening and forcing Jones to decide and to do A. In the latter case Jones
would not be morally responsible, and A would have no deontic status. The
same should hold true in the case of the twitch as sufficient cause. In each
case, A is causally determined by something over which Jones has no control.
Jones may have chosen to do A, but in these odd cases he did not have a
choice. He may have thought he had alternatives, but an earlier event over
which he had no control ensured that he had only one alternative.
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Therefore, if A were causally determined by Jones’s twitch, then Jones
would not be morally responsible for doing A. Moreover, his act would have
no deontic status. Hence, the example would fail as a counterexample to PAP
and the adaptations of the example would fail as counterexamples to the
Avoidability Requirements. All this holds regardless of whether Black is
waiting in the wings.
Some may try to salvage Frankfurt’s example by modifying it as
follows. Suppose that instead of a twitch, the sign and sufficient cause Black
uses to predict Jones’s future decision is an inclination of Jones that Black
somehow detects on a brain scan. I do not think that such a modification
would help much if at all. For I do not think that people have much if any
more control over their inclinations than they do their twitches.
In conclusion, Frankfurt’s example and the adaptations and modified
versions of it that I have discussed do not succeed as counterexamples to PAP
or the Avoidability Requirements.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter I present my Unavoidability Implies Deontic Amorality
Argument, and I support and defend its premises. The conclusion of this
argument is that: If no one ever can do otherwise than he does, then nothing
anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory. The three key premises are
what I call the “Avoidability Requirements.” They roughly state that rightness.
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wrongness, and obligatoriness each imply avoidability. In support of these
requirements, I cite various situations in which people withhold or withdraw
deontic evaluations ot certain doings apparently based on a belief that the
agent in question cannot do or could not have done otherwise. I also describe
certain dilemmas that can be dissolved by accepting the Avoidability
Requirements. Then I present and respond to an argument against the claim
that obligatoriness implies avoidability. That argument is based on either of
two utilitarian ethical theories. Lastly, I argue that certain counterexamples to
the Avoidability Requirements do not succeed. These counterexamples are
based on one of Harry Frankfurt s ([1969] 1988, 6—7) counterexamples to the
Principle of Alternative Possibilities.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
61 Deontic Incompatibilism and Fischer’s Consortium
In his book The Metaphysics ofFree Will, John Martin Fischer
describes the following case:
Suppose, for example, that a consortium of well-respected scientists
announces that they have developed a remarkable new theory which
implies that all events can in principle be fully explained by previous
events and the laws ot nature. That is, they claim that, although they
cannot at present make all the predictions about the future, their theory
implies that the world is not fundamentally indeterministic as many
scientists had previously thought; rather, if one knows enough about
the past states of the world and the laws of nature, one can confidently
predict all the states of the world in the future.
Such an announcement would evoke considerable interest and,
no doubt, skepticism. But what if the scientists’ result, having been
subject to critical scrutiny, were corroborated? What if we had good
reason to suppose the universe to be deterministic? Under these
circumstances, I do not believe we would have any inclination to give
up the reactive attitudes, or to assimilate all entities with regard to the
attitudes and activities constitutive of personhood. (Fischer 1994, 6-7)
The term ‘reactive attitudes’ comes from Strawson ([1962], 1982). He
uses the term to refer to such things as esteem, gratitude, love, contempt,
anger, feeling obliged, moral approbation, and moral disapprobation. Deontic
claims are at least expressions of reactive attitudes. 1 Thus, I think Fischer
would accept:
1 Note that I believe that a deontic claim can be true or false and be an
expression of a reactive attitude. (I also believe that some affirmative deontic
claims are true.)
179
The First No Change Thesis: If the consortium’s strong, corroborated
evidence of determinism were publicly announced, most people
would continue making deontic claims.
Furthermore, I think that some philosophers, including perhaps Fischer,
would consider the First No Change Thesis to be linguistic evidence against
the conclusion of the Main Argument of this essay, which is:
(Aj) Deontic incompatibilism: If determinism is true, then nothing
anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory.
They might argue that the First No Change Thesis shows that in a certain
hypothetical but not farfetched situation, most people would use deontic
words in a way that is best explained by the claim that those words mean
something that is inconsistent with deontic incompatibilism. Thus, deontic
incompatibilism is false . 2
“Similarly, some philosophers might argue:
(a) If the consortium’s strong corroborated evidence of determinism
were publicly announced, most people would continue making
“could have done otherwise” claims.
(b) Therefore, determinism does not entail that no one ever can do
otherwise than he does.
My response to this argument would closely parallel my upcoming
response to the argument from the First No Change Thesis to the falsity of
deontic incompatibilism.
180
I admit that the First No Change Thesis is most probably true.
However, for several reasons, the First No Change Thesis is not evidence
against deontic incompatibilism.
First, I think news of the consortium’s conclusion of determinism
would be under-reported and would not reach the majority of people. As
evidence of this, the majority ot people today have not heard that most
physicists accept a theory that is standardly interpreted to imply
indeterminism (namely, quantum mechanics). This surprising information has
been reported in some public sources but it has not been widely reported.
Secondly, even if the majority of people heard of the consortium’s
conclusion, I do not think that most of the media reporting the conclusion
would sufficiently explain the concept of determinism. Thus, 1 do not think
that the majority ot those hearing of the conclusion would have a basic
understanding ot it. The notion ot gaining a basic understanding of
determinism which I am using here does not require a belief in deontic
incompatibilism. Rather it requires a basic understanding of the definition of
determinism and the constituent concepts of determinism, such as the concept
of a law of nature. It also requires an awareness that determinism, if true,
applies to every event in the history of the universe, including, every human
action. I think the vast majority of people are quite capable of a basic
understanding of the concept of determinism, but I do not think the media
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would provide enough explanation in their reports of the consortium to allow
for such an understanding.
Thirdly, ot the people who would hear and sufficiently understand the
consortium’s conclusion, I think that most of them would not be convinced of
it. To reach such a broad conclusion as determinism, the evidence used by the
consortium would have to be miniscule compared to the broadness of their
conclusion. Thus, even with corroboration by many other scientists, the
conclusion would be subject to a significant amount of skepticism and
uncertainty. Moreover, the reasoning process employed by the consortium
would probably be very complex and difficult to understand. This would add
to the skepticism and uncertainty.
In addition, I think that few people would accept one of the
implications of determinism, namely that everything they ever do is
determined by a state of the world before their birth. My claim is not that
people have an a priori belief in indeterminism or that it would be impossible
to convince them of determinism. Rather, 1 claim that few' people would
accept that everything they ever do is determined as just described, and thus
most people are unlikely to accept determinism. If familiarized with the
terminology, most people would think that such determination of all their
behavior would undermine their firm belief that they have some degree of
control over their own lives. Thus, most would also think such determination
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of all their behavior would undermine their firm belief that at least some of
the things they do are morally right, wrong, or obligatory.
Perhaps many people would be willing to accept that such
determination applies to some of the things they do. In addition, nearly
everyone would be willing to accept that much of what they do is partly
influenced by things beyond their control. However, few would accept that
everything they do is determined by a state of the world before birth. I also
think few would accept the idea that all the decisions they ever made could, in
principle, have been predicted by a scientist who knew the laws of nature and
some state ol the world long before humans ever existed. Most people want to
believe not only that they make choices but that they really have choices.
To sum up, most people would not hear of, understand, and be
convinced of the consortium’s conclusion. I contend that this better explains
the probable truth of the First No Change Thesis than the claim that the
meaning of deontic words is inconsistent with deontic incompatibilism. In
conclusion, the First No Change Thesis is not evidence against deontic
incompatibilism.
In response, some philosophers might employ the following thesis in
order to reject deontic incompatibilism:
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The Second No Change Thesis: If nearly all people heard of,
understood, and were convinced of the consortium’s conclusion,
then the vast majority of those nearly all people would continue
making deontic claims.
I admit that the Second No Change Thesis, if true, would provide at
least prima facie evidence against deontic incompatibilism. However, for
several reasons, the Second No Change Thesis is false. The first two reasons
provide support for deontic incompatibilism beyond the support already given
in this essay.
First, consider those people who have come to accept recent scientific
claims that a certain behavior pattern, for example homosexuality or
alcoholism, is determined or at least largely determined by a genetic
predisposition, something established before birth. Such people generally tend
to stop making or at least tend to soften any harsh deontic judgments they
previously had regarding people with that behavior pattern. 3 This seems to be
one of the reasons why people with such behavior patterns generally want to
publicize such scientific claims.
Such linguistic behavior conflicts with, though may not contradict,
deontic compatibilism.
In the cases where people merely soften their harsh deontic judgments,
they probably believe that the genetic predisposition does not fully determine
the behavior and that people with such behavior patterns still have at least
some choice in the matter.
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Secondly, suppose that you know nothing about a person, P, or a doinu.
A, except that:
( 1 ) P s doing A at 1 ' is entailed by the laws of nature together with
some state of the world before P’s birth.
Now, do you think it is ever morally right, wrong, or obligatory that P does A
at T'l Avowed deontic compatibilists notwithstanding, I think that most
people familiarized with this generic story and its terminology would answer
this open-ended question with a No. I think my claim would be supported
by a scientific study in which this story and this question are posed to a
variety of people. If most would answer “No,” this would conflict with deontic
compatibilism. So, deontic compatibilists probably think such a study would
produce different results than I hypothesize. Still, perhaps they at least can
agree with me that the kind of study I suggest would help resolve the question
of whether deontic incompatibilism is true.
Thirdly, my extensive support of the Main Argument in this essay
collectively counts as evidence for deontic incompatibilism. So, if one thinks
the truth of the Second No Change Thesis would be evidence against deontic
4 Of course the questioner must create an environment where the
respondent feels comfortable answering any way he wants. In Section 4.4.3 I
presented some guidelines for creating such an environment. In that section I
also defended against a contextualist critique of a study similar to the one
described above.
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incompatibilism, then one should also regard this essay as collective evidence
against the Second No Change Thesis.
Based on these three reasons, I conclude that // nearly all people heard
of, understood, and were convinced of the consortium’s conclusion, then most
of those nearly all people would stop making deontic claims. Thus, the Second
No Change Thesis is false.
Some deontic incompatibilists might be willing to accept the Second
No Change Thesis but then argue that it neither implies deontic compatibilism
nor does it provide evidence for deontic compatibilism. First, one must
recognize that the Second No Change Thesis is a subjunctive conditional with
a farfetched antecedent. And inferring anything from a subjunctive conditional
with such an antecedent is almost always speculative and questionable. Given
the present general acceptance of quantum mechanics by physicists, it seems
unlikely that Fischer's consortium will ever come to pass. Also, I earlier made
claims that suggest the improbability of nearly all people hearing of,
understanding, and being convinced of the consortium’s conclusion. Given all
this, it is at least speculative and questionable to claim that the Second No
Change Thesis implies deontic compatibilism.
Secondly, it could be argued that if the consortium did come to pass
and nearly all people heard of, understood, and were convinced of its
conclusion, then those people would be or would become sufficiently different
than they are now that they would have different meanings for deontic words.
186
Those meanings, unlike the present meanings, would be inconsistent with
deontic incompatibilism. People who are more willing to accept the idea that
all their behavior is determined by some state of the world before birth are
also more inclined to have meanings for deontic words that are inconsistent
with deontic incompatibilism. All this better explains the Second No Change
Thesis than the claim that (given the meanings of deontic words today)
deontic incompatibilism is false. The Second No Change Thesis is merely
evidence for the claim that, in a certain farfetched scenario, new meanings of
deontic words would emerge that are inconsistent with deontic
incompatibilism. Therefore, the Second No Change Thesis does not imply, nor
is it evidence tor the claim that (given the meanings of deontic words today)
deontic incompatibilism is false.
If I were to become convinced of the Second No Change Thesis, I think
I would do so in the following manner. I would come to believe that, in the
farfetched scenario described in the antecedent of that thesis, the meanings of
deontic words would shift (as described above). If the Second No Change
Thesis were true, I think its truth would be better explained by a shift in the
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meanings of deontic words than by the falsity of deontic lncompatibilism
(given the meanings of deontic words today). 5
6 2 Chapter Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have presented two arguments against deontic
incompatibilism and responded to them. They were based on John Martin
Fischer’s hypothetical case of a consortium of scientists that finds strong
evidence of determinism. The second (and better developed) argument was
based on the following premise: If nearly all people heard of, understood, and
? Some philosophers might argue:
(a) If nearly all people heard of, understood, and were convinced of
the consortium’s conclusion, then the vast majority of those
nearly all people would continue making ‘"could have done
otherwise” claims.
(b) Therefore, determinism does not entail that no one ever can do
otherwise than he does.
My response to such an argument would closely parallel my response to
the argument from the Second No Change Thesis to the falsity of deontic
incompatibilism. For example, with my first reason against the Second No
Change Thesis, substitute ‘could have done otherwise claims’ for ‘harsh
deontic judgments’. With my second reason, the question would change to:
“Do you think P ever can do otherwise than he does at T'T' My third reason
would be revised as follows: My support of the Argument for Incompatibilism
in chapters 3 and 4 collectively counts as evidence for incompatibilism. Thus,
if one thinks the truth of (a) would be evidence against incompatibilism, then
one should also regard Chapters 3 and 4 as collective evidence against (a).
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were convinced of the consortium's conclusion, then the vast maiority of
those nearly all people would continue making deontic claims.
In this essay I have supported and defended:
The Main Argument
(A 1 ) If determinism is true, then no one ever can do otherwise than
he does.
(A2) If no one ever can do otherwise than he does, then nothing
anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory.
(A3) Therefore, if determinism is true, then nothing anyone does is
ever right, wrong, or obligatory. (Deontic incompatibilism)
The sense of ‘can’ I use in this argument is “the power-‘can’ of
ordinary language.” In Section 2.2 I first discussed this sense of ‘can’ and
argued that it is a sense of ‘can’ with which the “ought implies can” principle
holds true.
To support the Main Argument I have woven together threads of
semantics, metaphysics, ethics, and even some epistemology. I found it
necessary to focus above all on the meanings of deontic words and the power-
‘can’. In doing this I considered various linguistic behaviors, including how
deontic words and the power-‘can’ are ordinarily used and not used, and how
they generally would be used and would not be used in various situations. I
found that many such linguistic behaviors conflict with compatibilism and
deontic compatibilism. In this way compatibilism and deontic compatibilism
189
conflict with common sense. Moreover, that conflict exists whether or not
determinism is true. In contrast, I believe incompatibilism and deontic
incompatibilism would only conflict with common sense if determinism were
true. And determinism is most probably false.
Once again, it has turned out that the solution to some persistent
philosophical problems depends largely on what certain words mean in
ordinary language. I have some mixed emotions about this finding. I feel some
disappointment because my initial interest in the debate developed out of
strong metaphysical and ethical concerns. However, I also feel satisfied with
achieving a modicum of discovery and resolution. The semantic evidence
advanced herein provides strong support for deontic incompatibilism.
Determinism and moral obligation are indeed incompatible.
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